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28 November 1983

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2239

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FOREIGN MINISTER ELLEMANN-JENSEN SEES SDP CONFRONTATION ON INF

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 6 Oct 83 p 4

[Article by Karen Jespersen: "Government Foresees Breakdown in Geneva and Confrontation with Social Democratic Party on Missiles"]

[Text] The Russians are out to profit politically by the split in Western Europe regarding the missiles, Foreign Affairs Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen believes; therefore, he has no faith in a solution to the talks in Geneva before NATO starts to deploy the nuclear missiles.

Foreign Affairs Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen does not have great confidence in possibilities of a truce with the Social Democratic Party regarding the security policy. On the contrary, he foresees that "serious political problems here at home" can arise because everything indicates that the talks in Geneva will not lead to any result before the deadline runs out in the middle of November, and that NATO will then begin to deploy the first nuclear warhead intermediate range missiles in Western Europe.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen thinks that it is the Soviet Union which in this case will be the cause of the breakdown, because they are aiming at cashing in on a political gain by the split and concern which the deployment of the first missiles will provoke in Western Europe.

Political Gain

"I still think that there is a negotiation situation in Geneva. But the Russians' rejection of Regan's [as published] latest move can make one suspect that deployment of NATO's intermediate range missiles must be over and done with before a real negotiation situation exists."

"That is, one has the impression that the Russians are waiting for deployment of the missiles to begin so they can cash in on the biggest possible political gain. They want to see what kind of political gain they can cash in on from the work of the freedom movements in Western Europe. What kind of political gain they can cash in on through the political split which has come between sides which up to now have been in agreement. It is this gain they quietly and calmly want to cash in on before they begin real negotiations."

The so-called INF negotiations in Geneva came about after NATO's two-track decision in December of 1979. The two-track decision is to the effect that NATO will deploy 572 nuclear warhead intermediate range missiles in Western Europe if a negotiated solution is not reached with the Soviet Union regarding reduction of their SS-20 intermediate range missiles. The negotiation deadline runs out in a good month, on 15 November, after which NATO will begin deployment of the new nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Truce with Social Democrats

[Question] The Liberal Party has talked about a "truce" with the Social Democratic Party on the security policy. Do you believe in the possibility of a compromise with the Social Democratic Party in the course of the fall?

[Answer] "This depends totally on what happens outside around the world. And I can well see that we will get into some serious political problems if it turns out that a negotiation result is not reached in Geneva. There is no doubt that with the frame of mind which exists in the countries which are to receive the first missiles--Italy and Great Britain--the missiles will come if a negotiation result is not reached. And this can then give us some problems here at home."

"The Social Democratic Party is affected also by what happens in the West German Social Democratic Party, and I would like to say quite frankly that I anticipate problems for the fall."

Rejection

The West German Social Democratic Party, the SPD, is holding a congress on 18-19 November. Here it is expected that the party will pass a no on NATO's nuclear missiles regardless of whether a negotiated solution has not been reached in Geneva. If this happens, the question is whether the Danish Social Democrats will follow suit.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen does not reckon that the Social Democratic Party will take part in a majority against the government before the end of November:

"My perception is that the Social Democratic Party does not have any desire to make this a domestic policy subject of controversy in the time to come. And it is also my perception that the desire is keep close watch over whether the government lives up to the letter to the resolution of 26 May, and if the government does, then there will be no desire to contribute to impeding the talks in Geneva."

Resolution of 26 May

The comments of the Social Democratic Party and Radical Liberal Party on the opening speech indicate that Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is right that there will not be any clash regarding the missiles before the end of November.

It is stated in the prime minister's opening speech that both the two-track decision and the resolution of 26 May, which the government was against, are part of the government's basis. Both the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberals regard this as compliance with the demand that the government take the resolution seriously.

The two parties are in reality disposed to remain waiting until the foreign affairs minister's visit to Moscow on 1 November has been completed and until there is clarification of the negotiations in Geneva. Therefore, the two inquiry debates the Social Democratic Party together with the Socialist People's Party and the Socialist Left Party has announced for October will probably not conclude with there being a majority for the resolution the Socialist People's Party wants to make regarding enjoining the government to "work actively" in behalf of the viewpoints in the resolution of 26 May.

[Question] Will the government accept the fact that a majority in the Folketing in the course of the fall defines the resolution so that the government is enjoined to "work actively" for its views?

[Answer] "I do not want to begin to comment on any motions for a resolution which have not been passed. But we did not like the resolution of 26 May, and I do not think that it has been beneficial for the talks in Geneva. But we have accepted living with it and we have lived up to it loyally until now and we intend to continue to do so. Those are the parliamentary terms."

In the resolution of 26 May a majority consisting of the Radical Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party and the Socialist Left Party enjoined the government to present demands that the Geneva talks be extended and that missiles are not to be deployed as long as talks are under way. In addition, the French and English intermediate range missiles are to be included in the talks and the zero solution is to be abandoned, i.e., "the first goal must be reductions of Soviet SS-20 missiles such that the deployment of Western missiles is avoided."

Other Possibilities

[Question] American SALT Negotiator Paul Wanke has, just as the resolution of 26 May, cautioned against the deployment of missiles while talks are under way in Geneva, because there is the possibility that new missiles will be deployed which constitute a threat. Is it not true that the deployment of NATO's nuclear missiles will impede the talks?

[Answer] "This I do not believe. And it is also not logical, because it is possible to take down what has once been deployed."

[Question] But it is at once more difficult, is it not?

[Answer] "No, it is precisely this which we are demanding of the Russians, and so we must ourselves, too, be disposed toward the same thing."

"But it is of course totally decisive that the talks in Geneva continue even though NATO begins to deploy the missiles."

[Question] Rumania's President Ceausescu, among other things, has proposed that the talks be extended a year without new missiles being deployed and that the Soviet Union at the same time begin unilateral reduction of its intermediate range missiles. Why not support this proposal rather than deploying new missiles?

[Answer] "This is an interesting proposal but it does not seem to have aroused interest in the Soviet Union. Just as the proposal from the famous walk in the woods between Nitze and Kvitsinsky has also not aroused interest."

[Question] It was first rejected by the USA, was it not?

[Answer] "This has not been made completely clear."

The Two-Track Decision

[Question] But the proposal is not more interesting than that the government and NATO are standing by the two-track decision?

[Answer] "When we enter the next phase then, regardless of what this phase will be, we must devote much thought to what the costs have been of developments around the two-track decision."

"I think that the same ought to be done in the East. The gain they score is perhaps short-term, because circles which previously were willing to negotiate arms reduction control with the Soviet Union are no longer, because they feel squashed by Soviet propaganda."

"But here in the West we must in any case consider whether the two-track decision was wrong. Have we lost on it here? Is our entire resolution system altogether focused on entering such a situation in which we say that we want to deploy missiles if we have not achieved a negotiation result? Shall we in the future instead say that now you have deployed something and so we have to deploy something equivalent before we can begin to negotiate?"

Stand Firm

"Regardless of whether the two-track decision was right or wrong, there is one thing that is important. That is to carry it out. If we show a totalitarian government like the Soviet that we are not energetic, this is fatal for future East-West relations."

[Question] Then you think that it is necessary to stand far more firm in negotiations with the Soviet Union than with a Western democratic country?

[Answer] "Yes, for it is completely different decision mechanisms you are facing."

"We must not be naive in our relations with the Soviet Union and above all not behave in a manner which makes them confused or causes them to doubt that we are in a position to carry out the resolutions which have once been made."

"Regardless of whether the two-track decision is right or wrong we must stand firm."

[Question] Then you are also risking locking the Soviet Union firmly in their negotiation position when NATO is standing so firmly on its initiative, are you not?

[Answer] "Yes, it is clear that there is this one risk. But the other risk is that you tempt them to undertake adventures."

[Question] Is this the explanation why, largely speaking, no real negotiation moves have come from the USA in the talks?

[Answer] "Let us turn this around and say what initiatives have the Russians made? A single one, and it is a propaganda move whereby they say that they want to have a number of missiles which they claim equals the French and English missiles, which means that they maintain a monopoly on intermediate range missiles. This is the only thing you have seen from that side."

Zero Solution

"But what have you seen from the other side? First there was the zero solution which should have been every peace activist's dream, because it means that there are not to be any intermediate range missiles at all."

"Then the zero solution was crushed by Soviet propaganda; then came the offer for an in-between solution, which states that agreement should be made regarding a suitable number of missiles on both sides which can counterbalance each other. When one speaks of this as an in-between solution, it is precisely because from this it is possible to go further with a zero solution."

"In the last move it goes like this: Well, you have expressed anxiety over bomb-carrying planes, you have expressed anxiety over a mixture of Pershings and Tomahawks, and you have been troubled by dismantling of Soviet bases in the Orient in return for something in Europe. On all these points we are complying with Soviet desires. Then, you have seen mobility on the part of the USA, which most recently has been expressed by quite specific compliance on some of the points raised by the Soviet Union."

[Question] The in-between solution is, as you express it yourself, just a variant of the zero solution which has been demanded all along. Where is the concession, then?

[Answer] "No, I am just saying that the in-between solution is something which can be negotiated for aiming at, in order thereafter to create a basis for continued negotiation which thereafter can be aimed at a form of zero solution."

"The zero solution is, as far as I see it, still the ideal, for then there is zero of this type of weapon on both sides. This should be the ideal. The Soviet Union says that this goes against their security and they want to keep this type of weapon. And then we say that then they must not have a monopoly on it. If they have a monopoly on intermediate range missiles then all the military and psychological problems will arise which Helmut Schmith [as published], for one, pointed toward in his time."

[Question] Former CIA Director William Colby, for one, supports a freeze on present nuclear arsenals on the grounds that the USA's retaliation capabilities against the Soviet Union are total. Why do you think that NATO's nuclear striking force is not sufficient to counter a possible nuclear attack by Soviet intermediate range missiles?

[Answer] "It is indeed. True enough, there is not a great difference in the balance of power when we look at the major power blocs in terms of one another."

"But the fear Helmut Schmith and others had at the end of the 70's is confirmed in reality by the many Americans—who certainly cannot be accused of being peace activists—who now support views like Colby's."

Political Pressure

"What led to the two-track decision was, namely, the fear of detachment of the USA from Europe. When the two-track decision was passed, it was not just because a new direct military threat had arisen. For of course it could of course be said [as published] that they have 'something big' over in the USA which they can hit the Russians on the head with if they use their intermediate range missiles."

"No, the two-track decision was passed because it was feared that if this new weapon was present only in the Soviet Union then it would mean detachment of the USA from Europe so that the USA, if the occasion should arise, would be more hesitant to use massive nuclear retaliation against SS-20's and that Western Europe in this way would become more exposed to political pressure from the Soviet Union. This was the European reasoning behind the two-track decision and it is just as valid today as then."

[Question] Is the opposite consideration not more logical, i.e., that the USA's intermediate range missiles in Europe, on the contrary, create real possibilities for a limited nuclear war in Europe, because NATO can be satisfied with the fact that intermediate range missiles [words missing] then the USA in any case will be kept out militarily?

[Answer] "No, this is a totally naive and unfounded consideration. With NATO's intermediate range missiles in Europe, on the contrary, any possibility of their being a nuclear war has been really destroyed. On the other hand, you are not risking a situation in which from one side with a limited-range weapon it is used as the basis for political pressure because it is known that the enemy will not use the 'big one' they have anyway."

[Question] Then you believe that it is realistic that the USA will twiddle its thumbs and watch the Soviet Union toss nuclear bombs at Western Europe?

[Answer] "No, but what we are talking about is also not the situation whereby they toss nuclear bombs at Europe. What we are talking about is the situation in which they threaten to do it and in which there is no sufficiently balancing counterthreat."

[Question] What kind of political pressure can the Soviet Union exert on Western Europe?

[Answer] "I do not like to speculate on clever scenarios in this regard. But we have experienced previously the fact that the Soviet Union was to gain specific concessions regarding Berlin, regarding individual border posts, etc. And they can more easily press concrete concessions out of the opposite side if they have a threat capability which cannot be counterbalanced by an opposing threat."

"It is to make up for the political balance that we must have intermediate range missiles."

[Question] But at the same time the West does not have its strategic weapons in the USA alone, but there are also advanced nuclear weapons placed on aircraft carriers, submarines and airplanes. Is this not a sufficient threat to the Soviet Union?

[Answer] "They are not nearly so accurate as land-based intermediate range missiles."

French and British

[Question] The Soviet Union has placed store in the fact that it is precisely the European context which is to be looked at and that the French and British missiles are to be counted in. This has been rejected out of regard for the fact that they are strategical weapons which are to be included in the START talks. But the British and French weapons have been implicated in neither the START nor in the earlier SALT talks, have they?

[Answer] "As late as last week France's President Mitterand and England's Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe brought attention in the UN to the fact that they have never refused to discuss their weapons in a larger context. But that the proper context for these is the START talks."

[Question] U.S. Secretary of State Bush [as published] has on the other hand just proposed that the French and British missiles be included in the INF talks in Geneva without the INF and START talks being combined.

[Answer] "No, he did not say this. There are some strange headlines which have been made for many articles on this statement. There is no doubt that

what Bush did state was that French and British are to be involved in the START talks on strategic nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it has been construed some places as though he wants to include the French and British missiles in the INF talks, and this is not what is in question."

[Question] The other reason that inclusion of the French and British missiles has been rejected is that they are purely national means of defense. But both France and England have signed the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the participants, in the central part of the document, declare that an attack on one member is an attack on all members and therefore the countries are to assist one another. Correspondingly, the two countries have bound themselves to mutual assistance as members of the Western European Union.

France Is Outside

[Answer] "France is not a participant in military cooperation in NATO. And since they signed the North Atlantic Treaty they have withdrawn, and the Western European Union has nothing to do with this matter."

"It is especially France which uses the argument that the missiles are exclusively a national defense force. But what is the totally essential argument is, of course, that the English and French missiles are mainly totally another kind of weapon."

"If you, for example, are to count in all the French and British submarine-based weapons, why should the Soviet submarine-based missiles, which, for one thing, are located in the Baltic Sea, not also be counted in?"

[Question] But why, then, not comply with the Russians' demand that the talks cover the combined nuclear strike force in Europe?

[Answer] "Yes, but then they are completely different negotiations. And both sides have accepted the fact that what we are negotiating on is a portion of the missiles on both sides. It is considered appropriate by both sides that land-based missiles be concentrated on now, also because there is a bigger opportunity to monitor whether agreements entered into are actually observed. And so, the picture only becomes confused if other missiles are brought in in this context. Even though it is possible, of course, to say, like Bush, that the INF and START are to be negotiated at the same time."

Compliant

[Question] You have said that Denmark must be loyal and not uncritically compliant toward our allies. What is really the difference between the government's attitude toward the negotiations and uncritical compliance?

[Answer] "It would be uncritically compliant if we as a matter of course swallowed everything which was said to us by our allies. This we are not doing. We are loyal by the fact that the discussions we are having with our allies are taking place in the forums suited for this, first and foremost, in

various agencies within NATO, where we discuss this type of thing. It would be disloyal to act out publicly and use the newspapers to present the critical viewpoints we have of our allies instead of doing this in, for example, the NATO Council Planning Group and in the NATO Council of Ministers."

[Question] Then, you do not as a matter of course agree with NATO's position?

[Answer] "Clearly I cannot answer this."

"But we are not uncritical, and both the in-between solution and Regan's [as published] last move were first presented in NATO's negotiation group, where we have had very thorough negotiations long before they were made public, which I regard as an expression of the fact that the USA is to an increasing extent interested in a negotiated solution."

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CSO: 3613/20

BRIEFS

SOVIET PRESS LAUDS PEACE MOVEMENT--NATO and Norway Were to Scare Danish Missile Opponents; Soviet Army Newspaper Warns Danish Peace Movement. Moscow, 4 October. "The last month Denmark has resembled a besieged fortress," the Soviet army's newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on Wednesday. The "Ampel [Hanging Lamp] Express" fall maneuver is a clear provocation, the newspaper writes, and by this certainly means a provocation directed against the Soviet Union. It is in part being carried out against the background of strong anti-Sovietism and in part it is so extensive, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes further, but however omits explaining why its size makes it a provocation. Is it because it is presumed that an attack with major forces against Denmark can only come from the Soviet Union? However, in addition the maneuver has another and more important purpose, i.e., to attempt to combat the anti-missile movement in Denmark, which, accordingly, in the opinion of the writer, Naval Captain Kuzar, would be easier when the country has been transformed into a "besieged fortress." And as though this should not be enough, NATO has sent two "envoys" to Denmark in order to break down resistance to the American missiles: One of them was the USA's Deputy Secretary of State Richard Pearle, and the other was Norway's Prime Minister Kaare Willoch. [By INFORMATION Correspondent Poul Hansen] [Excerpts] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 5 Oct 83 p 2] 8831

CSO: 3613/20

ARMY PUSH FOR CREATION OF OWN ANTITERRORIST UNIT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Oct 83 p 13

[Article by Carlos Yarnoz]

[Excerpts] Madrid--Senior officers of the army general staff are studying the possibility of establishing the army's own antiterrorist operational group, similar to those existing in other European countries like Great Britain, sources in the Ministry of Defense state. The plans to form this group are being analyzed by Maj Gen (Cavalry) Antonio Rodriguez Toquero. It is presently scheduled to be assigned to Army Headquarters, although the establishment of the unit has not yet been approved by Minister of Defense Narcis Serra. It is reported that he will soon make a decision on this matter.

Minister of the Interior Jose Barrionuevo announced last Wednesday [19 October], after the assassination of Capt Martin Barrios, that new antiterrorist steps would be taken, including an increase in systems of self-protection for members of the armed forces. The principal mission of the antiterrorist unit, if the government approves the proposal, would consist in providing security and protection to army commands and to the principal offices of the Ministry of Defense. In parallel fashion appropriate efforts were begun several months ago in the office of the minister to strengthen the intelligence services with responsibility for the antiterrorist area.

Through the implementation of these and other steps some of the army commands are attempting to move from simple security and passive protection of military personnel to a more active attitude to deal with the terrorist phenomenon.

Studies of the antiterrorist operational unit began several years ago, but the idea has gained strength in view of the recent escalation of activity by the ETA and especially since the assassination of Captain Martin. Nevertheless, in some circles of the Ministry of Defense itself it was stated yesterday [24 October] that in principle the concept should be studied in depth to determine in concrete terms the mission of the future unit. At the same time

these circles stated that the initial army plan "could go beyond the role of the armed forces in this area."

Last year Maj Gen Antonio Rodriguez Toquero was chief of the Center for Information and Social Defense Relations [CRISDE]. In February 1983 he was designated for assignment to the army general staff, where he prepared a broad plan to provide security and protection for the principal general officers of the army.

South Africa and Formosa

Under this plan, which has been in effect for several months, these protective services are provided by members of the Special Attack Unit (UEI) of the Civil Guard, who escort the generals, at times on motorcycles. The members of the UEI are entrusted with confirming or changing the daily movements of the generals, as well as controlling access to and the vicinity of their homes. It has been arranged that in the next few months the principal commands will also have armored automobiles, which they presently lack.

Over the past several years Maj Gen Rodriguez Toquero has specialized in antiterrorist operations. During the time he was assigned to the Civil Guard he set up a broad plan for self-protection of members of the Civil Guard assigned to the Basque provinces. In the same way, and in order to expand his knowledge of the subject, he made several visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, Taiwan, and South Africa. In fact he was in South Africa when the attempted coup d'etat of 23 February 1981 took place. Some sources have related in part the army's intention to establish its own antiterrorist unit to the visit to South Africa in September of Lieutenant General Ascanio, who on that occasion was accompanied by Maj Gen Rodriguez Toquero.

5170

CSO: 3548/71

PVV'S DE CROO ON COALITION, PERSONAL VIEWS

Brussels L'EVENEMENT in French Oct 83 pp 22-23

[Interview with Herman De Croo, Liberal minister of Communications and the PTT [Posts, Telephones and Telegraph] by Jean-Claude Ricquier: "Herman De Croo: Armed with Wit"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] If you had to choose one word to describe Herman De Croo, you might say he is the happiest of our politicians. In any case, that is the impression he gives everyone, and he certainly must be happy that it is so. He is cheerful, relaxed, cordial and more entertaining than skeptical; he is a brilliant orator who makes no use of sarcasm, probably because he has no meanness in him. He does not take himself seriously or anything tragically. Herman De Croo has become an "unavoidable" figure in this country's political life. As long as the PVV [Freedom and Progress Party [Flemish]] is in the government, it is impossible to imagine his not being a minister. Unlike many of his colleagues in parliament, he does not owe this privilege to unyielding stands or unswerving loyalties. He is a Fleming accepted by the Walloons and is as much at home among the Social Christians as among the Socialists; Herman De Croo is a free man and a man of freedom. This means more to him than anything. Every election shows that public opinion is grateful to him for it.

Jean-Claude Ricquier: Mister minister, the government has achieved most of the things it has set out to do, and public opinion is aware of that. But the government seems to be constantly threatened. Could it be that the segment of public opinion that supports the government gives credit only to the liberal group for its successes?

Herman De Croo: Oh, I think you are very optimistic! Unfortunately, the government does not succeed in doing everything it tries to do. You know Jacques Monod's book, "Chance and Necessity." Well, the present government is the result of chance and necessity. First, because only this coalition was possible in December 1981. Second, because most of the ministers, of which there are only 15, are men of stature: former party presidents such as Messrs Gol, DeClerq and Nothomb, or former prime ministers such as Messrs Tindemans or Eyskens. For the first time in a very long time the government has been able to cut itself loose from the mothers-in-law in the political parties. The parties have seized the opportunity to change their leaders and presidents. So the government has gotten off to a good start with its members.

On the other hand, the economic and financial situation was awful. That is what made it decide to devalue the currency, something that had not been done in Belgium since 1949. In the same breath it obtained special powers from parliament. It was hard to do that, because you may recall that both the CVP [Christian Social Party [Flemish]] and the PSC [Christian Social Party [Walloon]] had just been routed in the elections. I also want to pay them a debt of gratitude here, because it took real courage to join the government under those conditions. In that connection I want to pay homage particularly to Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, whom I recently visited in the hospital in Louvain; I told him, "To become prime minister in Belgium, you have to be a CVP, a union man and Flemish, but to remain prime minister, you have to be less of a CVP, less of a union man, and less Flemish." He laughed at that, but it is true that his moderation and desire to be an honest arbiter won him a great fund of confidence. Let's not forget that we were taking over from a Socialist government whose Socialist ministers were on strike. Right here in the Communications ministry I found that Mr Valmy Feaux's files had not been opened in 6 months. The public does not know about that, of course, and that is why it would like us to get more immediately tangible results. But the old farmer that I am knows that when you plant an apple tree you're really doing well if you get fruit 3 years later. So we are trying to get people out of the habit of impatience.

[Question] Shortly before the present cabinet was formed, you openly called for a Socialist-Liberal team. Did you clearly see what points of agreement you could have reached with Messrs Van Miert and Spitaels, when it is undeniable that the PVV [Freedom and Progress Party [Flemish]] and the PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] are their bugbears?

[Answer] The problem was not phrased in those terms. In November 1981, for the first time since 1954, several alternatives were available for forming a government. We Liberals had 52 representatives in the Chamber, and there were 61 representatives for the Social Christians and Socialists. We had political strength comparable to that of the other two traditional parties. We controlled the game, and we had the tactical possibility of proposing an alternative that would have excluded the Social Christians, who had been in power for 24 years. I might say in passing that that might not have been bad for them. I merely pointed out that a political alternative existed: a Socialist-Liberal alliance. But I admit I was pretty much alone in my party. The party even took me to task in a memorandum that some of my friends did not want to have released to the public. I, on the contrary, demanded that it be published, and I even committed the same offense again in an article in MORGEN on the Friday after the elections in order to show that my statement was no mistake. To my surprise, Karel Van Miert then rejected my proposal, thus torpedoing at once an alliance with us or a three-cornered alliance; if he didn't want us, he didn't want us with the others, either. In that way he practically forced the Social Christians into a government with us. I still think I made a tactically sound move at the time. I should add that I was a bit worried about the PSC then; I was afraid it wouldn't hold up, that

it would go "belly up" as we say in politics, because it had been burned so badly by its disaster at the polls. That was not the case. The party is making a courageous attempt to survive; of course, the PRL is making life hard for them because they, the PRL, are looking more and more like a credible alternative to the PS [Socialist Party] in Wallonia, but I admit my fears were unfounded that a kind of ghost PSC might enter the government. And, finally, my nudging the Socialists had another purpose: I wanted to find out whether they still had broad-minded men capable of imposing a crisis government on their own ranks. I was really disappointed. The Flemish Socialists have become quite unrealistic, and as for Guy Spitaels, I do not understand his jumping the gun, as it were, 10 years late, in favor of hyperfederalism. He was already rather late in realizing he was a socialist, but he was even later in realizing he was a Walloon. In short, I am not sorry I made that overture to the Socialists, but I am happy it was turned down.

[Question] Don't you think that a government that brings together the Liberal and Christian groups is generally more fragile than any other by virtue of the fact that these groups share some of the same voters?

[Answer] Your question is an appropriate one; it is true that both parties are plowing a part of the same field. But I would say that that is happening in a new context. The Liberals are no longer a small party. Indeed, it is not widely known that the second largest party in the country is not the PS but the PVV, even though the French-speaking Socialists have 8 seats more than we in the Chamber of Deputies with 10,000 fewer votes. This rather embarrassing situation in our parliamentary democracy is due to the fact that foreigners do not have the right to vote but are counted in the constituencies that determine the number of deputies, which works out in favor of Wallonia. That means we have become a popular party, and I see that a large share of the CVP voters are attracted by the PVV's doctrinal renewal, its seriousness and accomplishments. In a way, we are now carrying out the people's program that Omer Vanaudenhove started in his own time. It is as true on the Walloon side as it was for Brussels [Brussels Rally [RB]] after the debilitating misadventure of the alliance with the FDF [Democratic French-Speaking Front].

[Question] Ever since universal suffrage took effect in 1919 there have never been so many Liberals in parliament as there are now. To what do you attribute this popularity, which has made your political group a force comparable to the two large traditional parties?

[Answer] The basic reason is the declericalization of Belgian political life. That process is the result of action by Liberal politicians of the 1960's and 70's, such as Messrs Vanaudenhove, Motz, De Clerq, Descamps, Henrion, and many others, including myself. After 120-odd years of sectarian cleavage, we have succeeded in pulling the country out of it. Now, you must understand that the religious people were very happy that we were anticlerical, because as long as we were, the Catholic voters were not fully aware that the Christian Social Party's economic and social program was just a sieve. Let me point out that this declericalization has also taken place in the FDF and Volksunie [People's Union] parties. Suddenly all these voters started thinking and voting "politically."

You have to see, too, that by a strange turnabout the common union front is the greatest weakener of the Christian Social parties. Now try and explain to the devout little voter that the Liberals are very wicked while he sees his Christian unionist flirting openly with the Socialist "antichrist"! Another reason for the Liberals' success in Belgium is the exasperation of public opinion at the omnipresence of the state. In this respect we are somewhat the children of May 1968, which admittedly had a lot of different shades of opinion, but one of them was the struggle against the Moloch state. For too long, people had the impression that they were on the dole or even paralytics for whom the state had to provide everything. Well, the state failed miserably at that. Hence the general movement away from state control, except for what some hard-core Socialists are doing in Spain and France.

All that has made our party a popular one rather than a party of the elite, as some people rather foolishly used to say it was. Do you know that proportionally I am the Belgian politician who has the largest number of preference votes? If my district were in Brussels, I would have about 200,000 votes. Finally, we have remained a party of public opinion, while the other two large parties have become what churches become when faith is lacking: they are only hollow shells, like the Labour Party in England, and their members of parliament are only timid representatives.

[Question] You are one of the rare Liberal ministers in these times who has a portfolio with broad social implications. Is this a deliberate choice on your part?

[Answer] Oh yes, quite so, as much as one can choose a portfolio, of course. It depends on the negotiations that lead to the formation of a government. But I clearly said that I wanted Communications. For a long time I had been afraid of being cast as the one-and-only specialist in National Education. Beginning in 1980 I succeeded in getting the PTT and Pensions. I then became the "shadow minister" of Public Works, Communications, etc. in my party. When this government was born, there had been no Liberal minister in this department for 47 years; since Pierre Forthomme in 1934. I saw that the management had been disastrous: the conditions of Railroads and Sabena [Belgian World Airlines] was evidence enough. I thought it was high time to correct the situation. Furthermore, what I like about my present job is that it requires that everything really work. Obviously, you can make reforms in Interior, Finance or Justice, but here the trains have to run, the planes have to fly, the ports have to operate; I like the practical, tangible nature of my responsibilities. Let me add that Communications is on the border between the public and private sectors; I wanted to see whether, under the circumstances, a more liberal administration might not do better than one with a high level of government control. That is why, as soon as I arrived, I launched the concept of cost effectiveness, which was something completely unknown to my predecessors. Thus I am carrying out a policy that stresses productivity, where we try to do more with less or with as much as before. Since I have become minister, there are already 10,000 people fewer in this department, and this has been achieved through a normal process of attrition; as you can see, nothing has collapsed. There are 1,000 people fewer at

Sabena than in 1981; not only is it still flying but it is even beginning to earn a little money! And you are still getting your mail even though there are 2,000 fewer people in the Post Office. That is what I wanted to demonstrate: with cost effectiveness and people's motivation you can get excellent results and still keep costs down. That is why I intend to continue in this direction.

[Question] You have had occasion to proclaim, though a bit tongue in cheek, that you would not be averse to having Sabena disappear. Haven't the good results achieved by our national company made you change your mind on this subject?

[Answer] When I came to Communications, I called in Mr Van Rafelghem and told him, "When you accepted your mission you promised that Sabena would get out of the red within 5 years. Well, that's not the way things have been going." Indeed, in the preceding years, Sabena had lost 3.5 billion francs a year, which is more than its registered capital! It was bankrupt. And it was not for lack of calling on experts. If I put on my desk all the reports that have been written to get Sabena out of trouble, we wouldn't be able to see over them! When I came here, I purely and simply cancelled the 1.3 billion-franc subsidy. The administrators were a bit taken aback, and they came to see me, and I told them, "You know the law: administrators who cover up for a virtually bankrupt company are liable and can be prosecuted." The next day I sent a confirmation of this message in writing. So they understood that this time something had to be done. Here is what was done: salaries were cut by 17 percent, except for those earning less than 30,000 francs. The early retirement age was set at 55, even for pilots, something nobody had ever dared do before. And a deliberately aggressive commercial policy was launched. I got all that through special powers. Despite union opposition, the salary reductions were voted in by a majority of 68 percent. If that had not been done, I tell you plainly I would have let the company go bankrupt. No way was I bluffing; I was completely determined, and let me add that in this office everything was prepared for that eventuality. Is Sabena out of the woods yet? It is too early to tell, but I sincerely believe it is capable of taking off, and I will personally do everything I can to help it.

[Question] What is your policy on guaranteeing the privacy of telephone communications?

[Answer] I am asked that question every time I turn around. Everywhere I hear that this or that line is under surveillance or "tapped," as they say. In this respect I am absolutely strict, even brutal. I think that a state that can penetrate the private life of its citizens, the private part of our life that is indispensable to our mental and psychological homogeneity, is a police state on the skids towards political dictatorship. I will not have this kind of state at any price. I would fight it till my dying breath.

Having said that, there is the problem of a legal decision concerning surveillance. Let me explain right away that even an examining magistrate cannot listen in on a telephone conversation. All he can do, when it is technically possible, is obtain the name of the person called, that is, the person you have called, not the one who called you. And to let you know how attentive I am to this issue, I have had Jean Gol's bill amended, the one dealing with the prohibition of privacy, by including a provision forbidding an examining magistrate to make a unilateral decision and to set indefinite terms in this matter. The judge must now make the decision in the Chamber of Counsel, that is, with the concurrence of other magistrates who will share collegially in setting the duration of the action. I am well aware of these magistrates' heavy responsibility when they have to choose between the protection of privacy and preventing a terrorist attack or an assassination. But, as far as I am concerned, I think I have done all that can be done to protect privacy in this country.

[Question] You have known two prime ministers in your career in government: Messrs Tindemans and Martens. Are the two men very different in filling that office?

[Answer] Outwardly and on first sight, not very. They are both quite aware of the fact that a prime minister must be an arbiter and that he must therefore keep his distance from his own group. Both Mr Tindemans and Mr Martens are very respectful of everybody's opinions and give every minister the right and time to express himself as he wishes. When the Socialists are not in the government, cabinet relations are most courteous, because individual opinions in no way spoil personal relations. Having said that, Mr Tindemans is an excellent negotiator and a skillful diplomat; he has a tendency to let problems work themselves out with all their nuances until a majority solution can be reached, one that is preferably but not necessarily his own. On the other hand, Mr Martens hitches himself more directly to the plow and even unhitches himself a bit when he sees that his solution is not going to win out, even though he has to get back in harness 3 weeks later. I think, then, that he is more persevering when it comes to putting across what he thinks is the best viewpoint, while Mr Tindemans seems to me more inclined to join the opinion of the majority.

[Question] How do you think of yourself personally as a politician?

[Answer] I am a staunch independent. And what I try to make myself most independent of, is myself. That is a very profound motive, and my whole life has been marked by it. I studied humanities in French at Mons, under the Jesuits. Then I studied law at the ULB [Free University of Brussels]. It was not out of a spirit of contradiction but of freedom, which I define as the power to sober yourself up. I forbid myself to be ambitious, or in any case to be the prisoner of an ambition. I could leave power tomorrow without regret. I would go back to practicing law, to my parents' orchards, or to teaching at the VUB [ULB]. I would have no trouble at all in doing so; I have overwhelming confidence in Herman De Croo. Having said that, I love what I am doing here. That is why I often say I am not working, in the sense that I have to. The 70 hours a week I spend in my office is not work for me, it's a passion. During my whole childhood I was rickety and sickly until one day I decided I was fed up with it; I have not been sick for a single day since then in 27 years. Now that's something to make you optimistic, isn't it? And I am also optimistic for Belgium.

I do not believe all these prophets of doom who predict some kind of right- or left-wing dictatorship. The Right is stupid; the Left is generous, but it is not very smart either.. What we have to be careful of is that our democracy remain effective and responsible. A democratic government is one in which the men to whom power has been freely given must be accountable for their actions to the voters. People must have the power to get rid of them if they are not satisfied. As a corollary, political power plays its rightful role when it acts with determination or even authority. Without that, without the real exercise of power, democracy is devalued and, with it, freedom. And, as you might suppose, freedom is one of the few things that I would take up arms to defend..

8782

CSO: 3619/7

DETENTION OF LIBYANS DURING SHARON VISIT CREATES INCIDENT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct 83 p 6

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] The government is attempting to solve the diplomatic crisis between Libya and Denmark that arose 14 days ago when Danish police arrested eight Libyans for security reasons when Ariel Sharon visited Copenhagen. Housing Minister Niels Bollmann's diplomatic mission coincides with a major equestrian competition in which top Danish riders are involved.

Today in Tripoli Housing Minister Niels Bollmann (Center-Democrat) will express regret to Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi for the groundless arrest of eight Libyan citizens by Danish police last Friday. The arrests occurred at the Hotel Scandinavia in conjunction with former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to Copenhagen.

Diplomatic Crisis

The arrests, which occurred on the afternoon of 31 September, caused a minor diplomatic crisis between Denmark and Libya. Among other things, visas for travel to Libya have been affected and complaints were made to the Danish Foreign Ministry through official channels.

The crisis occurred at a time when many sports figures were preparing to travel to Libya for a major equestrian competition. A number of top industrial leaders also had been invited to participate in the ceremonies at the event. Even then, before the arrests, the Danish government had agreed to let the housing minister represent the government.

Important Talks

The Foreign Ministry told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that Niels Bollmann would explain to Libyan authorities that the Danish police were always on the highest alert when prominent people visit Denmark. At the same time, he will hold important talks on economic and trade problems with officials in Tripoli.

Denmark often sends government representatives to countries in which it is primarily the state that negotiates with Danish companies. Danish exports to Libya total about 300 million kroner annually.

No Problems

The largest Danish project in Libya, construction of a dairy and poultry center called Danfarm 70 km south of Tripoli, has remained unaffected by Libyan anger over the arrests in Copenhagen. Sources at Danfarm Contractors-Hojgaard & Schultz, Atlas and the consulting firm Danagro which are responsible for the 1.5 billion kroner project, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the project had encountered no problems.

The project is slightly behind schedule, but this has nothing to do with the current crisis.

The fact that the directors of the Danish companies involved in the Danfarm project had no problem obtaining visas for Libya shows that this project is extremely important to Libya. These industrial leaders traveled to Tripoli the other day along with the Danish and Swedish riders and their horses.

Our Four Best

The equestrian competition in Libya begins tomorrow and will continue for 6 days. Riders from 22 nations will participate in this world-class competition.

Four of the best riders from Denmark will participate. They are N. K. Hansen, Hasse Hoffmann, Per H. Hansen, and Hanne Lis Nielsen. The tour of these sportsmen is led by Niels Ulrich Pedersen of the Sportsrideklubben. The chairman of the Danish Riding Association, Svend Aage Birk Jakobsen is also with the group. There is a possibility of a return visit by the Libyan team to the spring derby in Denmark.

9336

CSO: 3613/29

STALINIST PRESS ORGAN COMMENTS ON KOIVISTO'S U.S. VISIT

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 29 Sep 83 p 2

Editorial: 'The Presidents' Speeches'

Text In the speeches given when the presidents of Finland and the U.S. were meeting two points have been given more emphasis than others. The first one is the lack of problems that characterizes the relationship between our countries and the other one is the acknowledgement of Finland's neutrality made by the U.S. highest leadership. Both of these thoughts have been received with acceptance by Finland's president. How else would it be.

In regard to the lack of problems, two countries could hardly have greater and more serious problems than Finland and the U.S. It is acknowledged that Finland's standpoint is that of peaceful coexistence in all directions, while the U.S. hardly hates anything as much as slackening of tension and peaceful coexistence. In declaring the lack of problems in the relationship President Reagan wants to bring Finland along into his actions that are shocking the world, for example, in the Near East and in Central America--if not exactly as a participant, then at least into a neutral position in these matters. The exaggerated praise of Finland's neutrality is needed precisely for this purpose.

The presence of problems in the relations between Finland and the U.S. is especially emphasized by the fact that these countries have different approaches to the slackening of tension. In the U.S. view the slackening of tension is only a means to endanger the privileges that the U.S. have in the world, while again Finland's attitude is--and its own experience supports this--that the slackening of tension is the only strategy that makes sense and besides the only possible strategy for the securing of peace in the world.

It is thus extremely misleading to talk about the lack of problems in the relationship between Finland and the U.S. whether this should have been said straight out to Reagan, is again a completely different matter. That matter in this case is entirely up to President Koivisto. Naturally it is always possible to wish that Finland's foreign policies that are based on the YYA Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Agreement would be explained to everybody and why not especially to Reagan in as clear wordings as possible.

In regard to neutrality itself, one has to understand why Reagan is understanding. Right now Reagan needs Finland's neutrality for the purpose that Finland would at least be quiet, if not even supportive when the U.S. are getting ready to place missiles in Europe. Here we see once again how slippery the whole neutrality is.

It is an especially big mistake that Finland has not taken an official stand against Euro-missiles, as Kekkonen did almost 6 years ago against cruise missiles. It is hardly possible for anybody to claim that the Euro-missile matter is such a super-power conflict that would require that Finland be "neutral." It is not known so far whether President Koivisto even expressed his personal opinion against Euro-missiles. That is the least that should have been done, thus uncovering the neutrality praised by Reagan.

9662

CSO: 3617/23

STALINIST PAPER ON KOIVISTO'S SPEECH TO UN

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 4 Oct 83 p 2

[Editorial: "President's Standpoint"]

[Text] There was a very well considered point about Finland's neutrality policies in the speech that President Koivisto presented to the United Nations.

This point is very important because especially in the area of the neutrality matter many games have been played and the fundamental meanings and goals of Finland's foreign policies have often been described in a harmful manner.

President Koivisto said that "Finland is able to practice active neutrality policies that aim to support a peaceful development."

Herein lies, of course, the eternal irreconcilable conflict of neutrality policies. To be neutral, but supportive of peace. Such a thing is not possible in the world. But this conflict is actually considerably alleviated by the goal itself: to be neutral in order to maintain peace. Herein lies the goal that is part of neutrality and that exceeds the limits of neutrality: peace. Peace, on the other hand, cannot be obtained with neutrality, a fact that has been proven thousands of times both in practice and in theory.

President Koivisto's position in regard to neutrality deviates thus both in terms of its nature as well as its practical ability to function from the neutrality represented by Jakobson, for example. That neutrality, as we all know, always brings up the issue of neutrality in important matters concerning peace, whereby such a neutrality is instantly lumped together with matters with which one cannot take issue without being cursed with finlandization.

Now the standpoint of the President of the Republic clearly deviates from this stand and hopefully it is taken seriously in the world, particularly by the U.S.

Finland supports peace and the international acknowledgement of Finland's neutrality policies certainly does not mean that the international acknowledgement would here mean the same as the support of the U.S. Euro-missile plans.

While the final information is still missing it seems right now that in important matters Koivisto has performed well. The Finnish people are ready to believe that.

JAKOBSON DISCUSSES NEW BOOK ON TIES WITH USSR, NORDICS, UN

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 30 Sep 83 p 16

Interview with Max Jakobson by Inger Jagerhorn: "Opinions Can No Longer Be Directed From The Top"

Excerpts Max Jakobson, one of our internationally known personalities, is 60 years old today. Now serving as spokesman for industry and consensus policy, he has worked as a journalist and diplomat.

In an interview for HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, he examines the changes in our society and policies, the relaxation of the hold exercised by organizations on their members, the mass media that more and more create "their own events," and the attempt to strengthen the UN through organizational reforms.

Max Jakobson was sitting in a cream-colored, very attractive living room in Skatudden with a view onto the Uspenski Cathedral, sipping his coffee and resisting the urge to smoke a cigarette.

Jakobson "The climate has changed in our country. It would be going too far to claim that debate has become more open, but it has acquired a more nuanced character. One doesn't so easily brand people as advocates of one thing or another.

"This is not only because the Urho Kekkonen era is over. We Finns have a tendency to be too compliant. But after such a long period with a domineering president, changes are inevitable.

"A truly structural change has occurred in our political life.

"The People's Front Policy has collapsed. This was to be anticipated, but it happened sooner than expected."

Green Problem

"One problem of the center is to adapt to a situation with new social trends, trends which do not fit the traditional left-right spectrum.

"The Greens--the 'meek ones'--are dominating the debate. Here it can also be seen how the role of the mass media has changed. Now they don't merely report; they create their own events and exercise a more active influence on opinions than before. The mass media have even assumed a role that is more independent of institutions, parties and property owners. They are no longer simply a mirror.

"A good example is the fact that the Greens are accorded a greater importance by the mass media than their numbers would justify."

Jagerhorn "Isn't it good that the press is focusing on the new things going on in society?"

Jakobson "It's sometimes overdone. But it is good to have an independent press, although it can lead to problems and excesses."

Jagerhorn "What sort of excesses?"

Jakobson "In reporting corruption, the press has been too careless in branding certain people prematurely, before the court has addressed the questions. Stricter rules are needed here, self-discipline."

Jagerhorn "How do things stand with the press's self-discipline in foreign policy? Has it broken down there too?"

Jakobson "No, the press has been very responsible there."

"The 1980's will bring changes that are still hard to define. Opinion cannot be formed from the top as before. The organizations don't have the same power over the masses. People have become independent and critical, which of course is positive. But society's governing institutions must be developed so that they can satisfy the new demands of a better educated and informed public. We will have problems until this happens."

Jagerhorn "Who do you mean by 'we'?"

Jakobson "Well, society. We have experienced a positive and calm development--almost idyllic. It might be getting harder now to maintain a consensus, a unified line. The decisive factor here has been that the major parties and union leaders have been able mutually to wage a very sound and prudent policy. I believe they will continue to do this. The question is whether they can get their members to follow."

Jagerhorn "Is it possible that the members don't think that the consensus policy has been protecting their interests?"

Jakobson "The consensus policy has benefited all citizens. But certain demands and wishes are surrendered for the sake of compromise. That is in the nature of things."

"Waging consensus politics is like playing the accordion. You have to expand it now and then to let it breathe air. We've reached a point in time now where it's necessary to loosen the grip a little.

"Today in Sweden we are seeing a hard confrontation. It is unnatural, for it does not reflect the opinion of the people. The people are not divided into 49 percent of the population against the other 51 percent. Agreement in fact exists, but there are squabbles over merely marginal questions. The confrontations are created by the system, and that is unfortunate."

Jagerhorn "Are the employee funds a marginal question too?"

Jakobson "That is the one exception. In the public's opinion, employee funds involve a structural change in society itself."

Jagerhorn "Can that happen here too?"

Jakobson "There's hardly any chance of that so far. The Social Democrats are waiting to see what happens in Sweden. What happens there is very important for us."

The Role of the United Nations

Jagerhorn "The Scandinavian countries are trying to enhance the role of the United Nations in world affairs. Is this possible?"

Jakobson "Actually, it's not possible to strengthen the UN position by means of organizational reforms. This attempt is being made for lack of something better, and it is politically useful for small nations to stress the importance of the United Nations. But scarcely anything can come of it.

"It is the major power's lack of interest in using the United Nations that put the organization on the shelf in international politics. During the next period of detente, people will rediscover its usefulness.

"But the United Nations can never stand outside of power politics. The UN is resorted to if the various parties of a crisis have need of it. And each crisis is unique in one way or another."

Jagerhorn "Is the UN doomed to failure in the Middle East?"

Jakobson "The UN is of no use in Lebanon. This is partly because the Israelis mistrust it because it is dominated by states which are unfriendly to Israel."

Urho Kekkonen is the principal personality in Max Jakobson's new book.

He was perhaps at his best in those years [late 1930s]. Max Jakobson believes that the book could offer new points of view, for example, on relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time when Finland's policy of neutrality came under review.

Jakobson "I don't think that these questions have been treated against the background of the international order. But it's hard for me personally to see what is new in the book. That's for someone else to decide."

Jagerhorn "Finland's foreign policy line remains firm. But has the manner of handling foreign policy changed?"

Jakobson "With Kekkonen no longer directing foreign policy in his personal manner, a change is clearly inevitable. It is inconceivable that anyone else would operate in the same manner. And Koivisto has recently assumed a different attitude. The situation has become normalized and the assignment of roles is more in keeping with our conventional system. Kekkonen paid the system no heed."

Finland's Role

Jagerhorn "Is Finland too active on the international scene today, or too passive?"

Jakobson "We are well represented in the context of the United Nations, but we should be more active in less political and dramatic contexts. The UN has many important economic and technical organizations in which too few Finns are included. These can represent our point of view and also make Finland better known. Our industry and trade have begun to enter the international market.

"Where will all the young men and women come from who can manage this? Many more people are needed who can speak foreign languages--others in addition to English."

9992

CSO: 3650/16

SKDL SOCIALISTS, STALINISTS CLASH IN HELSINKI DISTRICT CP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Oct 83 p 9

Text The SKDL Finnish People's Democratic League district secretary is being fired, because he is considered politically unreliable by those who demand that he be fired. The Socialists of the SKDL are the ones who in the loudest manner are demanding that District Secretary Reijo Kallinen (Communist) be fired.

The firing matter was discussed during the past week by the SKDL Helsinki district commission. The demand that he be fired was, however, brought up so suddenly that the matter was left pending with a 10-2 vote. The district commission will consider the matter again 13 October.

It is said that the person who is especially pushing for the firing of Kallinen is the SKDL union council chairman Kalevi Kilpi. He is said to have accused Kallinen of, among other things, putting his name on the SKP's Finnish Communist Party so-called third line plea a couple of years ago. Kallinen had, according to Kilpi, opposed Kalevi Kivisto's presidential candidacy and besides Kallinen has an "inappropriate political conviction" and "he uses his time more on the SKP than on the SKDL matters."

It is said that Kilpi demands that Kallinen be fired, because Kallinen's conviction cannot be changed by means of a district commission decision. It is said that Kallinen answered that he himself intends to quit because of such political accusations.

On Friday District Secretary Kallinen did not want to comment on the demand that he be fired "because the handling of the matter is not finished and it is a matter of such fundamental issues that cannot be solved with a court-house mentality." "The solution is in the hands of the district commission members," said Kallinen. He has been the SKDL Helsinki district secretary for 4 years.

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CSO: 3617/23

DISTRICT SECRETARY QUIT OVER CP PRESS DISPUTE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Oct 83 p 8

Text The Helsinki district of the Finnish Communist Party wants to fire its district secretary. On Sunday the district committee presented to the central committee of the party the wish that district secretary Ismo Kuivala "be freed from his task."

Behind the wish to fire him is the party's press matter. District secretary Kuivala has supported, as a solution to make the party more solid, the proposed founding of a new daily newspaper for the SKP Finnish Communist Party.

The Helsinki district of the SKP which is under the control of the majority has been against the press solution. The district organization has recently also in other issues taken a more drastic position in regard to the minority than the supreme leadership of the party.

The district committee told about the intention to fire District Secretary Kuivala with a brief communication, which only states the presence of "great conflicts." The final decision will be made by the central committee, whose next meeting will be at the end of November.

The firing of the district secretary has also been demanded during the past few days in the Helsinki district organization of the SKDL Finnish People's Democratic League.

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CSO: 3617/23

STALINIST PAPER COMMENTS ON HELSINKI DISTRICT DISPUTE

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 12 Oct 83 p 2

[Editorial: "SKP's Opposition"]

[Text] Two very closely related incidents describe the difficulties of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. The SKDL's [Finnish People's Democratic League] socialist leader recently conjured up a new party with the clear goal to break down the SKP. A couple of days ago the Helsinki district of the SKP decided to fire its district secretary in order to strengthen the SKP and on account of differences concerning the press matter. One threat to break down the party thus stemmed from the Socialists and the other one from those who represent the axing policy and are nestled inside the SKP.

Although these two incidents--there are indeed others--show that the joint goal of the Socialists and those who represent the axing policy line is to make the situation of the SKP difficult and to break it down to the extent that the "serious possibility" for the formation of a new party--desired by Alenius--would open up.

It all started in Lapland. Now it is becoming a reality in Helsinki. But the ranks of those who want to destroy the SKP are not tight and so far they are still followed by a lot of such SKP people who do not support the breakdown of the party at all.

The increase in the efforts to break down the party is linked to the preparation of those who represent the axing line for the 20th SKP Delegate Meeting. It forebode the unification of SKP's interior and exterior forces in order to repress the efforts to make the SKP more solid. This has been specially speeded up by the example in Lapland on one hand, and on the other by the press solution as a counter measure.

The Socialists who support Alenius consider the press solution a very bad fateful matter for themselves. If the press solution would become a reality it would, by giving the SKP its own paper and thereby a strong possibility to become solid, it would at the same time weaken SKP's opposition forces, such as the Lapland separatists and the majority of the Helsinki district committee.

Thus the extremely alarming condition of the SKP is still telling us how the party's chances of becoming stronger are increasing, which the opposition forces of the party want to repress.

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST PARTY STARTING WEEKLY--The weekly paper of the Communist Party will begin to appear under the name of YHTEISTYÖ [Cooperation]. The leadership of the paper decided on the name on Wednesday, after the matter had been handled by the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] political commission. This year the paper will be published as three sample issues in editions of 100 issues. On a regular basis once a week the SKP paper will begin to be issued in the beginning of next year. The final decision about the destiny of the paper and the number of times it will be published will be made by the SKP delegate meeting in May. The decision on the name of the weekly paper was made by the leadership of the paper, the chairman of which is Erkki Kivimäki and vice chairman Taisto Sinisalo. Kivimäki belongs to the SKP majority and Sinisalo to the minority wing. [Text] [Helsinki] HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Oct 83 p 1 [I] 9662

CSO: 3617/23

PCF MEMBERS CRITICIZE PARTY POLICIES, STRATEGIES

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Aug 83 pp 651-678

[Article by Jacques Derville and Patrick Lecomte: "The French Communist Party in Its Supporters' Mirror: A Contrasting Image"; article recapitulates report presented to the European Political Research Consortium, Fribourg, March 1983]

[Text] During the 1970's, the French Communist Party was the subject of an impressive wave of studies: historical works, sociological analyses, hagiographic memoirs or critical accounts. This flow of research reached a peak between the breakup of the Union of the Left in the fall of 1977 and the presidential elections of the spring of 1981.¹ Ushering in the first takeover of power by the left under the Fifth Republic, the serious elections setbacks of the PCF have undoubtedly continued to fuel the interest of political observers since that time, but in contrast, there are few studies dealing specifically with its current situation. Conspicuously absent are surveys aimed at shedding light on the way in which the rank and file and periphery of the party: (members, sympathizers and voters) have perceived this turbulence, lived through the trauma.

And yet, a look at these "ordinary communists," who have few opportunities to express themselves, is more than ever essential for penetrating the heart of the communist phenomenon, too frequently apprehended at the level of its leadership circles, institutional cadres or official practices. The current period seems particularly favorable for such research into the rank and file for three main reasons: First of all, the situation of political change in the spring of 1981 revealed or exacerbated "nerve centers" in the Communist Party, the subject of internal debates or public controversy whose exact dimensions and implications it is difficult to discern. Next, during the months following the presidential investiture of Francois Mitterrand and the inclusion of four party representatives in the government, official communist discourse bore witness to a certain "viscosity," the reflection of the less assured positions of the center of the organization, which one might expect would favor more freedom and spontaneity in the expression of personal opinions of its rank-and-file members or closest supporters. Finally, never have so many of the latter wondered and had so many questions to face, as surprised or confused as they might be by the rapid and chaotic sequence of recent events over which the party manifestly has only very imperfect control.

These three arguments seem to argue for the timeliness and interest of an examination of the image of the PCF in the eyes of its supporters. That is what we have chosen to do in trying to perceive it through the prism of the opinions of a sampling of these members of the communist community, loyal to their party at least until the 1978 legislative elections, but now prey to doubt: backers or old members whose origins, like their background, differ, but who share the same acute sensitivity to the problems and challenges which the circumstances put before the party.

A total of 38 persons (28 men and 10 women) expressed their opinions and judgments on four main lines of questioning:²

- 1) the evaluation of the election performance of the PCF in April-May 1981, with the central question relating to the communist "decline" being preceded by a review of the overall results of the presidential election and followed by an opinion on the campaign waged by Georges Marchais (questions 1, 2, 3);
- 2) the perception of the Communist Party, its image in itself, but also compared with that of the Socialist Party and within the framework of the new political majority (questions 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14);
- 3) the perception of the party's activity in the field, taking as an example the local case of Grenoble (questions 7, 8, 9, and 10); and
- 4) finally, the identification of their own positions toward the party, mainly measured with respect to their recent election behavior (questions 13, 15, 16).³

The analysis and interpretation of the opinions gathered on these different themes must be done with caution because the rank-and-file communists who expressed them, relatively representative of the Grenoble circles from which the party recruits, nevertheless present certain specific traits sociologically or politically. One must first of all note in this connection that our sampling is only made up of "urban communists," that it is particularly young (almost 1 out of every 2 is under 35, while only 2 out of 10 are over 45) and that teachers are over-represented, especially among former members, while workers make up only 5 out of 35. More noteworthy is the fact that they all live in a universe widely and strongly impregnated by communist influence, either because of their family or local environment: Three-fourths live in Grenoble where the PCF had since 1977 participated in the municipality of the Union of the Left headed by socialists. The other one-fourth is distributed over three communes in the Grenoble suburbs long administered by communists.

In view of these remarks, however, one must spell out the limits of our project: not a survey of opinions of a vast sampling statistically representative of French communism (an ambition which the projected investigation and the "target" immediately prohibited), but the political identification of a palette as diversified as possible of "rank-and-file" and "borderline" communists, based on an examination of their reactions to the various turbulences that have recently affected them.

Within this context, a selection was made of 24 interviews (about two-thirds of the total) with former members of the Communist Party whose dates of membership were somewhat remote but still after 1977, as well as 14 interviews with communist sympathizers close to the party in voting or thinking without ever having joined its ranks: a "reference group," in a way, whose additional enlightenment helps outline the political identity of the "target group," clarify its image of the party, which are the main objectives of the survey.

The first characteristic sign of that identity is belonging to the "leftist people." Former members or sympathizers of the PCF, all voted for its candidates on the first ballot of the 1978 legislative elections, did not question their fundamental option in the 1981 presidential and legislative elections and are happy over the failure of the right in those elections. While Georges Marchais may have gathered two-thirds of their votes (65 percent of former members, 70 percent of the sympathizers) on 26 April 1981, while the communist candidates for deputy seats still obtained 70 percent of their votes in June, 3 out of 10 nevertheless divided their choices equally between the socialist representatives and abstention, and carryover votes between the two parties worked much less well in the legislative than the presidential elections (on 10 May, Mitterrand took 37 out of 38 votes). The fact is that all these faithful supporters of the left are at the same time worried over the extent of the socialist victory, distrustful of the now preeminent ally who reduces communists to a short allowance, relegating them to a secondary role. This is the manifest expression of their awareness -- as acute as it is unfortunate -- of being communists, their feeling of preferential or exclusive affiliation.

More basically -- and this is the second characteristic sign of their identity -- they have an ailing CP. Their judgments, fears and criticisms of it are of a surprising richness, a profound complexity: Contradictory expectations, ambivalent evaluations, reactions as passionate as they are fascinating express their almost visceral attachment to a party they nevertheless view with no indulgence. Their criticisms are aimed at its strategy as well as its operation, its national leaders as well as local officials. A "party of systematic demolition" for one of its sympathizers but a "party of stamp collectors" for one of its former members, it is controlled by "fossilized people," and the "clownish appearances" of its secretary general, who "is as needed on television as much as Guy Lux," have made it ridiculous, according to others. Moreover, "it no longer has its ear to the masses" and "does not trust its members." In short, it is a very unflattering image, on a par with the one it disseminates itself, "very sectarian and very dogmatic," an image for which it is mainly responsible, along with "its own isolation, its weakening." But despite these unyielding depictions largely marked by skepticism, even cynicism ("reading L'HUMA in high school is indispensable because of all the phraseology"), the feeling of a deep link seems to remain with all of them, an almost family bond with the party and an almost filial reverence for it: "I am very happy that Francois Mitterrand was elected, but at the same time, I am very sad to see the party decline to such an extent; it is contradictory, my own feelings are mixed," explains one former woman member. Another says: "I cannot imagine voting any other way than communist.... One does not become a social democrat, much less a rightist. One may no longer be active, but one always remains a communist." A third: "There was a point at which I was truly

sick of it.... I no longer felt capable of being in the Communist Party, but I am still a communist." Could it be because a "Communist Party in France is always indispensable"? Whatever the case, the profound and general ambivalence of the reactions it rouses today among the rank and file and on its edges is summed up as clearly as it is eloquently by this verdict in the form of a profession of faith: "It has to change or die. I don't want it to kick the bucket so I hope it will change" (former member).

It is this complex alloy of lover's pique and demand for excellence that seems to make the metal of their critical loyalty to the PCF and it is from that discordant view of the party that its contrasting image springs. And it is an analysis of that image, drawn by a disoriented rank and file, that we shall tackle, pointing out first of all the "fault zones" opened in the communist community by their virulent criticisms, turning next to the few "refuge-values" to which their identity as communists solidly clings.

Fault Zones in Communist Community

The critical eye discerns a singularly deteriorated image of the party.

What is remarkable, in fact, in the collection of judgments made of the different internal or external aspects of party life is both their near unanimity in form: severity, and their very broad convergence on substance: incomprehension, reproval. In short, it is a generally negative conclusion whose heavy message leads one to ask: Does such dissonance not outline the contours of veritable "breaches" in the communist community, stretching or rending that close-woven fabric of representation and interaction which joins the active core of the PCF with its protective outside circles?⁴ A party whose former members and sympathizers understand less and less, question more and more, is a party in danger, if not moving toward a break with its social foundations.

A clearly disavowed strategy, an organization largely discredited: The two elements essential for an observation of discord between the PCF and its supporters therefore seem likely to make relations taut or relax them, confusing the original image of the party that sealed their union.

Disavowal of Strategy

That former members and sympathizers of the PCF should come together in judging the party's line of action in international policy as well as on the French domestic scene with no indulgence will scarcely seem surprising: Its strategic options have been sufficiently invoked -- and condemned -- to explain the development of critical manifestations within it or dissident movements around the edges since 1978 and the succession of mediocre election performances since 1981. More significant may be the convergence on this point of criticisms addressed to the party by its less docile members -- those of Communist Meetings, in particular -- and by its least active partisans: The latter join the former in categorically condemning the two main aspects of party strategy, the constancy of its line of support for the socialist camp on the international level and the fluctuations of its policy of the leftist union on the national scene. The first option is deemed incomprehensible; the second inadmissible. It is therefore an unambiguous rejection of all its

orientations that the PCF is now facing, a rejection that points to the first open split within the community of its support.

Table 1. Sociological Identification of Sampling

<u>Distribution by Age</u>	<u>18-34</u>	<u>35-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55 up</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sympathizers	5	6	1	2	14
Former members	13	6	3	2	24
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	18	12	4	4	38

Breakdown by Socioprofessional Category

	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Blue-collar</u>	<u>White-collar</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Lib. Prof.</u>	<u>Merchants</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>Misc. Artists</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sympathizers	0	3	5	3	0	2	1	0	14
Former members	10	5	11	5	2	2	2	1	24
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	10	5	11	5	2	2	2	1	38

Table 2. Political Identification of Sampling

<u>Period of Membership</u>	<u>1945-1958</u>	<u>1967-1971</u>	<u>1973-1977</u>	<u>After 1978</u>
	5	9	9	1
<u>Voting in Elections</u>	1978 Leg. PC 1st Bal.	1981 Pres. Marchais 1st Bal.	1981 Pres. Mitterrand 1st Bal.	1981 Leg. PC 1st Bal.
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sympathizers	14	10 ¹	14	11 ³
Former members	24	15 ²	23	16 ⁴
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	38	25	37	27

1. Plus 4 for Mitterrand

2. Plus 5 for Mitterrand, 3 abstentions and 1 vote for H. Bourchardeau

3. Plus 3 votes for socialist candidates

4. Plus 5 votes for PS and 3 abstentions

International Handicap

It is clear that the original identification of the party of the working class with the homeland of socialism no longer works at all to the benefit of the PCF. On the contrary, its image seems heavily burdened by the continuation of its traditional position of support for the USSR, particularly in a period of international tension in which the most recent and most striking moves of the USSR are called intervention in Afghanistan or "normalization" in Poland.⁵

The correlation of responses given to questions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11⁶ points up the weight of this burden on the party and its role in the erosion of its credit, first of all in elections. Among the factors causing the communist decline in the 1981 presidential election, 11 former members and 6 sympathizers invoke up front the "unconditional alignment" of the party with the USSR and explicitly mention its positions on Afghanistan and Poland as symptomatic -- and harmful -- manifestations of its continuation "in Moscow's lap": "That men in the party should support tricks like that is unacceptable. It results in a loss of members and votes. That is natural" (supporter).

The effect is more broadly felt on the level of party identity. None of the positive attributes for which the PCF is credited concerns its loyalty to the socialist camp,⁷ while the reproaches addressed to it frequently include the criticism: At the time of "the failure of socialist countries," the formula of the "on the whole positive record has hurt the PC" and the "PC = Russia" equation has "helped anticommunism" (former members). It is therefore logical that the treatments suggested (particularly by 7 former members and 7 sympathizers) to stimulate a recovery of the party's influence include "distance" or "independence" from the USSR and its superpower policy. Some also want a clearer definition of the specific "internationalism" of the PCF, while others look for a clearer affirmation of a "Eurocommunist line" characteristic of the PCI in particular.

The state of tutelage in which the PCF seems to continue is deemed incomprehensible because it is incompatible with the party's national strategy, intolerable because it is unjustifiable politically and harmful in elections. It is therefore in relationship to the overall communist line of action, particularly the "French path to socialism," that the relative weight of this international burden on the PCF must finally be judged.

Price of Disunion

More costly than its faithfulness to the socialist camp would seem to be the party's infidelity to the alliance with the socialists, whose harm is directly related to the exact measure of its responsibility: "The PC sabotaged the union," one sympathizer unhesitatingly claims, echoing the majority opinion. A comparison of responses given to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11 enables one to clarify the dimensions and shed light on the implications of the disavowal of this second aspect of the communist line of action.

A focal point of criticism: the evaluation of the 1977-1981 period, a phase of strategic reorientation opened by the growing pressure of the PCF on its

allies and co-signers of the governmental agreement of 1972 to "update the Common Program," marked by the failure of their negotiations in September 1977, then developed starting in 1978 by a stubborn campaign of harassment of a socialist partner systematically suspected of a shift to the right. It is a phase now perceived by former members and communist sympathizers as a "turning point," viewed as a "stiffening" they do not understand and above all do not accept. With a single exception,⁸ they all observe and deplore the break from the line of the Union of the Left, which they largely attribute to the party, which also seems to them to bear the heaviest consequences, with two former members going so far as to link its future to the essential precondition of a "veritable self-criticism" on its "anti-unity" strategy followed since 1977.

Responsible for a "policy of division," the PCF therefore logically must bear the "sanction," in elections, first of all. "For 4 years, leaders tried to demonstrate that the PS had shifted to the right, that the PS in power would be worse than Giscard.... People have understood that one could no longer treat the socialists as they had done before. With Guy Mollet in 1947, they got nowhere." The "victim of its ambiguities," "its isolation," even "the rise of a leftist anticommunism resulting from its sectarianism," the PC "has played the role of the defendant," "lose its credibility" and "left the way clear for the PS," which has "taken advantage of the dissunity" (former members). Twelve former party members and 7 sympathizers agree on the predominance of this clarifying factor in their analysis of election setbacks of the PCF in the spring of 1981. Going more deeply, it is at the level of the political and social rank and file that the effects of such a strategy seem to have been the most damaging to the party. "There is a growing divorce between the goal of the PC formulated at the 22d Congress and political practice.... The party has taken the other side of its own principles...and has not been able to take over the demands of the workers"; "it has cut itself off from the grass roots" and "members have been disoriented" (former members). Seven former party members but three sympathizers as well explicitly link this double split between the leadership and its troops, between the party organization and its support, to another split, offering two contradictory lines despite commitments made and efforts initially mobilized. The very last effect of a strategy "perceived by the rank and file to be profoundly divisive," the presidential campaign, of which it is the culminating manifestation, deemed "scarcely credible" at best and "catastrophic" at worst because of its anti-socialist orientation. "It was a weak campaign because it went after the wrong enemy: By putting Giscard and Mitterrand on the same level, the party was doomed to cut itself off from the masses," "a campaign of sloganeering expressing the ideological vacuum of the party machinery," "a campaign run in by the leadership without considering the opinions of rank-and-file members." Former members and sympathizers use this "opportunism" and "demagogy" to explain their lack of interest in the communist participation in the pre-election jousts of the spring of 1981. More radical are the criticisms from 7 former members and 5 sympathizers who condemn the "sectarianism" and "aggressiveness" displayed by the PCF toward its old ally and...future partner: "We were expecting the victory of the Union of the Left and we could envision it only within the framework of the alliance.... The PS did not respond to the attacks (of the PCF) and it looked like a rabble-rouser." "It is normal to

set oneself apart...but without personally attacking Mitterrand in a terribly sectarian, even suicidal, way," because "you criticize, you attack everyone and after the first ballot, you demand unity" (former members). In addition, there is the condemnation by 6 former members and 2 sympathizers of a few high jinks that sprinkled the pre-election offensive of the PCF: the Vitry and Montigny-les-Corneilles "affairs," communist "crusades" against drug trafficking here, a hotbed of immigrants there.⁹ "Unfortunate moves," "gaffes" or "errors in analysis," these "racist attitudes" did not only "disturb people," they mainly illustrated the fact that the party was no longer "listening to the masses," that it had "lost contact."¹⁰

Largely majority in the two groups of its supporters, the judgment of the strategy followed by the PCF in recent years therefore seems to have no appeal. The overall "political line, if it can be called a line," is clearly disavowed and there are many, especially among former party members, who coherently link the bundle of criticisms roused by its national and international orientations: the "break with the PS" and the "realignment with the USSR," a double manifestation of a "stiffening" that "cuts the party off from the masses" and "demobilizes its members," drags it into a campaign as "opportunistic" as it is "dogmatic" and "fatally ends in a decline in influence felt in the elections." "That is the core of the party's entire failure" and "it is totally logical" (former members). The coldly reconstructed logic of a severely rationalized failure, the attitude of these former members of the PCF toward their party is still astounding. It bears witness to a distance, a critical remoteness significant enough to support the hypothesis of a veritable split, whether open or latent, in the communist community in a terrain undermined by excessive fidelity to its international options when its alliance with the Socialist Party should have forced it to relax its ties with the "homeland of socialism." This disavowal at the same time opens up another breach in the convictions of its supporters: It is the "good-natured men making up the party (and) the line they impose on it" who are responsible, according to one of its sympathizers, for the situation of a party "essentially losing ground."

Discredit of Organization

The second source of criticisms addressed to the PCF by its supporters but the main cause of the deterioration of its image among its former members in particular: the operation of its organization (actors being inseparable from the machinery). Confused under the same disgrace of a "Stalinist party" are the members and machinery of a political apparatus that no longer seems to respond to the requirements of its social base. The two reasons for discredit of the communist organization given by former members and sympathizers to be revealed below join, as one will see, the pessimistic diagnosis expressed by Louis Althusser when he branded, in 1978, "that which cannot go on any longer in the Communist Party."

Shadow of Stalinism

And it is definitely a shadow: Through the responses given to questions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11, the "Stalinist" epithet seems to weigh on the party like a spectre one cannot exorcise. Under this infamous label is a whole host of vague

representations, a series of disparate accusations, the accumulation of which seriously tarnishes the image of the PCF.

What does that shadow shield? First of all, the absence or insufficiency of democracy in party life, explicitly condemned by 9 former members and 4 sympathizers who identify that lack with the "still too Stalinist" nature of the communist organization. "The line is imposed by the top on the rank and file; the members are taken for imbeciles."¹² "(Their) criticisms are systematically refuted," "they are crushed," in short, "the democratic centralism is marching backwards...(and) the PC's proclamation that it is the only democratic party is an untrue statement" (former members). Another way to name the evil, the prime requirement for its eradication in order to make way for renewed vitality and influence of the party, affirmed by 11 former members and 7 sympathizers: "Finally listening to the rank and file...ceasing to believe that only the others are mistaken," "ceasing to 'parachute in' decisions, having them debated in the cells...promoting a critical spirit at all levels," "creating democracy within its ranks" (former members).

An additional element in the "Stalinist" nature of the PCF, the coefficient of its lack of grass-roots democracy: the confiscation of power in the hands and to the benefit of members of the central core of the organizations, leaders and officials. The abundance of criticisms and demands expressed on this point by 9 former members but also 5 sympathizers is a perfect illustration of the relevance of the classic positions of Roberto Michels on the oligarchy secreted by mass organizations:¹³ "There is the so-called 'Stalinist' party made up of rigid cadres who know only their ideology," "a party whose apparatus has turned away from the mass struggles in order to win political posts," whose "officials...cut off from the rank and file and problems...are to members what inspectors are to teachers," "tend to preserve their posts and therefore have to defend the line," "practices (that) compromise the planks of the honest party," of the "party that holds the truth," when actually, "it operates on command." Whence the urgent need, in order to restore the credit of such an organization, to "change the teachers of the cadre school," "send the officials back to the factory," "rotate cadres," "change heads," all measures deemed imperative in order to "put an end to the conservatism of the leadership (which) preserves its posts out of fear of change" (former members). Concentrated, confiscated and frozen: This is how power in the PCF appears. Excessively personalized as well, because the evaluation of the services of the party's presidential candidate, difficult to separate from those of its secretary general, gives rise to abundant criticism from 9 former members and 5 sympathizers: "an excellent actor," "the newsmen's clown" who mainly "made people laugh" but who "no longer has the aura necessary for a good secretary general" because "the negative effect" of his election campaign of the spring of 1981, "his speeches (which) can be perceived as the discourse of a leftist Lecanuet," have "hurt the party, too personalized under his features" (former members).

The third element in that cumbersome Stalinist heritage burdening the party's image: the dogmatism and sectarianism of its style of action, already condemned in connection with its relations with socialists, which seem to penetrate all its practices and in particular, creep into its discourse. Three sympathizers brand its "systematic criticism" and inability, "when it is its

turn to do something, to be constructive." More precisely, 13 former members lump under the same accusation the dogmatism attributed to its analyses and the sectarianism denounced in its attitudes: "The party has become a transmitter of slogans drafted in Paris, up there on Colonel-Fabien, without any contact with concrete reality," whence "its sectarian policies," "a discourse completely detached from reality," that "schematization (which) comforts members but demobilizes them," that "practice of the law of silence...which maintains taboos" and makes the PCF "a party that too often hides behind great principles," therefore "the party of proof" but at the same time, of "double language."

It is a heavy burden then, that of the communist organizational pattern. Widely criticized by its closest supporters and above all, profoundly questioned by its own troops who judge it in terms of their disappointments, it still appears to be the prisoner of the ice pack of Stalinism. Actually, democracy remains "its No 1 problem" and its persistent manipulation by an apparatus frozen in the defense of its principles and...its privileges completes the job of disqualifying it in their eyes. As for the party machine that operates at the price of these discredited methods, it no longer even seems to them to have the excuse of efficiency.

Routinization of Action

This is the second aspect, one that complements the first, of the reasons for the disaffection, the skepticism expressed by most former members and communist sympathizers toward their organization. It can be measured in their critical views of the local activities of the party (in Grenoble) in answer to questions 7, 8, 9 and 10.

In this connection, how can one fail to be surprised, first of all, by the harshness of the opinions solicited by questions 7 and 8 relating to the understanding of the influence of the PCF in the life of a city with which it has long been associated? Deemed "noteworthy" by only 4 sympathizers, only, communist action in Grenoble is judged to be "inadequate" by 7 of them, who on this point agree with nearly all the old members, with only 1 calling it "positive" in the cell. All have a disillusioned view of local militancy which seems to them to be wearing out and 9 point to a clear drop in the level of party action starting with the 1978 legislative elections: "Today the party does not engage in much activity.... It is not a party of struggle; because of its political line, it cannot be." "It is being pulled along by the PS" and the 1977 break has affected all levels.... There have been many defections" (former members). There is even a significant minority of 6 former party members who have an overall negative view of members and officials who keep the local organization active: "a lack of openness," "routine," "busy work and an easy conscience," for some, while the others are "cut off from daily life," "appropriate the party" by "taking advantage of the blind attachment of some members" (to the party). With respect to communist influence on Grenoble municipal administration, criticisms are less strong, but the views scarcely more flattering. A few old members and sympathizers deem the partnership of communists and socialists in the management of municipal affairs to be positive, in particular, attributing the "social" orientation of communal

management to the action of the former: "The PC acts in favor of a local policy oriented more to the left," "brings in new blood," "gives priority to collective facilities" and to "aid to struggling enterprises" (former members). But all the others agree in considering its influence to be "not very important," "scarcely visible in the field," "diluted...unspecific," "imperceptible" or "insufficient" (former members). One old party member even came right out and said that "the communists are the cuckolds of the municipality" as their minority position forces them to swallow the most disastrous measures of the socialists in city planning or local finances. The overall impression given by these evaluations is therefore that of feeble interest, joined with mediocre favor, in activities which the party engages in at the local level. Could this be due to a lack of information and not just of motivation?¹⁴

Whatever the case, this is what seems to be suggested by the answers to question 9, which bears witness to the limited and sporadic nature of the flow of information between the party and its supporters. Among the sympathizers, 3 admit having no contact with informative sources of the PCF, 4 claim to be irregular readers of L'HUMANITE or its local counterpart, and the others admit learning of communist positions only through tracts distributed in their mail-boxes, especially during elections, tracts to which only 3 attribute some importance (as information or propaganda), but that 6 consider to be of little interest or reliability. More former members still regularly read the communist press -- 11 claim to do so¹⁵ -- but their majority opinion on the information disseminated by the PCF is rather harsh: "L'HUMA never has anything new," "always the same thing...no criticism," "a FRANCE-DIMANCHE a little to the left."

Another mode of communication characteristic of the party: the dissemination of information by members at places of work or door to door (question 10). It gives rise to a more shaded evaluation.

Sympathizers express certain reservations about the militant presence in front of businesses (which 11 deem to be both legitimate and useful, while 2 condemn it as a "violation of freedom"). Above all, they massively reject door-to-door methods, compared with the approach used by propagandists for religious sects ("the party's traveling salesmen are like the "Jehovah's Witnesses"). On the other hand, former members, who have often participated in this type of action, justify and almost unanimously support the first of these forms of militancy: "On the grounds of the enterprise...to spread information with direct contact ...is essential in the definition of the PC" because "communists have to be everywhere," and if 4 of them doubt the timeliness of door-to-door tactics ("it's a little like salesmen" "rug salesmen"), 12 retort that "it is not brainwashing" because "the people go more naturally toward the ideology of the right or reformist ideology, their daily bath...but no one goes spontaneously to communist points of view." But beyond these divergencies on the grounds and effectiveness of this activism, the large majority is made up of those, in both groups, who deplore its weakening and attribute it to the recent strategic orientation of the party: "There are so many contradictions, so much incoherence, that the membership potential is frittered away, "it is no longer dialogue.... They do not listen to the people's aspirations," "this regression shows that the PC is no longer in touch with the workers."

On the whole, whether with respect to its local performance or all national activities, the communist machine therefore appears to be somewhat worn out. Its efforts are poorly perceived, its results poorly appreciated, if not absolutely scorned. A definite skepticism and even a certain cynicism often come through the disillusioned remarks of its former members, as if it seemed to be spinning its wheels.

Disenchantment

The verdict of one former member illustrates the general tone of the uncompromising evaluations which most of these rank-and-file communists give of the party and leads one to ask the question: With the strategy disavowed and the organization discredited, what then remains of the original party image to which they attached their convictions, committed their loyalty, in joining its ranks or supporting its candidates?

That which finally unveils their string of criticisms of the model and practice of the PCF is at the same time that which points up the importance of the splits thus revealed within the communist community: the shaking of the certainties of its supporters, which marks both the extent of the damage done to their ideal representation of the PC and the depth of the breach opened in their attachment to it. Two convergent signs are furnished by their attitude to the election campaign of the spring of 1981 and their overall evaluation of the current situation of the party.

In response to questions 2 and 3, many former members and sympathizers admit their lack of interest or note the weakness of the mobilization stimulated by the presidential offensive of the PCF. Among the former, 10 believe that this "lifeless, boring campaign did not rouse the enthusiasm of members," but on the contrary, their "demobilization," "their vigor being less great than in 1974." Among the latter, 8 mingle the expression of their skepticism toward election campaigns in general and the confession of their lack of attraction to that of communists in particular: "The PC bangs the same drum as the other parties," "they all talk rubbish," "we no longer have much faith in the type of practice in which the truth is butchered."

But above all, in response to question 4, 13 former members and 6 sympathizers reveal a more general and more radical skepticism with regard to a party suspected, in their eyes, of fighting a serious crisis, even embarking upon an inexorable decline. Analyses developed on this point by former members of the PCF are the most significant of this movement of doubt so widespread among rank-and-file supporters. At best, the party now seems to them to be caught in "its own trap": opportunism and vote-getting. "It is bound hand and foot, the government has bought it, it has sold its soul, and the devil is Mitterrand." "For a party that calls itself revolutionary, it waits too much," "there is no more reflection...no more real determination" and "we would like something more constructive." At worst, it seems to have "lost its ideological identity," "its specificity," even "its legitimacy, (for lack of a) model to show off," especially since "it is suffering from a questioning of past values...the end of churches," "a world crisis in communism...a sectarianism that absolutely will no longer catch on." Consequently, "it is leaking

everywhere" and "evolution is impossible" because "the integration of the PC into the institutional machinery has ceased to make it a party different from others," transforming it into an organization "we can no longer recognize."

Bitterness, on a par with the pessimism of the judgments: The political universe of these former communists is definitely a disenchanted world to which they have lost the key by repudiating the ideal. The crisis of identity they attribute to the PCF, is it not also somewhat their own? Among the sympathizers, part of the idealization in the representation of the party seems to remain, as shown by their greater propensity to take up the self-justifying arguments of the PCF in analyzing its difficulties: Among the causes of its election decline in the spring of 1981, 5 invoke the choice of a "useful vote" for the socialist presidential candidate (while no former member mentions this factor by way of explanation). Some emphasize the "distorting effect" of the media and others the "anticommunism" reigning in France, old refrains of official communist discourse.¹⁷ But these are very fragile dikes to hold back the tidal wave of doubt that has shaken the certitudes of these communists, former members and sympathizers combined, doubt apparently so profound that it cannot fail to call forth another: Are they still communists, these prosecutors without indulgence or illusions, orphans of a party that is no longer a model and disappointed supporters of a cause that is no longer ideal?

Whatever the case, what their answers show is that "nevertheless, it is still operating," the PCF's machine for integrating and differentiating, as shown by the rejection of any other choice, the vitality of its reference model and the importance of emotional attachments (particularly among former members). Compared with the PS, which plays the role of a "foil" on the left, and contrasted with the other actors on the political scene which feed the reflex of generalized distrust of "politicking politics," the Communist Party remains a "different" party, the party of the workers, the party of an ideal, of "refuge-values," an identity that come hell or high water feeds on the most solid attachment of all: "the family spirit."

Absence of Alternatives: Not Socialists, Not Anyone

The first of the "refuge values" to which communist supporters remain firmly attached consists of a clear discrediting of the PCF's rivals on the political scene. Consequently, it does not seem outrageous to claim that the positive attributes which the party image takes on in the eyes of its supporters are first of all measurable in direct proportion to the negative evaluations from which all forces fighting for their attachment seem to suffer. The identity of rank-and-file communists would appear to be mainly structured by their spontaneous rejection of any other identification, with non-communists generally being thrown together with anticommunists, a negative reflex particularly discernable among former members.

Although criticized for its anti-unity strategy, the PCF remains the only pole of reference of the left in the eyes of its supporters. Indeed, in their answers to questions 1, 5 and 14, they express a rather profound skepticism of the firmness and even reality of the anchorage of the Socialist Party on the left. On this theme of propaganda at least, arguments of official communist discourse appear to echo their own warnings, when they are not strengthened.

These warnings are manifested first of all by the reticence, on the part of 4 sympathizers and 2 former members, accompanying the positive evaluation of the outcome of the 1981 presidential elections. All express suspicion of the winning candidate and party, "the fear that the low score of the PC may encourage a shift to the right on the part of the PS" because "one cannot count on (the socialists) to bring about change" (former members). These suspicions are clearly outlined by qualities attributed to the PS in the list of "differences" separating the two major forces of the French left (noteworthy differences because 2 sympathizers and 4 former members only deem them less important than what brings them together). The Socialist Party is criticized on four grounds: first of all, that of its makeup and social base. According to 6 sympathizers and 7 former members, "it mainly recruits among the intellectuals, the well-off." It is therefore "more bourgeois than the Communist Party" but above all, it is "a catch-all party," even a "bastard party" (former members). The second criticism echoes the first, emphasizing the ideological and political effects of its social diversity: "reformist" because it is "less anchored on a class position" than the PC. "Its ideology is less clear" and "it rather looks after its own interests," according to 9 sympathizers. "On the right, one does not know where the PS begins. On the left, it stops where the PC begins," meaning that "it is not a party (but) the geometric location of a dominant ideology: social democracy...an excellent solution for French capitalism after De Gaulle," according to 7 former members. The third flaw attributed to the PS, a correlation of the preceding two, is "the haziness of its line," which 6 sympathizers criticize less severely than 7 former members, for whom its "fluctuating positions," "its catchall proposals" aiming to "satisfy everyone" are the mark of a party "less determined than the PC to fight the bourgeoisie," "which maneuvers and even prostitutes itself" ("at certain key political moments, the PS yielded to the pressure...of imperialism, while the PC would resist longer"). On the last attribute characteristic of the socialists, opinions diverge between the two groups of communist supporters: 3 sympathizers actually deem the organization and operation of the PS to be "more open, more democratic," while a single former member approves of its "freedom of factions and expression" compared with the "rigidity" and "sectarianism" of the PC. The others consider it rather like a "struggle of factions" harmful to its cohesion and determination in action, which should be noted when one sees the vigor of their criticism of the communist organization.

It therefore appears clear that even in the wide-open eyes of its former members and its sympathizers, the PCF remains "the only solution" on the left, as their distrust of its main ally and rival in this hemisphere of the political universe keeps them in or brings them back to its orbit. A former member sums up the mechanism admirably well: "Just as much as I could be in the PC, I could not be in the PS." And it is definitely distrust that is at stake because the evaluations of the role of the PC in the new majority (in response to question 14) express the total absence of credit of the PS as the "driving force for change," either political or social. Only the pressure of the former prevents the shift to the right of the latter, that "administrator" without "revolutionary potential" (former members).

Beyond the socialists and noncommunists more generally, what emerges is the unflattering image of all the actors and all the practices on the political scene. With the exception of two former members, only sympathizers demonstrate

distrust for the "politicking politics" that seems to feed on the old fund of the traditional popular imagery of the "politicos" and other "grafters."

It is expressed in two ways: first of all, in the form of a series of negative appraisals of the interest of election campaigns. By denigrating those of all parties aiming at the 1981 presidential elections, 6 sympathizers attenuate the harshness of their judgment of the specific contribution of the PCF: "You have to view it in the context of all campaigns. The PC beat the same drum as the others" and in general, it was "more a question of politics as usual," "resembling brain washing." But while they "no longer believe in it," they nevertheless think that this "rubbish" can be gravely detrimental to the communist cause, for -- and this is the second manifestation of their distrust of politics -- they suspect all activities to which it leads of being systematically guilty of "anticommunism," a reproach that two former members share with these sympathizers: "Twenty-three years of anticommunist conditioning" have forged the "French spirit, the 'cheek' of communism as the French imagine it."

Mingled in the same reflex of suspicion, the undifferentiated "others" join the closer and more distinct "other" of the PCF in the camp of its adversaries, so that it remains the only political reference of its supporters who left it and of those who never joined it. And it essentially seems to owe this constancy to its persistent difference compared with all the other political forces represented on the French scene.

Family Spirit

The communist identity is not solely or even principally structured by a negative reflex. Without it always being consciously clear, "there is," explains one sympathizer who nevertheless expresses the harshest criticisms of the PC, "a force that keeps you from voting anything other than communist." "In the presidential elections," admits one former member, "I was a step away from casting a blank ballot because frankly, Marchais' campaign was, I dare not say weak, but something like that. I could not vote for Mitterrand, at least on the first ballot.... The last day, I went for Marchais. It would have bothered me personally to be with the people who played a dirty trick on the PC.... I voted for Marchais despite all my complaints." What is then the nature of these "invisible ties" that still profoundly link and bind the former member to his old party?

An analysis of certain elements of the answers to questions on the activity of communists in Grenoble or the presence of four members of the party in the government, that of the answers to questions 4 and 6 (party image) or 11 (what the PC should do to regain its influence) provide enlightening indications. One should not forget that most of these answers come from persons who have not totally broken with the PC because, in the elections at least, they were only sporadically unfaithful in 1981 and 1982.¹⁸ Without stretching things, they cannot therefore be thrown in with that fringe of communist voters who for the most part were the cause of its double election failure in 1981. The fact nevertheless remains that in view of their cold and logical criticisms, one cannot fail to be struck by the trace of powerful positive emotional ties that are manifested in their judgments on the party in two ways: on the one

hand, recognition of a prime, undeniable quality in the party's elected officials, its representatives in government and its members: They are from the people, the authentic representatives of the working class and who therefore help anchor the new leftist government. Second, there is a very strong awareness of belonging to a family, the idealization of the communist model and the conviction that in the final analysis, the party is not only irreplaceable, but indispensable. For the persons we questioned, the Communist Party is at one and the same time the party of their reference group ("the workers, the poor"), the group with which they identify politically and the party of their ideal, a community to which they remain somewhat emotionally tied because they revere and idealize its model.

Party of the Workers

"If there were only socialists, they would crush us; the communist ministers defend us." This assertion by a sympathizer shows to what extent the complaints piled up against the party have not touched the "reserve of faith" of many supporters. For the latter, the communists are "on the side of the workers": in the local councils, the government and the factories. Even in a minority, "cornered," "dragged along by the PS," its elected officials are on the local level "a needle for social struggles," and its ministers, on the national level, "guarantee that the course will be stayed on the left." "That is the strength of the PC," says one former member. "With respect to the defense of the workers, in France the communist are the best. In the factories, they are the only ones who see clearly.... I do not see how the PS could take its place there."

In the local councils, "the most interesting aspect of the presence of the party...is the aid it gives to the struggling workers; it is a truly leftist position. (In Grenoble), it has become a local council of workers. The communists have brought...an aspect of political solidarity with the workers against employers when there is a dispute" (former members).

The same is true in the government, despite the limits imposed on communist ministers by the weakness of their representation: "They do good work and try as much as possible to lean toward social aspects, while supporting government action. That is not easy!" Only one sympathizer criticizes this participation of the communists in government, to the extent that "it plays into the hands of the socialists." But considering the positive aspects of their work, especially that of Jack Ralite, manifestly the best liked communist minister, one former member goes so far as to remark: "We should have had 40 of him!"

"The party of the deprived," contrasted with the PS, often labeled "more bourgeois," the PC appears to be driven by a "will for real change." Eleven sympathizers use this reason above all others to explain the communist vote today (question 6), while motives having to do with "tradition" or the "rejection of other solutions" are invoked 7 and 4 times respectively. Former members have very similar opinions which they express, however -- logically -- in more "political" terms, giving more weight to "the class vote," labeling the desired change as "radical," presenting the PC as the "driving force of social

transformation," "a political tool for defending the working class," attributing most of its following to "its foothold in the trade union world."

Under such conditions, one can understand why a certain number of former members continue, in spite of everything, to have very great trust in the party: "I took out my card mainly because I am the daughter of working people. Furthermore, despite all the publicity, it is truly the party of the workers. I was on that basis that I joined *a priori*" (former member).¹⁹

One can also understand why, at the time of placing one's vote in the ballot box, the questions and doubts that may have been aroused by "errors along the way" of the PC carry little weight in the face of this "obvious fact": "I do not vote for the party line, but with all the workers.... One has to stand firm with the party as communists" (former woman member). In the extreme and no matter what criticisms are addressed to the leadership, the organization or the strategy, "one does not vote for a line, a candidate, but because it is necessary to vote communist."

Such loyalty, in short, tends to guard the great majority of the sympathizers and former members who express it against the risks of deviation from or of a break with the party, but at the same time, it leads them to require of the party equally exemplary loyalty to its own origins. Loyalty to its principles, without a doubt, but especially to the very high image that both formed of it when they chose it as a central political reference: "a party-family," a community of sincere, unselfish members, of elected officials generously offering their time and ability in the service of everyone, especially the poor, a party, in short, which calls for respect and demands admiration.

Party of an Ideal

It becomes very clear, in fact, that one of the main elements anchoring the "communist faith," perhaps the most solid mortar of party unity enabling it to go through periods of turbulence with less damage within its community of members than in the elections, is the exemplary nature of the image offered by its elected officials and rank-and-file members, an exemplary image stemming, first of all, from their reputation of competence: "The communists, they say, are good administrators, good workers. They engage in very positive actions; that is a permanent trait," says one former member. This competence, deemed unequalled in other political groupings, appears to be strikingly unanimous as a real inherent feature of the originality of the PC: The entire sampling attributes it to ministers as well as to local officials. The former are considered to be "the best." "As always, they demonstrate that they can be people of great ability. They are capable of thorough work, able to assimilate dossiers. I am sure they are acquainted with all the matters before their ministries from A to Z. They are reliable, solid" (former member). The latter are also presented -- by sympathizers and former members -- as administrators without equal. This response came from a sympathizer: "In Echirolles, a "completely communist" (sic) commune on the outskirts of Grenoble, the administration is good, positive.... Kioulou (former mayor) is excellent; he has headed his city well and Biessy (his successor) should improve things even more. I am optimistic; I believe it." Another, concerning Saint-Martin-

d'Heres: "If he is like Blanchon (mayor of the commune since 1971), there will be no problem; I will vote communist.... The communists are really the kind of guys you want to manage things!" (sympathizer).

The second trait deemed characteristic of representatives of the party, whatever their level of responsibility: They are "close to the rank and file," "simple in their language and behavior," "know how to talk clearly to the workers." It was not without pride that one sympathizer reported: "I worked for 10 years in Neyrpic, with Blanchon and Biessy. Now if I meet one of them on the street, we talk...."

A third element, the one that probably carries the most weight, in their judgment, comes back constantly in our responses, obviously establishing a profound unity between elected officials, on the one hand, and the more modest members, on the other. It is a whole set of personal qualities unanimously recognized in "rank-and-file communists": They are sincere, honest and unselfish. "Even if they are bureaucrats," concedes one former member, "they are devoted comrades who spend their evenings at meetings." "You have to have a certain strength to go sell L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE at the market square or to go door to door" (sympathizer). "I feel a great deal of admiration for those who do it," "I have never seen people from the RPR do it," "It is extraordinary," "Only communists still do it," "That is where you see the communists in flesh and blood, where they belong," "This contact with the man in the street is important" (former members).

A party made up of members of this stripe, which trains local elected officials with such competence and simplicity and which gives France ministers so "devoted to and honest in their work," cannot, by itself and despite the errors of its leaders, lose its intrinsic qualities. Naturally, "it is no longer so radiant" (sympathizer), "it is no longer completely itself" (former member), but the party of the workers, that of the "good guys," the "honest people," still merits, somewhere in the depths of the conscience of its disappointed supporters, an inalienable share of their esteem and confidence.

"I respect the Communist Party infinitely," says one sympathizer. "I think it is the most idealistic party, perhaps, in the real sense of the word." While they do not all manifest such enthusiasm, one still notes the same respect for a party "that is not a party of hacks" and whose rank and file is made up of people who want to "reach out to others" (former members). In a previous survey,²⁰ we detected this very significant testimony of the almost existential nature of the militant commitment to the PC. "I was born of communist blood," we were told by a member of a Grenoble cell. One response echoes this "call of the blood" in the interviews of the post May 1981 period: "I have been a communist since birth." This 25-year member, who belonged to the Communist Youth and the Federal Bureau, calls his father a "traditional communist" and gives a very enlightening version of his departure from the party: "I did not leave the party, I just did not renew my membership. My cell is dead and I didn't feel like going anywhere else." He concluded: "I am no longer a member, but I am still a communist."

The situation of the PC is definitely singular, for it conserves an exemplary image among persons who no longer belong to it. With them and with disappointed sympathizers, it retains an ideal figure and is still a reference model! This situation has already been reported in the past, but it emerges here with a degree of intensity that is surprising in many ways and among persons very harsh in their judgments. Furthermore, it is expressed, not in the reconstructed memories of a few intellectuals who have broken away, but in ordinary members who spoke very spontaneously to researchers from outside the party.

The overall impression left by these accounts is profoundly ambiguous: expressions of doubt or resentment from disoriented persons who have lost their frame of references, but in the same movement, there are professions of faith that are often moving in their simplicity and striking in their warmth. "In the communist vote, there has always been a fringe of people sickened by the structure of society, rebellious people. That is the vote of those who trust in that categorical, strong 'No' symbolized by the party," says one former member. "The PC is life against death," says another. "It is the only party that does not give up the demands of life. Personally, I am attached to a revolutionary ideal; I want to believe in it."

Then must the signs -- or can the signs -- of such a visceral attachment to the ideal figure of the "party-family" be interpreted by its leaders as signs pointing to a resurgence, reasons for hope in an imminent recovery? One can ask the question when one of its members, breaking the ban, mentions his "possible return to the fold," another his "possible reintegration into the family sometime in the future." But there is nothing to authorize any anticipation of the future conduct of its supporters and disappointed former members and for two reasons:

The first has to do with the depth of the splits noted in their convictions. More than the emotional ties, still very strong although strained, it is in fact these broad analytical disagreements that seem essential for the future because they tear the very fabric of the communist community, questioning its operation, if not the very principle, of democratic centralism, affecting such fundamental orientations as loyalty to the Soviet Union or the strategy of access to socialism, articles of faith as important as confidence in the leadership or support for their decisions.

The second reason has more to do with the extremely delicate, even impossible, situation in which the party finds itself: Summoned to change in order to last but forced not to change in order not to renege, the PC is urged from all sides to adopt more democratic practices, to draw up more independent positions vis-a-vis the USSR, to practice self-criticism -- at least partial -- of its strategy from 1977 to 1981. But the paths recommended to embark upon its renewal appear singularly vague and the therapy suggested resemble more petitions of principle (of the "we-must-be-clear" type, a formula that comes back like a leitmotiv) than they do articulate political proposals. Taking these paths presumes wrenching revisions, although over and over the same regret is expressed in general appraisals of the party: "It is no longer the same." Consequently, the dominant feeling seems well expressed by one former member who notes: "From the standpoint of political orientation, it is difficult to see in short-range terms; in the long run, you cannot see it at all."

Indeed, there is a double image of the communist commitment, whose powerful emotional motivations mark the individuals profoundly and in a lasting way but which, once enthusiasm has dwindled and hopes have been disappointed, open the way to bitterness and resentment, if not a cynical rejection of the former object that embodied their ideal. It is a contrasting image of a Communist Party at a crossroads, a phrase whose triteness does not rule out its timeliness in the singular situation characterizing the PC today. The opinion of its sympathizers or former members whose testimony we requested will not necessarily influence the choices it will make in the future. After all, has it not accustomed us, throughout its history, to seeing it drift away from old disillusioned traveling companions and the new disoriented recruits, even discreetly push aside its most vigilant members? But independently of what the teachings of such a survey can suggest or point toward with respect to the near future of the PCF, it seems certain, nevertheless, that similar investigations into the thoughts of these "ordinary communists," generally neglected by observers, would be rich in progress in in-depth knowledge of a party which, let us admit it along with one of its former members, "remains an enigma."

Appendix - Questionnaire

1. What do you think of the results of the April-May 1981 presidential elections?
2. In your opinion, what is the cause of the election decline of the Communist Party? in the elections
3. What is your opinion of the campaign of the Communist Party during the presidential election?
4. How do you view the Communist Party personally?
5. In your opinion, what differences exist between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party?
6. In your opinion, what explains the communist vote today?
7. What do you think of the activity of the communists in Grenoble?
8. Have you seen important changes in the administration of the city since there have been communists on the city council?
9. Do you receive information put out by the Communist Party in Grenoble?
10. What do you think of the presence of communists in front of factories and of the door-to-door distribution of tracts or selling of newspapers?
11. In your opinion, what should the Communist Party do to regain the influence it has lost?
12. What do you think of the action of the communist ministers?

13. Do you belong to a political party, trade union or association? (If so, give the reasons for such membership(s).)
14. In your opinion, how does the Communist Party fit into the leftist majority?
15. Did you vote communist in recent years?
16. How old are you and what is your profession?

FOOTNOTES

1. See in particular the book of synthesis by Georges Lavau, "A Quoi Sert le Parti Communiste Francais?", Paris, Fayard, 1981.
2. Prepared with the aid of two teachers from the Institute of Political Studies of Grenoble, Maurice Croisat and Pierre Kukawka, a survey using a semi-directive questionnaire was administered during the 1981-1982 school year by three third-year students from the sampling (see questionnaire at the end of the article).
3. See the two tables of identification for the sampling, indicating the breakdown by age and socioprofessional category of the 38 persons questioned, their period of membership in the party and the evolution of their election choices, from the 1978 legislative elections to the presidential (1st and 2d ballots) and legislative (1st ballot) elections of 1981.
4. See Kriegel (A.), "Les Communistes Francais," Paris, Le Seuil, 1970, Parts 1 and 2; Lavau (G.), "A Quoi Sert le Parti Communiste Francais?", op. cit., Chapters 1 and 3.
5. G. Lavau emphasizes in particular the "considerable harm" done to the PCF by its "indissoluble tie" with the USSR ("A Quoi Sert le Parti Communiste Francais?", op. cit., pp 26-29).
6. See questionnaire.
7. With the exception of one sympathizer, who admits "regretting that the PCF was forced to set itself off from the USSR" and states unequivocally that "a dictatorship should be set up as in the USSR."
8. One sympathizer, who in this way justifies the cogency of the "policy (of the PCF) since 1977": "It is better to have a PC with 16 percent if it is on a correct political basis than a PC with 20 percent with a vague basis."
9. In particular, see LE MONDE of 10 February 1981.
10. One must point out this paradox, however: Two sympathizers address the same reproach to the PCF, arguing that "it defends the immigrants too much and the French not enough."

11. Althusser (L.): "That Which Cannot Last in the Communist Party," LE MONDE, 25, 26, 27, 28 April 1978.
12. The same former member continues: "When one criticizes certain orientations, one is told that one has not understood the party's policy, as if the leaders never made a mistake and never contradicted themselves from one moment to the next."
13. See Michels (R.), "Les Partis Politiques. Essai Sur les Tendances Oligarchiques des Democraties," Paris, Flammarion, 1971.
14. One former member notes that these activities are "never discussed in the cells...other than in the rare and sporadic fashion of action for this or that."
15. Eight former members read L'HUMANITE, two L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE and two others REVOLUTION.
16. A few former members deem the information disseminated by the party insofar as it seems to give them a different light on current events from that contained in the most widely read regional daily, the DAUPHINE LIBERE.
17. Among the former members, one even finds two mentions of the "harmful role of the media" and two references to the "anticommunism" from which the PCF reportedly traditionally suffers in national elections.
18. See Table 2b [Political Identification of Sampling, Election Conduct] for the 1981 elections. The diversity of local situations in 1982 cantonal elections prevents any strict comparison.
19. Our emphasis.
20. Croisat (M.), Derville (J.), "The Socialization of French Communists; Elements of a Survey in Isere," REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, August-October 1979, p 766.

11,464

CSO: 3519/76

FEAR EXPRESSED OVER GREECE BECOMING SOVIET SATELLITE

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 23 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial: "We Must Forestall Before We Become Satellites of Moscow"]

[Text] Misleading the people with promises, distorting reality, and concealing the truth are the characteristics with which the government is trying to cover up its mistakes and shift public interest to other directions.

Now is added the effort to deceive about its actual intentions on crucial issues directly connected to the country's interests.

The case of the Czechoslovakian airplanes which landed at the Salonica airfield, but were prohibited from taking off because it was discovered that they were not civilian, as had been declared, but military, and finally...it was found they belonged to civil aviation, fully characterizes the tactic of our deception by a government which accumulates only disasters for us.

It is certain that the government is maintaining that the airplanes belong to civil aviation so it will not be revealed it is placing itself with partiality vis-a-vis the Lebanese crisis.

Since it is impossible to cover up the truth completely, however, the government does not dare to deny that the Czechoslovakian jets are destined for the Syrian Air Academy.

The government representative told us that they are training aircraft, without explaining who is to receive them. And it is possible the government is telling us that the aircraft bore the insignia of civil aviation just like the monks who blessed the meat for fish and expected an absolution of sins.

If the government were not afraid of the repercussions from the permission it gave for the airplanes to land and refuel at a Greek airfield, it should have said immediately and openly that the airplanes are destined for military training purposes and they will be received by the Air Academy of Syria--a country which has been involved directly, and with military means, in the crisis in Lebanon.

That is, it concealed an essential element and, in order to obscure things more, it told us that former Greek governments had given similar permissions for similar

types of airplanes to pass through and refuel. And the government believed that with something like this it would fool us more. It forgot to consider, however, that in the former cases, the civil war in Lebanon was not raging and it failed to consider the gravity of its action when a short time ago it had refused to let U.S. airplanes land with the justification that they would transport war materiel to U.S. forces in Lebanon, and thus it would be running the risk of taking a position in favor of one, and against the other, of the factions fighting in this unfortunate country.

Hidden behind the screen of deceptions and delusion is, unfortunately, one other truth which reveals the government taking a position in favor of one of the rival factions, and--what is worse--favoring Soviet plans in the area.

In a space of only ten days, the current government took positions which clearly serve the Soviet policy. And this is particularly troubling because we are slipping imperceptibly towards the Soviet bloc, without the PASOK government needing to tell us officially, and without us having to expect other, perhaps worse things to persuade us who are incredulous and credulous, vigilant and serene in this land.

Furthermore, Moscow's public encouragements for Mr. Papandreou's pro-Soviet stance and the undivided support which KKE gives to this policy of his are declarative that we are lashing ourselves to the Soviet chariot.

The pro-Soviet message which is being sent by the government damages the country in terms of its international position.

Regardless of this, we who live in this country must forestall before we become satellites of the Soviet bloc without comprehending it. And this mission of politically dynamic resistance to these tendencies of the government policy must be decisively expedited by the official opposition. It has an imperative duty to act quickly.

9247

CSO: 3521/30

UNITY CALL AGAINST PERCEIVED COMMUNIST THREAT

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 9 Oct 83 p 1

/Editorial by Goriogos Levidis: "Chaos, New Democracy and Karamanlis"/

/Text/ On 4 September we addressed a letter to Evangelos Averof in which we respectfully transmitted to him the concerns of the people. Since then every Sunday or whenever we felt the need we highlighted the problems of the country without fear, without prejudice and without subservience. However, more than a month has passed and the only thing we have seen as an encouraging sign that something was being done in our party was the festival held by ONNED /New Democracy Youth Organization/. Nevertheless, even this demonstration was a move upward by the grassroots with no special initiative taken by the leadership. Besides this festival there were also a certain number of verbalistic flashes that although clearly good and capable of being implemented have not had the time to become rooted.

And it is exactly time that concerns us and frightens us.

At this very moment when you are reading this article and at every moment that passes everyone must understand that the system upon which Greece is built is being smitten. Let us become aware of this danger. Let this be well understood by those who voted for PASOK because at the very last minute they got some sort of loan from ND. Let this be understood by those who obtained a loan from ND and voted for PASOK. Let it be understood by those who financed or who are financing PASOK that they will not get away with it. Nor will those who offer those in government "heaven and earth" for some small-time contract or small-scale immunity get away with it. And they will not get away with it because they do not belong there where they should belong even though they make desperate efforts to be convincing over their good intentions. Taking everything into account no one loves a traitor. He is thrown into the garbage heap when his use has been ended. And usually this comes about quickly.

Let us therefore wake up and move! Enough of that question that has become a "slogan" of our party: "How far will the situation go?" Instead of asking and going into hibernation, let us react decisively. Let us shake up our party. Let us for once stand up in the street and show the green-red scoundrels that we will not tolerate any more brainwashing.

Everything about the organization of ND is very well. The fact that we opened so many offices over the past month is also a miracle. That, however, is not enough. That is not what will carry the people away. That will not convince those undecided people that renewal has come about, that famous word renewal that has recently taken on a thousand countenances and a thousand meanings.

Unfortunately we in Greece are historically still in the age of parties by leaders. And the ND grassroots want an Averof of his time as a leader. If they wanted him any different they will not have changed Rallis.

We do not have room for maneuver. We have to realize that moment by moment we are being led toward the establishment of a personalized Titoist or Castro regime by Papandreou and Kastri. That is the first step. The second and last step is the communization of Greece.

The party interest and above all the country's interest is being subjugated to the "personal" interest.

And the "bootlickers" run and fight one another over who will put out the news about some kind of "Nobel Peace prize." And why all of that? Because Mr Andreas Papandreou, the new "Tito" or the new "de Gaulle," you choose what you prefer, sometimes formulates some gems of international policy that are of no interest to anyone in the universe save a few half-wits in the party grassroots or the KKE (when it is a question of missiles) and so long as they get the line from their branch offices or Moscow.

We are on the verge of totalitarianism. And for those too who talk about "it's happening over there" and we talk about dangers!

And let those who go and see Karamanlis not think that we can sleep quietly because when and if he were needed he could lift his little finger and bring about a miracle. Miracles are not made and for that reason we believe that there are only three solutions to avoid the impending catastrophe:

First of all: ND should now and not a month from now gain the greatest likelihood to win the elections whenever they are to be held. We have already talked about how this will come about. As to how it will appear to have been realized it will appear only when the noise of the people is heard: "New Democracy in power."

Secondly: Karamanlis, once he has resigned as president of the republic, should decide to lead a crusade that, with his appropriate stance and position, will rally the Greeks who are opposed to PASOK and the KKE. Thus, delivered from the danger of irreparable catastrophe we would be able to move forward toward the rebuilding of the ruins.

Thirdly: He should convene a conference of political leaders and should place before them the Greek problem and his views straightforwardly and toughly, at the same time calling on them to assume their responsibilities over the chaos to which we have been led. He should ask that they make known to him the formation of a government of common trust that will be based on the chamber of deputies and that will have as its mission the solving of the major problems of the country.

Undoubtedly the first solution is the healthiest and the best for the democratic life of the country. The other two have dangers and problems in being implemented. We must, however, understand that moments are going on quickly, time is going by quickly and social-Marxism, or if you will pure Marxism, will very quickly become the only element for handling political developments in Greece. So, let us wake up before it is too late.

5671

CSO: 3521/47

MEMBERSHIP DETAILED IN SPECIAL AFFAIRS PASOK COMMITTEES

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 25, 27 Sep 83

[25 Sep 83 p 3]

[Text] AKROPOLIS today reveals a shocking document.

It is the names of the members of various committees which PASOK made. It is the party favorites, the people who "are all-powerful." And, naturally, they are all members of branch organizations. They are the so-called "branch-authorities." Among them are several deputies.

The lists with the names which constitute the committees were composed on 30 May 1983. They are signed "with friendly regards" by the minister of public works, Akis Tsokhatzopoulos, on behalf of the president (Andreas Papandreou) and the Executive Office and are addressed to the PASOK Executive Office committees, nomarchy committees and local committees. Of course, they are secret.

What is distinctive is that the members of the committees have been appointed (not elected), as is stated in the documents.

The disclosure of the names of the members of the various PASOK committees would--perhaps--not have special significance if it did not "coincide" with the fact that all these "branch people" have filled positions in the state (by meritocracy, remember) and that the activity of some of them has not been proper.

Now, who they are:

Economic Committee

Kostas Geitonas, secretary; Panagiotis Kostakis, alternate secretary; Nikos Othonaios, alternate secretary; Vasilis Kedikoglou, alternate secretary and deputy; and Io. Angelakis, Kiki Lygerinou, Fotis Arvanitis, N. Dimopoulos, Dimitris Evangelatos, Giorgos Zogakis, Andreas Dimitriou, Panos Kondogioris, deputy, Panagiotis Lymberopoulos, Triandafyllos Lysimakhos, Levteris Makaronis, Giannis Metallinos, Manolis Beteniotis, deputy, Giorgos Birdimiris, Vasilis Bikouvarakis, Dominik Dagadakis, Ira Patera, Stelios Piperakis, Filippos Stylianidis, Mikhalis Terzidis and Paraskev-as Foundas, deputy.

Committee for Workers' Syndicalism

Rovertos Spyropoulos, secretary; Lambros Kanellopoulos, alternate secretary; Giannis Paidakakis, KE [Central Committee] member, alternate secretary; Andreas Fouras, KE member, alternate secretary; and Alekos Akrivakis, deputy, Loukas Apostolidis, Lili Vasilakou, Spilios Vasileiou, deputy, Stamatis Galeros, Giannis Glavini, deputy, Dimitris Kaimas, Thodoros Katsanevas, Anna Karamanou, KE member, Kostas Kataxakis, Sarandos Karakhalios, Khr. Kokkinovasilis, St. Koletsis, Sp. Kotsias, Petros Lazarou, Nikos Manikas, Dionysis Mavrogennis, Konstandinos Mavromikhalis, Efi Bekou, Giorgos Bregiannis, Giorgos Nikiforakis, Giorgos Orfanos, Vasilis Paidakakis, Ilias Panagiotaropoulos, Marinos Panagopoulos, Kostas Papanagiotou, Giannis Papamikhail, Dimitris Pipergias, Khristos Protopapas, Thanasis Rallis, Loukas Rallis, Giorgos Ravtopoulos, Nikos Rizogiannis, deputy, Andonis Sarris, Mikhalis Skourkeas, Minas Tsangarakis, Vasilis Tsitsas, Giannis Tsingogiannopoulos and Alexis Tsolis.

Committee for Farmers' Syndicalism

Gerasimos Bristogiannis, secretary; Giannis Khardalias, alternate secretary; Dimitris Khristodoulou, alternate secretary; and Thanasis Avagiannos, Dimitris Alambanos, Giannis Anagnostopoulos, Nikos Anagnostopoulos, Evstathios Athnopoulos, deputy, Spyros Velonis, Dimitris Gaitanidis, KE member, Thanasis Golfopoulos, deputy and KE member, Dimitris Kondylis, Loukas Kyriakou, KE member, Makis Konstandinou, deputy, Tasos Lekkas, Giannis Dinos, Kostas Markoulis, Stelios Bazianas, Thanasis Balis, Thanasis Batsos, deputy, Giannis Bitas, Khrysa Bournazou, Andreas Doutsos, KE member, Thanasis Xanthopoulos, deputy, Kostas Paipoutlidis, Stavros Panagiotou, Thanasis Papageorgiou, Ilias Papailias, deputy, Giorgos Perrakis, deputy, Giorgos Plastiras, Dimitris Pratsos, Aristotelis Samios, Kyriakos Sakhanidis, Evdokimos Sakhpazis, Giannis Tomaras, Giannis Tsaklidis, deputy, and Nikos Khras, KE member.

Committee for Mobilizations and Demonstrations

Panagiotis Giambouranis, secretary; Giorgos Panagiotakopoulos, alternate secretary; and Dimitris Iliopoulos, Vangelis Kanlis, Takis Kaskambas, Sotiris Karakitsos, Giorgos Klavdianos, deputy, Nikos Kondoos, Giannis Kopitas, Dimitris Koumaniotis, Dina Lazari, Kostas Baramboutis, Kostas Papadakis, Dinos Parrigoris, Makis Skouteris, Giannis Tyrlis, Giannis Khrysafis, Olga Stratea, Minas Tavlaridis, Stefanos Tsaparas, deputy, Argyris Khatzipetrou, deputy, and Foivos Khatzis, KE member.

Committee for Local Administration and Problems

Andonis Papathanasopoulos, KE member, secretary; Theodoros Kapetanakis, KE member, alternate secretary; Dimitris Mavrakis, KE member, alternate secretary; Manolis Bakopoulos, alternate secretary; and Nikos Agrafiotis, Thanasis Athanasoulis, KE member, Thanasis Asimakopoulos, Spyros Avgerinos, Kostas Georgakakis, Stelios Giannarakis, Giorgos Stamatis, Pandelis Gretzelias, Alexandros Damianidis, deputy, Thanasis Dimitrakopoulos, deputy, Tasos Doukas, Kostas Theokharis, Spyros Kataniotis, deputy, Dimitris Konitsiotis, Giannis Korkovelos, Manolis Kourmadias, Lakis Komninos, Giannis Koutsougeras, Giorgos Bikos, Thodoros Orkopoulos, Alekos Pandazis, Soula Panousi, Nota Papadopoulou, Faidon Papatheodorou, Anna Panagopoulou, Katia Papanikolaou, Giorgos Patsilinakos, Kostas Papakos, Dimitris Repas, deputy, G. Sideris, Evdokia Serreli, Mairi Stolina, Kosmas Sfyriou, deputy, Ilias Tsanis, Giannis Fotakis, Khristos Fotiou, deputy, Athina Khalari, Giannis Kharalambopoulos, deputy, Vangelis Khatzigiannakis, and Ilias Khatzoplakis, deputy.

[27 Sep 83 p 5]

[Text] AKROPOLIS began to publish a revealing document last Sunday, 25 September. It is the names of members of various committees which PASOK made. They are the party favorites, the people who are "all-powerful." And, naturally, they are all members of branch organizations. They are the so-called "branch-authorities," the people who "settled themselves" into various positions immediately after the elections. We publish today the second part of the lists:

Committee for Solidarity and Social Welfare

Dimitris Koutsodimitris, secretary; Spyros Giannopoulos, deputy, alternate secretary; Iraklis Matrangas, deputy, alternate secretary; Giorgos Simeros, alternate secretary; and Tasoula Athanasiou, Voula Geitona, Giorgos Davidopoulos, deputy, Khristina Divani, Dimitris Zisis, Anastasios Karras, deputy, Giorgos Ktenas, deputy, Panos Kouroumbilis, Maria Latsi-Langadinou, Dimitris Mandzaris, deputy, Sofia Bandea, Ilias Basteas, Georgia Benou, Kostas Nikolis, Khristos Oikonomou, deputy, Panagiotis Palmos, Giorgos Papadopoulos, Giorgos Pafilis, Spyros Rallis, deputy, Soula Raptakis, Grigoris Solomos, deputy, Vangelis Staikos, deputy, Thodoros Stoltidis, Stelios Taktikos, Maria Timogiannaki and Miltos Khatziyiannakis.

Committee for Hellenism Abroad

Makis Papastavrou, secretary; Giorgos Kalpakas, alternate secretary; Manolis Niotis, alternate secretary; Vasilis Tsapaliaris, alternate secretary; and Panagiota Androustoupoulou, Andreas Valyrakis, Nikos Vgenopoulos, KE member and Eurodeputy, Giorgos Vlakhos, Giannis Dimos, Giannis Zafeirakis, Giorgos Kandalepas, Giannis Kasaras, Akhilleas Kolliousis, deputy, Dina Lazari, Kostas Benakopoulos, Aris Ouzounidis, KE member and Eurodeputy, Giorgos Paspaliaris, Nikos Petropoulos and Georgios Seimanidis.

Office for Legal Coverage

Tasos Mandelis, deputy, secretary; Sotiris Felios, alternate secretary; and Nikos Athanasopoulos, deputy and PS [expansion unknown], Dimitris Alambanos, Stathis Alexandris, deputy and KE member, Dimitris Anastasopoulos, Panagiotis Apostolopoulos, Mikhalis Vathis, deputy, Alekos Darivianakis, deputy, Vasilis Dimakopoulos, Polykronis Thomopoulos, Giorgos Kalogirou, deputy, Giannis Karambatsas, deputy, Giorgos Kapsis, Giorgos Koukos, Giannis Koulaxis, Foivos Koutsikas, deputy, Thanasis Lambrakopoulos, Giannis Degiannis, deputy, Maria Panagopoulou and Nikos Papaioannou, deputy.

Cultural Committee

Manolis Khatzinakis, deputy, secretary; Orfeas Mytilinaios, alternate secretary; Stergios Khatzinouskas, alternate secretary; Lila-Khristoforidou, deputy, alternate secretary; and Mikhalis Angelakis, Tasos Alexakis, Ilias Andriopoulos, Khristos Avthinos, Marianna Valaora, Giorgos Voulgarakis, Natasa Dimitropoulou, Spyros Dimitrakopoulos, Kostas Kanellopoulos, Myrto Konstandinou, Stratis Karras, Pinelopi Kanala, Foteini Kanatsouli, Nora Katseli, deputy, Ilias Kyriakopoulos, Dimitris Lagios, Nikos Langadinos, Makis Lapienis, Nikos Levogiannis, deputy, Iosif Mikhel-

ogiannis, deputy, Manolis Bofiliakis, Nikos Mikelidis Fenek, Nana Nikolaou, Nikos Papageorgiou, Alekos Papadopoulos, Orestis Papastratis, deputy, Spyros Sioumalas, Khristos Sarakatsanos, Ilias Tsamourgialis, Andreas Filippidis and Laloula Khrysikopoulou.

Committee for World Peace and Human Rights

Doris Mikhalis, KE member, secretary; Eirini Lambraki, KE member and deputy, alternate secretary; Anastasios Peponis, KE member and deputy, alternate secretary; Alexis Rosios (Ypsilandis), alternate secretary; and Giorgos Athanasiou, Sefis Anastasakos, deputy, Giannis Grapsios, Dina Gongaki, Dimitris Daoulas, Dimitris Diamandidis, deputy, Giorgos Zarafonitis, Giorgos Iliakopoulos, mayor of Neo Irakleion, Tzeni Karaveli, KE member, Stefanos Kekhagioglou, deputy, Giorgos Kokkinos, Virginia Kondomerkou, Kostas Kondopodis, deputy, Niki Koutsogiorga, Marianna Koutsi, Giorgos Lakopoulos, Themistoklis Loulis, deputy, Giannis Malandrakis, Takis Markopoulos, KE member and Eurodeputy, Giannis Mortzos, KE member, Takis Batzelis, Khristos Basagiannis, deputy, Manolis Bouzakis, Zografos public councilor, Thanasis Nisiotis, Kostas Panodimos, Dimos Papadimitriou, deputy, Giannis Papadonikolakis, deputy, Kostas Papaspyridis, Iro Papastylianou, Kostas Politopoulos, KE member, Kiki Tsamatropoulou and Marina Flenga.

Equipment Office

Stelios Pratikakis, director, Andreas Androulidakis, Giannis Lambropoulos and Kostas Polymeros.

Committee for Women's Issue

Elpida Praxiadou, secretary, Aliki Andypa, three-member secretariat, Eirini Frangoudaki, Stamatis Nikalopoulos, Khrysanthi Andoniou Laiou, Mikhail Avgoustianakis, Petros Valvis, deputy, Alkistis Volani, Dimitris Vradelis, deputy, Eleni Drivakou, Soula Evthymiou, Anna Iliopoulou, Eni Kapazoglou, Maria Kypriotaki, deputy, Dena Logiadou, Giorgos Malliakas, deputy, Maria Moira, Aristeidis Bourdaras, Niki Niki-foraki, Lena Pambouki, Lena Papanikolaou, Manolis Papastefanakis, deputy, Frinda Papakhristou, Despoina Saltouridou, Rena Tilianaki and Galini Foura.

Committee for International Relations

Karolas Papoulias, KE member and deputy, secretary; Vasilis Konstandineas, alternate secretary; Giannis Mandzouranis, alternate secretary; Periklis Nearkhos, alternate secretary; Giorgos Pattas, alternate secretary; and Nikos Athanasakis, Soulis Apostolopoulos, Kostas Georgoulas, Spyros Drainas, Giannis Ziangas, KE member and Eurodeputy, Kostas Thomas, Giannis Kranidiotis, Mikhalis Koutouzis, Kostas Livas, Periklis Oikonomidis, Khristos Oikonomou, Margarita Papandreou, Evi Papastefanou, Giannis Patelis, Kosmas Pavlidis, Rania Balafouta, Giorgos Sklavounos, Sofia Spiliotopoulou-Khronopoulou, Thodoros Stathis, deputy, Kostas Tsimas, and Vangelis Khatzimanolis.

9247

CSO: 3521/30

OUSTED PASOK MEMBERS FORM ORGANIZATION, TO HOLD CONFERENCE

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 28 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Mikh. Kanimas]

[Text] With a central question "Now what do we do?," the dissatisfied from PASOK will soon organize a panhellenic conference in Athens in order to define their position in the political area.

Participating in the conference will be hundreds, as is anticipated, of PASOK cadres who are active, ousted or have resigned, and who accept N. Kargopoulos' proposal and have the same opinions as he does on government policy.

According to our information, the conference will occur fairly "soon," will last one day and participating in it will be representatives of dissatisfied cadres from all over the country who have been specially invited.

The conference's organizing has temporarily halted completion of the circle of gatherings of "heretics" in the provinces, but they will be resumed in the near future. As is verified by responsible persons in the Kargopoulos movement, "the provincial PASOK cadres who never aspired to any participation in the distribution of local power agree with the content of the counter-proposal and are determined to not come to an agreement with the PASOK party and government establishment."

"The cadres who stand somewhat higher socially" and participate in the distribution of power--note the same circles--agree with the counter-proposal, even if with reservations, but they are not disposed for the present for any type of inner-party struggle whatsoever. It was noted yesterday by the circle of "heretics" that the war of mudslinging against them is at its highest point. The party mudslinging group is accusing them of "sinécures," while, as became known, none of the ousted organizers holds a government position. N. Kargopoulos is a professor of chemistry at the Ilioupolis First Lyceum, while Giannakos and Myritzis, who were councilors in the ministries of agriculture and public works, respectively, resigned long ago. Leondopoulos and Stenos never had a government position.

But while preparations for the panhellenic conference are continuing, the "Kargopoulos group" has proceeded to establishment of a Center for Socialist Studies (KESOM) which is housed at 17 George Street (seventh floor) in Kaningos Square. The manual containing the well-known counter-proposal is distributed there.

POLITICAL

GREECE

DISENCHANTMENT SPARKS ADDITIONAL PASOK RESIGNATIONS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 8 Oct 83 p 2

/Text/ Three more PASOK officials resigned yesterday, namely the following: Athanasia Tasoula, member of the Solidarity Committee; Kostas Basias, member of the Organizational Committee; and Nikos Tsiaras, member of the Athletic Committee.

In a statement signed by the three officials they mention PASOK's turning away from the line toward a socialistic transformation --in other words a turning toward the Right-- and they express the belief that the congress "will not be conducted democratically." They then condemned PASOK for the following:

It muzzles every member, cadre, organ or organization that insists on supporting the principles of the movement.

It candidly warns nome assemblies that if they do not elect the desired nome committees it would annul them and appoint others.

It arbitrarily forbids cadres to become candidates for nome committees.

It creates an unacceptable antidemocratic atmosphere in nome assemblies --in certain one of which two thirds of the delegates walked out. Such an atmosphere has been created in local organizations that has led to mass resignations.

It facilitates the entry into the organization of new members with the designation of government elements.

These cadres as well as others who have resigned, who have been thrown out of the party, as well as active cadres who disagree with the leadership --more generally speaking, those who agree with Mr Kargopoulos' views-- are scheduled to take part in the panhellenic official meeting planned for this morning. It is estimated that some 150 cadres from all nomes will participate.

It is expected that Mr Kargopoulos will make a report and describe "the lost opportunities of the popular movement" and will analyze the PASOK government policy.

Also speaking will be others who disagree with PASOK. A political decision will be issued in which it is possible that the establishment of a new political party will be announced.

5671

CSO: 3521/47

KKE PERCEPTIONS OF TWO-YEAR PASOK RULE

Athens I AVGI in Greek 9 Oct 83 p 5

Article by Stavros Karas: "A New Situation, A New Experiment"

Excerpt What is the KKE (Int.) position vis-a-vis the PASOK government 2 years after 18 October 1981? We have repeatedly and clearly given our opinion of the government's policy on the need for it to make a radical change to overcome the impasses on the road toward a genuine Change that leads to socialism. We have made clear how an indispensable new political make-up that would ensure equal cooperation of democratic forces is something quite different from the goal of the Florakis party for participation in the government that disorients and damages the development of the popular struggle.

From the standpoint of popular desires on what level are we working? I believe that the fact that the popular base of the KKE (Int.) has a common language and common visions with the greater part of PASOK's popular base, regardless of the ideological and political differences of the two parties, is of prime importance.

PASOK rallied and brought together a government party of an entire segment of a people whose ideological aspirations were to be found in EAM National Liberation Front, a people who were always in a "number two category" under rightists regimes and also during interims, i.e. during the pre-dictatorship period under the Center. The pariahs of the period of the Right, the economically weak, together with those who did not have access to the state mechanism, together with those who were afraid or had been terrorized, in other words an entire people who had gradually been put at a distance from the communists not because of hostile feelings but because of increased feelings of distrust over what prospects they were in a position to provide, these people found in PASOK and its visions its own political expression.

This was a question about a deeper issue, much more radical than the experiments made by EPEK National Progressive Union of the Center in 1950-1952 or the Union of the Center during the 1960's. This concerned a specific path for formulating-- for the first time in Greece-- a non-communist Left with mass repercussions, a socialist wave which started out not from the labor movement but which succeeded in making its own and in propagandizing to an extent unknown un post-war Greece those slogans of a deep revolutionary change having socialism as its goal.

It would be a major mistake for us to cut ourselves off from this people by raising walls through giving mere sterile nihilistic answers to PASOK's efforts in all fields of endeavor instead of trying to be convincing over the need for a possibility of attaining another form of policy. We are in essence providing tests before the broad popular masses over the existence and viability of another communist proposal, radically different from that which is being promoted by Florakis' party in the name of a future ..dictatorship of the proletariat. A proposal that can militantly and unifyingly operate in specific conditions, contributing to the formulation of a much more favorable correlation of forces on behalf of a genuine Change. The perspectives of the KKE (Int.) lie that direction and not to the repetition of third internationalists deeds.

If it is a common fact that something "is moving" today within the masses on behalf of the KKE (Int.), if it is becoming clear that some new feeling is being created among the PASOK people and even within the Florakis party, then this justifies our long held basic premises that emanate from the strategy of a democratic path toward socialism. Our ever greater energetic intervention in all fields of endeavor with positive militant proposals and not negatively in the practice of these premises that aim at the greatest possible rallying of forces for deep structural changes will all open for the KKE (Int.) a new dynamic development.

5671

CSO: 3521/47

POLL SHOWS DROP IN PASOK, ND SUPPORT

Details of Poll

Athens ENA in Greek 13 Oct 83 pp 10-11

/Text7 The Athens and Piraeus residents "vote" today: PASOK 41 percent, ND 17 percent, KKE 14 percent, blank 17 percent.

Should elections be held today, how would the Athenians vote? The shocking reply is that the three parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies show a significant decline in the Athens-Piraeus region: PASOK is limited to 41 percent compared to 48 percent received in the 1981 election. The New Democracy gets only 17 percent compared to 30 percent; KKE 14 percent compared to 16 percent in 1981 in the same electoral district. The only but significant change applies to the 17 percent blank vote. This is because a major portion of these undecided had voted for ND in 1981.

For the first time since 1981 a poll was conducted in Greece by using a ballot box. The well-known Nielsen research institute conducted the study on commission by ENA in the Athens-Piraeus region. According to the shocking results, the governing party has lost 7 percent of its support, the ND 13 percent and KKE 2 percent. The blank vote was 17 percent of the total. It is clear that PASOK has now reached the lower limits for remaining in power with an autonomous majority. The ND is getting farther away instead of drawing closer to power; and the very significant aspect is that KKE is also showing a decline instead of benefiting from the outflow of PASOK voters.

The Results

The question asked the voters was: "Which party would you vote for if the election was held next Sunday? Take this ballot, complete it and after you seal the envelope drop it in the ballot box."

The results are:

Of all those questioned, 41 percent said that they would vote for PASOK, 17 for the ND, 14 for KKE, and 5 for KKE-Interior. The Democratic Socialism

Party /KODISO/ would get 2 percent, and the National Camp/Progressives 1 percent. Another party, nameless, would receive 3 percent. Seventeen percent of the respondents cast a blank ballot.

Women were more reserved, 20 percent of them--that is, one in five--casting blank votes while among men only 13 cast a blank vote. The largest percentage of undecided is in the 30-39 age group--21 percent cast a blank vote. This percentage is "normal" considering that there is no indication that we are in an electoral period.

In 1981, a few months before the election, the percentage of undecided in similar polls with the ballot technique was around 8 percent.

With regard to the electoral behavior of the various age groups, we find that persons 40 years or older vote in a larger percentage for ND, while those between 18 and 39 vote in above-average degree for KKE and those between 18 and 29 for KKE-Interior.

For the two larger parties, PASOK and ND, the situation shapes up as follows:

PASOK

In the election of 1981, PASOK had received approximately 48 percent in the area of our investigation, which is approximately what it received nationwide. Compared to 18 October 1981, PASOK shows a decline of 7 percent or 15 percent of its support in 1981. The decline is larger, however, if we were to include the electoral force of the younger voters, 18-19 years of age, who did not vote in 1981. If we subtract the younger voters added since 1981 and we use as the basis only the voters who voted in 1981 and we compare them with the party for which they would vote today, the PASOK vote comes down to 37 percent. The loss, however, is offset in part by the new voters.

Generally speaking, PASOK--compared to 1981--shows a decline of its electoral appeal among women and all ages, but more specifically among persons 18-39 years of age.

New Democracy

The major opposition party shows a vertical fall of its force compared to its already low percentage in 1981 when it received approximately 30 percent in the same electoral region.

It is certain that a major part of those who cast a blank ballot had voted for ND in 1981. The fact that these persons do not "vote" today for the same party, but show a reserved attitude and cast a blank vote, reveals the intensive and deep changes taking place in a significant section of the electorate.

Generally speaking, in 1981 ND faced serious difficulties with the

mobilization of its party following, something which PASOK had accomplished several months before 18 October 1981.

Technical Aspects of Poll Taking

The poll was conducted between 29 September and 4 October 1983 and covered the area which includes the electoral districts of A! and B! Athens, and A! and B! Piraeus.

The sample reached 621 persons and was representative of the population from 18 to 69 years of age, voting in this area. The selection of the sample was based on cards with the area's city blocks. Seventy-eight "starting points" were selected and at each point eight persons were polled. Twenty-five pollsters under three controllers participated. These were persons with special training and expertise in similar studies. Almost all researchers had participated in similar polls in 1980-1981.

Each respondent was given a "ballot" which contained the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies but also those which are not. The respondent completed the ballot by himself, not in the presence of the researcher, and then dropped the ballot in the "ballot box" which remained sealed until it was returned to the offices of the company. In the ballot the respondent checked, in addition, the sex, age, and electoral district.

A Few Words About the Nielsen

The "Nielsen-Hellas" was established in Greece in 1977 and is a branch of the company established in North America in 1923 by Arthur Nielsen, a Dane. It has offices in 25 countries, including all West European countries. In our country, Nielsen-Hellas, in addition to studies for stores and markets, has a special section for political and social studies, mass media information (newspapers, magazines, television, radio), measurement of advertising expenditures, and studies about the various branches of our national economy.

It has a section for marketing for study planning, a section of statistics, and a section for the collection and analysis of data. The company's personnel in Greece consists of 85 regular and over 200 part-time associates.

The Nielsen Hellas became widely known as a result of its successful forecasts in the election of 20 November 1977, published in ELEVTHEROTYPIA, and 18 October 1981, published in ETHNOS.

The Section of Special Studies is under the direction of Kostas Ploumbis.

We give below the percentages of the poll in 1977 for the three major parties:

	11-16 November 1977	20 November 1977
ND	39%	42%
PASOK	25	25
EDHK	13	12

Results of the 1981 Poll

	7-13 October 1981	18 October 1981
PASOK	45%	48%
ND	36	36
KKE	11	11

In the accompanying analysis of the results it was shown why PASOK would in the end receive 48 percent.

The Force of the Parties in the Poll Area

	Today	18 October 1981*
PASOK	41%	48%
ND	17	30
KKE	14	16
KKE-Int.	5	3
KODISO	2	1
E.P./Progr.	1	2
Other party	3	0
Blank	17	0

* Rounded figures

Which Party Would They Vote for Today?

	Total	Men	Women	Age			
				18-29	30-39	40-49	50-69
PASOK	41%	43%	39%	40%	39%	39%	44%
ND	17	17	17	12	16	19	20
KKE	14	16	12	16	17	12	12
KKE-Int.	5	6	5	9	3	5	4
KODISO	2	3	1	1	1	4	1
E.P./Pr.	1	*	2	*	2	--	1
Other Party	3	2	4	5	1	3	2
Blank	17	13	20	17	21	18	16

* Less than 0.5 percent.

Poll Seen Suspicious

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 15 Oct 83 p 2

/Excerpt/ Suspected interests are hidden behind the polls which caused in the last 48 hours an upheaval in the people of the ND, a storm of angry protests against the magazine and the newspaper which published them, and statements by Averof and Mitsotakis. The ND leader /Averof/ denounced the polls severely noting that they serve PASOK which crumbles while Mitsotakis stated that the magazine (which is published by his son-in-law) in no way represents him or expresses his views /rest of text illegible/.

ND Leader's Criticism

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 15 Oct 83 p 2

/Excerpt/ The poll which portrays ND as being down to 17 percent in Athens and Piraeus, and that PASOK has lost only 7 percent, was denounced as suspect, especially when compared to the results of the municipal elections a year ago, and the results of the recent elections in trade associations which show a significant rise of the ND throughout Greece--around 10 to 12 percent with a corresponding decline for PASOK.

The ND Leader

The chairman of the ND Evangelos Averof made the following statement:

"A magazine and a newspaper, using a poll, tried to raise doubts about the New Democracy. I will not refer to the rumors about certain interests which are behind the affair. Nor shall I refer to two other recent polls conducted by serious companies, polls which give entirely different results about the strength of the parties and their course.

"I will not refer to them because the Greek people have at their disposal much more reliable polls than those which are based on 680 or 850 respondents out of an electorate of 5.7 million. The Greek people have the municipal elections in which a year ago the ND showed remarkable rise. This is a poll with hundreds of thousands of voters. They also have the recent elections in trade associations and unions, which took place under conditions of intimidation and after hiring new regular or two-month temporary employees.

The Greek people know about the elections in student unions. In all of them, the ND is on the rise to the levels of a few years back and in some cases it has exceeded 50 percent.

"In some of the recent ramparts of the Left the ND is gaining ground or has gained a majority for the first time. Under these conditions, it is not necessary to deny the existence of suspect interests. Those interests need to know only two things. First, that with such reports they only succeed in

serving the interests of PASOK which is crumbling and of KKE which is waiting in ambush. Is this among the goals of the interest mongers?

"Second, these interests cannot bend my will personally because in these critical hours I have reason to believe I am fulfilling a duty. In my whole life, in spite of any difficulties, I always did my duty."

Mitsotakis

The ND Parliamentary representative K. Mitsotakis stated:

"Because a section of the press continues to associate me with the magazine ENA, I have to recall that as a result of an earlier report--at the beginning of its publication--I had stated that beyond the family connection I have no relation with this magazine which in no way represents me or expresses my views."

Asked about the polls, he said that obviously they are divorced from reality and they are not true with regard to the ND, whose rise was reaffirmed by the municipal elections and then all the developments, with the triumphal results of the elections taking place in the major trade associations.

Editorial Attacks Poll

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 15 Oct 83 p 1

/Text/ At the very moment the government of Change faces serious difficulties; the moment when the problems pile up after 2 years in power; the moment when every Greek man and woman begins to feel more and more the decline in their real income; the moment when the "rebels" of PASOK start a movement to form a new structure; the moment when in the elections, imposed by the "socialization", PASOK showed its decline in all areas and throughout the country; the moment when the dance of the floodlights and the millions spent for the 2-year anniversary fiesta have started to cause explosive reactions even among PASOK cadres--at this very moment a certain "public opinion poll" appeared like a deus ex machina to strengthen PASOK and slow down the ND rise shown by the elections...

With a sample of 621 persons (!) the "poll" presented--for crying out loud--that in the Athens-Piraeus region PASOK "fell" from 48 to 41 percent, ND from 30 to 17 (!), and KKE from 16 to 14 percent. These "results" were published 2 days ago by the magazine ENA and reproduced noisily yesterday by the daily AKROPOLIS--causing anger among the ND followers throughout the country while the familiar Menios Koutsogiorgas lost no time in gloating...

There is no doubt that even the most fanatical followers of PASOK must have been unable to believe their eyes in the last 48 hours for this unexpected "gift" to PASOK. It was indeed hard to imagine how they could be undergoing defeats from one union to another, from one bank to another, from one agency

to another, and at the same time to "triumph" in the "opinion polls" of the 621 respondents.

Not even the PASOK-affiliate daily ELEVTHERI GNOMI had dared to publish such a miraculous poll for PASOK. Not because of respect for truth but because it would be afraid that such "results" would not be believed by anyone. But their publication by a magazine and a newspaper which until now were not considered as organs of the PASOK government, was indeed a double success for PASOK!

These results, of course, could not but cause the indignation and derision of the entire Greek people. Erriot said once that a "public opinion poll is like a pretty girl. It does not refuse anything provided you ask the right questions." But we could never expect that they would ask that it bring ND down to 17 percent, to make even the stones laugh. Just this fact would be enough to deprive the poll of all credibility, especially at a time when the real elections left no doubt about the rise of ND and the constant decline of PASOK.

The problem, however, is not limited to the ludicrous aspect of this poll which rightly deserves only ironic comments. The "provocation" is evident; and the attempt to disorient our people from PASOK's failures is equally obvious. What must be examined, however, is who organized this provocation and whose suspect interests were they trying to serve. Which part was played by PASOK and which by the extreme Right elements which appear ready to join not only PASOK but the devil himself to hurt the ND. Where did the stupidity end and the criminal intent begin? These are crucial questions that call for clear answers, not more guesses. And those of us who care not about personalities but about the great liberal and democratic camp, let us not limit ourselves to harsh denunciations but to move on to put the blame where it belongs.

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CSO: 3521/48

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR PAPANDREOU'S FOREIGN, DOMESTIC POLICIES

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 16 Oct 83 p 1

/Excerpt/ Two years after the elections of October 1981 the political scene in Greece has two features: First, the continuing reaffirmation of the premier's great personal prestige, and second, the continuing internal problems of the ND.

TO VIMA publishes today a series of reports which reaffirm precisely these findings: an analysis of a recent public opinion poll concerning the premier follows:

Five out of 10 Greeks today state categorically that they approve of the way Premier Papandreou handles all questions of domestic and foreign policy. Only 2 in 10 state that they do not approve of his policies, while 3 in 10 prefer not to take sides.

This is the result of a scientific poll conducted by the Metrix Research Center throughout the country, 2 years after PASOK came to power. These data show impressively the degree of confidence the Greek people have in the premier. It is also worth noting how small the percentage is of those who today express their opposition to the way Papandreou handles the various issues (only 2 in 10).

One should not lose sight of the fact that the "ratio" of "undecided"--sought in other polls--gives the premier a much higher level of confidence since the overwhelming majority of those who have and express an opinion are in favor of his policies.

This poll was conducted in 24 representative urban, semi-urban, and agricultural areas by 32 specialized poll takers and with a larger sample--according to international scientific specifications. The question posed was: Would you like to tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way Premier Papandreou handles the various issues? Please respond after you weigh the pros and cons, by saying only "I approve" or "I disapprove."

According to the responses, the results are:

Forty eight percent approve the premier's policies--and they state this

openly;

Twenty two percent do not approve--and they state so clearly; and

Thirty percent prefer not to commit themselves today with a specific statement.

From the analysis and crosschecking of these data we find that the Papandreou policy is approved at the same high degree by all social and economic classes and in all urban, semi-urban, and farming areas of the country. More specifically, the premier's policies are approved by:

- a) Forty nine percent of the "higher" income strata, 48 percent by the "middle" and 49 percent by the "lower" income groups;
- b) Forty nine percent of the Athens' inhabitants, 46 percent of Salonika, 48 percent of the other urban centers, 50 percent of semi-urban areas and 47 percent of farm areas. (In the same areas the negative percentages are: 25 in Athens, 19 in Salonika, 23 in the other urban centers, 22 in semi-urban, and 16 in farm areas.)
- c. Fifty two percent of those between 25 and 64 years of age and 42 percent of younger age; and
- d) Fifty percent of men and 46 percent of women.

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CSO: 3521/49

POLL SHOWS PAPANDREOU IN FAVOR BUT LACKING IN TRUST

Athens ENA in Greek 20 Oct 83 pp 10-11

/Text/ Seventy nine percent acknowledge /Papandreou's/ rare leadership talents; 62 percent consider him unreliable for fulfilling his promises and commitments.

The people admire Andreas Papandreou but they trust him less and less. This derives from the second ENA opinion poll conducted among the voters in Athens and Piraeus with regard to the personality of the premier. The admiration refers to his leadership talents. To the question whether A. Papandreou prevails in the party and whether all accept him as the leader, the present premier receives an impressive percentage of positive responses, that is 79 percent of those questioned. On the other hand, the increasing mistrust of public opinion is shown on one crucial point: the question whether Papandreou is trustworthy and whether he fulfills his promises. Only 38 percent gave a positive response.

Almost 2 years after the victory of PASOK, the electorate in the Athens-Piraeus region believes that the premier has at a high level a series of qualities which compose the political, leadership, and human side of his personality. At the same time, however, the electorate finds that he is unreliable and to a certain extent insincere.

The data indicate the personal opinion the respondent has about the premier today. Yet, this view has been shaped in the course of a fairly long period. The questions given contained 10 characteristics covering several aspects, and the respondent had the ability to say which one fit Papandreou: "very much," "much", "less", or "not at all."

With regard to most qualities, in the very much and much categories, the premier received around 59-79 percent from all respondents. The same measurement was done in November-December 1980. The image of the premier, held by public opinion, is very positive too...extremely positive. This last point is not made with tongue in cheek.

Let us see the responses on three qualities which reflect the leadership of the premier's personality:

He prevails in the party, being accepted by all as the leader (very much/much, 79 percent).

He is interested in seeing social justice in the country (very much/much, 70 percent).

He is capable of handling the big problems facing the country (very much/much, 63 percent).

We should remember that as a party PASOK received 41 percent of the vote in Athens, according to an opinion poll published in ENA last week.

This means that the premier personally receives more support than that received by the party he leads, and to an extent which at times covers the entire political spectrum. With regard to the qualities which characterize the political side of the premier's personality, public opinion feels very much/much that

- a) He is objective and respects his political opponents (61 percent);
- b) He seeks dialogue with all social groups (61 percent);
- c) He is capable of keeping social tranquility and a calm political climate (60 percent);
- d) He is a straightforward and sincere politician (47 percent); and
- e) He is trustworthy and fulfills his promises (38 percent).

The last quality is of primary importance for the image of a political leader because it refers to his credibility and his ability to implement the plans he has presented.

The 38 percent, therefore, reflects a first reservation on whether or how he can implement his programs. This reservation, which is counted against the premier, in effect reflects the mistrust and displeasure of public opinion because of the lack of effectiveness of the governmental policy in various sectors.

This position is supported by the fact that 63 percent consider the premier "capable of handling the big problems facing this country." Finally, with regard to the qualities which characterize the human side of the premier, 59 percent believe very much/much that he "inspires personal confidence;" and 66 percent that he is "simple in his behavior and democratic in his thinking."

His PASOK followers give him even higher percentages in all cases than those given by other respondents. Still, the reservation as to whether he is trustworthy and whether he fulfills his promises applies to them, too. Only 66 percent said this quality applies very much/much to the premier while the

percentage of approval on the other qualities range generally between 83 and 91 percent.

We find that Papandreou, who in 1980 already had an excellent image for the PASOK voters, succeeded within 2 years in power to improve this image even more, and to transform it almost to ideal.

At this point it must be said that Papandreou is the one political leader of a Western European country for whom the public opinion of his country formed a very positive image without the decisive support of television.

In 1980 Papandreou already had a high level of approval for several political and leadership qualities as shown by the data we publish here. The changes that took place since then are due in part to the wider acceptance that accompanies a political leader after his electoral success.

What is important, however, is that the premier is burdened with heavier responsibilities than what he would have "normally", precisely because of the confidence shown in him by public opinion.

We already noted the reservation expressed on his trustworthiness and implementation of his promises. This element should not be isolated and be regarded as accidental or marginal. Much more, it shows that the "resilience" of a leading personality has certain limits which reach a breaking point at a given moment.

The Technical Aspects of Poll Taking

The poll was conducted by Nielsen, the known research institute, from 29 September to 4 October 1983 and covered an area which includes the electoral districts of A' and B' Athens, and A' and B' Piraeus. The sample reached 621 persons representative of the entire population of 18 to 69 years of age who vote in this area. To select the sample Nielsen used maps with the area's housing blocks. Altogether, 78 "starting" points were selected and at each point 8 interviews were held. The poll was taken by 25 researchers under 3 controllers. They were persons with special training and experience in similar polls. Almost all pollsters had participated in similar polls in 1980-1981.

A Picture of the Premier

	Number of Respondents		PASOK Followers	
	Very much/ Now %	Much Then %	Very much/ Now %	Much Then %
He keeps and fulfills his promises	38	21	66	51
He is objective and respects his political opponents	61	43	84	72
He is concerned with having social justice in the country	70	59	91	87
He is simple in behavior and demo- cratic in his thinking	66	44	89	84
He seeks dialogue with all social groups	61	58	83	82
A straight and sincere politician	47	34	74	69
He prevails in his party and is accepted by all as leader	79	69	88	89
He is capable of handling the big problems facing the country	63	43	87	81
He is capable of keeping the social calm and a tranquil political climate	60	35	85	71
He inspires personal trust	59	45	91	87

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CS0: 3521/49

DESCRIPTION OF TYPICAL PAPANDREOU WORKING DAY

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 23 Oct 83 pp 10-11

/Article by Mikhalis Dimitriou/

/Excerpts/ Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has evolved his own techniques and methods (from the time he was a hard-working professor and political leader) which productively increase his limited 24-hour schedule. For example, while telephoning he glances at newspapers, looks at a television program and at the same time thinks and makes notes. While shaving in the morning he often dictates some message or other or gives orders. While having breakfast he discusses matters with some close associate, signs certain "routine" documents and at the same time is informed about some urgent matter.

Indeed, Mr Papandreou --who goes to bed after 1 am on a daily basis and swims early in the morning on many wintry days-- is truly a 64-year old biological phenomenon.

Starts Out With Exercises

The prime minister's day begins at 7:30 am with brief exercises and some jogging around the Galini Park. In the past (and in recent months even less so) Mr Papandreou used to get up very early (around 6:30 am) and go bathing in the area of Skhoinia, Marathona, from the beginning of spring to late fall. Of course, he continues his early morning bathing but now only on the week ends when he is in Lagonisi.

Following his exercises he dresses and then has breakfast with Mrs Margarita Papandreou and with any of their children who are at home at the time. In the past breakfast was bountiful (eggs, etc.) since Mr Papandreou was usually forced to skip his main meal (at noon). Now breakfast consists only of toast, marmalade, butter, a little bacon and Greek coffee. The prime minister does not especially like milk.

Usually at breakfast the prime minister reads both Greek and foreign newspapers and then begins work with his office associates: Mrs Angela Kokkola and Mikhalis Ziangas.

The prime minister reads all the Greek newspapers and some foreign ones including LE MONDE, the HERALD TRIBUNE, THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE LONDON TIMES, LE MATIN

and certain others. Every Tuesday he also reads the Sunday edition of THE NEW YORK TIMES. Moreover, every morning he reads three special bulletins prepared for him by the General Press Secretariat. One is a review of the Greek press, the second a review of the international press which contain articles on Greece (political, the Cyprus issue, relations with Turkey, etc.), while the third deals with a review of international issues taken from the front pages of the major foreign newspapers together with analyses by international press agencies.

The burden of systematic daily briefings, often made heavier by telephone calls and the upsetting of his daily schedule, etc., is compounded by telegrams from Greek embassies abroad. This bulky file from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with messages, reports, briefs, etc., is sent to Kastrì by the prime minister's diplomatic office. Through the same channels are sent the personal notes prepared by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kharalambopoulos and Deputy Ministers Giannis Kapsis and Karolos Papoulias

It is almost 9 am and if there is no previously planned special activity that forces him to leave Kastrì or the Maximos Building, the prime minister begins his regular work in accordance with the daily agenda.

The prime minister's regular appointments begin at 11 am sometimes at Kastrì sometimes at the Maximos Building (always on Friday). Up to that time he works with Mrs Angela Kokkola with whom he is in continuous contact all day long over his appointments, the requirements of the day, requests for an audience, invitations that must be answered, messages and greetings he must send, documents from foreign governments and officials, etc. According to the special interest or importance of these issues, close associates are assigned to draft answers or to receive visitors. Certain of these associates are admitted to work together with him or are informed by telephone.

Among these associates are Mr Andonios Livanis, director general of the political office; Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas, minister to the prime minister; Mr Gr. Kasimatis, a professor and director of the legal office; Mr Andonios Stratis, his political adviser; Mr Khristos Makhairitsas, director of the diplomatic office; and Mr Giannis Papanikolaou, director of the economic office. These are the men who most often and more than anyone else see the prime minister during the morning hours. During these meetings --as in the case when he reads his newspapers and bulletins earlier-- the prime minister telephones some minister or other to discuss some issue or make some observation, makes notes, signs orders, checks off those things that had been done (and how) on the basis of prior orders, requests answers to what certain published reports allege, etc. During these morning hours the prime minister is in frequent contact with Mr Giannis Alevras, president of the chamber of deputies (with whom he discusses general matters). Also with ministers I. Kharalambopoulos, Gerasimos Arsenis, Giannis Pottakis, Giorgos Gennimatas and Aki Tsokhatzopoulos, as well as with deputy ministers Kostas Laliotis and Dimitrios Maroudas who often "bears the burden" over what is being written by certain newspapers and over what is being written for television stations.

If the prime minister's schedule provides for his going to the Ministry of National Defense, usually every Thursday, then he goes to the Pentagon and stays there until 4-5 pm to work with deputy ministers Andonis Drosogiannis and Pavs. Zakolikos, as well as with the chiefs of staff, etc.

On other days, the prime minister either stays at Kastri or goes to the Maximos Building to continue his work. In both places, regardless of what foreign visitor he is to see or what kind of work he is to do with ministers, directors, etc., Mr Papandreou deems it indispensable that he be previously briefed on all the facts to be discussed and on all the latest developments.

All of the above-mentioned associates participate, as needed, in the preparation of these briefings of the prime minister that are often detailed with reports from files and with exchanges of views.

The regular appointments of the prime minister are scheduled to last around 20 minutes but they usually last longer. Mrs Angela Kokkola implements the prime minister's instructions and desires with experience and skill. Mr Papandreou is never a cut and dry fellow-conversationalist and he never discusses with his counterpart, be he Greek or a foreigner, the subject of the meeting exclusively, be it economic, political, diplomatic or other. He will always ask something more, if, indeed, he knows that the person with whom he is talking is specialized in some professional or technical field. He always shows interest in his family (if he knows it). He always wants to hear his listener's evaluations of his country as well as his impressions of Greece, about the course of the government, etc.

"It is natural that with such tactics of the prime minister," a close associate comments, "he will be continually briefed but also the appointment schedule will be drawn out." So, Mrs Angela Kokkola and other close associates can do nothing but be patient over the next scheduled appointment.

If, however, Mr Papandreou "recharges his batteries" by having such meetings and contacts and by meeting more or less well-known people, he also has contacts with unnamed persons. Of course, the prime minister does not accept to meet any mere Greek citizen who asks for an appointment. This is natural since "that is not his job." The exception, however, --usually through the intervention of Mrs Margarita Papandreou and Mrs A. Kokkola-- are meetings with Greeks from abroad who were tied to him during the dictatorship period.

The prime minister is said to have commented, "These people were right beside us during difficult moments and they did not expect anything from us." He welcomes these immigrants with great cordiality, not only at the Maximos Building but often at Kastri where he has them for lunch or dinner. These people are another "channel" of communication for the prime minister as regards the feelings of the people. His discussions with them over the given situation and over "how we are getting along with the Change" is sincere and straightforward.

In the intervening time between breakfast and the midday meal, that often takes place between 3:30 pm and 4 pm, the prime minister can --but not always-- eat two or three improvised little snacks. He might also drink a watered-down ouzo with these snacks. The prime minister's noonday meal --"he eats everything and he is not picky"-- is light, mainly greens, salad, meat (usually a cutlet) or

baked fish (preferably sole). One preference, however, is unshakeable and that is his wine. For years now he has preferred it white and Greek, so much so that people in his immediate entourage doubt that he has ever tasted red wine. Indeed, certain foreign table companions of the prime minister have commented that his insistence on the virtues of Greek white wines extends as far as ..being used as a shampoo!

At noon or rather in the afternoon there is an hour of relaxation, namely between 5 and 6 pm, either at Kastri or at the Maximos Building. Then begins another phase of daily work that is similar to the morning's and that goes on until midnight or 1 am.

Contacts, reports, study of files, memoranda, meetings, telephone calls, appointments. According to the time, the prime minister communicates by phone, and very often so, with well-known European leaders, ranging from Francois Mitterrand and Olof Palme to Mario Soares and Bettino Craxi. These same European leaders very often phone the prime minister. He is also in communication with ministers who are abroad on various missions (always, of course, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Kharalambopoulos), as well as with old friends and associates in West Europe, Canada and the United States. According to the importance of given issues, the prime minister has special phone contacts and work with various ministers, for example, Messrs Koutsogiorgas, Arsenis, Pottakis, Gennimatas, Tsokhatzopoulos and Skoularikis, as well as with deputy ministers such as Messrs Maroudas, Kapsis, Laliotis and Drosogiannis.

Friendly Evening Get-togethers

Many evenings the prime minister takes a break from his many long hours of work inasmuch as friendly evening get-togethers are organized for deputies of the Movement (by groups), for friends of the family or friends of the children. In the past the prime minister used to devote some evenings to political editors at Kastri at which time he used to listen to their anecdotes. He is a pleasant listener even though in the long run the conversation of the evening inevitably turns to politics.

Despite the fact that the prime minister's hours are limited he always understands the feelings of his invited guest to discuss things with him until late at midnight, thus violating the protocol that says that visits on these nights should not go beyond 3 hours. Even though it may be 1 am or later the prime minister will take the time to bid goodnight to each and every guest and thank him for being present that evening.

Among the most regular guests during these impromptu evenings at Kastri are the following because of old friendly ties: Mr Vasilis Kafiris, director of the Agricultural Bank; Mr Gerasimos Kavvadias, president of EOF /expansion unknown/; Mr Kostas Tsimas, director general of ELTA /Greek Posts/; Mr Nikos Skoulas, secretary general of EOT /Greek Tourist Organization/; Dr Themis Lambrinopoulos and others. Also, besides Minister of Merchant Marine Giorgos Katsifaras, regular table companions of the prime minister at Kastri or at "Leonida," and at "Astera" and Lagonisi in summer are Mr Stelios Panagopoulos, director of the National Bank, and some of his close associates either in the political office or in government.

The prime minister usually goes to bed between midnight and 1 am. Sometimes when there are critical issues to be discussed or meetings to be held and that last a long time the schedule could go on until 4 am.

At other times the prime minister --who follows the news programs at 9 pm and 9:30 pm over the two channels regardless of where he is in Greece-- usually reads some book, mainly a foreign scientific one picked up from the pile of books that have accumulated in his office. From the time he was a professor Mr Papandreou had learned the so-called "rapid reading" system that permits him to read amazingly fast while at the same time to understand the contents of the book, document or newspaper.

At other times when he wants to relax and enjoy a few comfortable moments he looks at some detective or war movie on television. If the evening's program does not interest him he prefers reading some Greek or foreign magazine. He sleeps about 6 hours and then wakes up to begin another tough day of work.

/Note: The caption of one of the accompanying photographs shows Mr Papandreou with Mr Andonis Stratis, his political adviser. The caption reads: "Mr Andonis Stratis is the oldest of the prime minister's associates and perhaps the only one among his most trusted colleagues who addresses him in the singular -- familiar-- form."/

5671

CSO: 3521/57

CONSERVATIVES' BENKOW ON ELECTION SETBACK, 1985 PLATFORM

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Eivind G. Karlsen]

[Text] The healthcare system, including care for the aged, must be given unreserved and clear priority in the years to come.

With this declaration, Conservative Party chairman Jo Benkow set his party's course toward a new nonsocialist coalition victory in the 1985 general elections.

The three coalition parties are all determined to conduct antiinflationary policies. They want to strengthen our economy and our competitiveness, thereby intensifying the battle against unemployment, especially among youth. Their strategy will include significant tax relief. Economic moderation is necessary now to secure the welfare state in Norway during the 1980's and 1990's.

In defense and security matters, the nonsocialist government stands for unwavering Western unity--in contrast to the capriciousness of the Labor Party.

Conservative Party chairman and parliamentary leader Jo Benkow was not discouraged by the election setback, although he has expressed thoughts critical of his party in that regard. The leader of the largest coalition party is preoccupied with unsolved problems and the true political test of strength 2 years from now. AFTENPOSTEN discussed several urgent issues with him.

[Question] Social security--what does this mean when patients must sleep in corridors, there is a shortage of convalescent homes, etc?

[Answer] We now have more hospitals and hospital beds than ever before and there has been an enormous increase in patient care in their own homes. But figures and statistics cannot hide reality: The number of our elderly is now increasing so rapidly that, despite our efforts, we are falling behind. It is bad enough that people must sleep in corridors, but that is not the worst of it--at least they receive considerate treatment and care. It is even more

tragic that many invalid people must wait long periods of time for special hospital treatment that could help them recover and become capable of working again.

Benkow said that public health must be given unreserved and clear priority in the coming years. Obviously, this priority includes care for the aged--but despite sharp annual increases in appropriations for these purposes, it will take a long time before we can meet these needs in a satisfactory manner.

"I have always said that social and medical security must be given top priority. Incidentally, AFTENPOSTEN has whole-heartedly and unfailingly supported me in this effort. It is for purposes such as this that we need economic growth."

"I believe the time is now right for open-minded discussions across political lines on organizational problems in the healthcare and social sector. Should we discontinue certain facilities in order to build up other more necessary ones? We must have the courage to make such evaluations."

[Question] You say it is unrealistic to solve these problems in a short time. That is of little consolation to those suffering want today.

[Answer] It would be even worse to give the impression that there are easy shortcuts that could make these problems disappear. But we must try to improvise: Forms of economic support to family members to care for their own elderly relatives and others in need of care are being considered by the social affairs minister. It could be that in such situations the feeling of togetherness could be supportive to the patient.

[Question] And the economy will take care of all this? Perhaps the necessity of tax reductions in this picture is not as easy to explain as the fact that our currency has increased in value--for everyone--because the government has succeeded in its battle against inflation.

[Answer] One of my urgent tasks has been to get across the idea that our tax reductions are not designed to give additional spending money to people who are fortunate enough to have jobs and income. We want tax reductions to help increase the real income of wage earners without sky-high taxes. A policy of this type would keep wage costs at a lower level without hurting wage earners. This reduces operating costs considerably and when operating costs are kept down it is cheaper to produce goods. This, in turn, increases our competitiveness. We can produce at prices that will make it possible to sell our goods. And, as we know, this is a prerequisite for low unemployment.

Direct support through the national budget and changes in the corporate tax structure can never have as positive an effect on cost levels as tax reductions that lead to moderate wage demands and moderate labor contracts. In this connection, I might mention that LO (Federation of Trade Unions) chairman Tor Halvorsen organized a political strike against tax reductions when the budget was presented in the fall of 1982. Nevertheless, these tax reductions were

taken into account when LO presented its demands several months later!

In addition, and in today's situation this is the most important reason for genuine tax relief, reduced marginal taxes would result in greater enthusiasm and initiative.

[Question] Is there sufficient agreement within the middle parties for these measures?

[Answer] The significant tax reductions already implemented probably are the best proof of this. I believe the coalition parties are capable of agreeing on reasonable reductions that we all can live with. And I believe that we can honestly base the 1985 elections on the tax issue if the opposition is prepared to do so.

[Question] Obviously, the battle against unemployment will be a main theme in that election. It is foremost in the minds of many that large numbers of young people could leave school without having a job to go to.

[Answer] That is the greatest challenge of our time. Apart from the significant effort already begun to offer continuing education and apprentice contracts, we must encourage local communities to establish contacts with the labor market, business, and local authorities to see what can be done on the local level. Such initiatives should be able to count on government support. I believe we should also provide additional support to establish even more apprentice contracts. We should redouble our efforts in this area.

[Question] The coalition government will continue working, unaffected by the results of local elections. Many people within the Conservative Party probably believed that the minority government could continue to rule until 1985. This was indicated by the fact that the rebuilding of the government last summer came as a surprise even to some who were directly involved in these events. Had Conservative Party representatives convinced themselves that the Conservative government would last that long?

[Answer] It cannot be denied that many enthusiastic members were quite satisfied with a pure Conservative Party government. But I am sure that we have broad support among our voters and representatives for actively promoting a majority government as soon as this became possible. After all, that had been our goal since the 1981 election victory. I am convinced that all non-socialist voters will recognize the significance of having the three present coalition parties welded into a viable and credible unit well before the 1985 elections. This is what is happening right now.

Conservative Party chairman Benkow had much to say about his party's setback in this year's elections. "There is no reason to deceive ourselves. We were clearly unable to mobilize our people. The defeat cannot be blamed simply on stay-at-home voters and indifference. People were disappointed, too. Perhaps we had a tendency to repeat the 1981 election campaign. And what was

worse, we misjudged the situation. We believed we would have a good showing, as predicted by the opinion polls. As a result, our political message was too stagnant and retrospective. We were not sufficiently offensive-minded," Benkow admitted.

But the Conservative Party is taking itself by the scruff of the neck, both politically and organizationally, under the leadership of a chairman with drive. He has called the local party secretaries to a meeting on Friday. He hopes, in this way, to find the reasons for the election setback. The Conservative Party will not "clean house," although that sometimes is necessary and refreshing.

9336

CS0: 3639/14

POLL MEASURES GOVERNMENT RATING WITH VOTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute]/
AFTENPOSTEN: Conservative People Most Satisfied with Government's Job"]

[Text] The Conservative administration was a little more popular than the present 3-party administration. In April of this year 49 percent of the people were satisfied with the job of the government at that time. An additional 3 percent thought the same in June. However, in August only 46 percent answered that they were satisfied with the job the 3-party government had done up to then. It is mostly Conservative voters who speak positively of the new government's job, a whole 83 percent. On the other hand, 30 and 37 percent, respectively, of the Christian People's Party's and Center Party's voters answer that they are dissatisfied.

This is drawn from a poll the Norsk Opinionsinstitutt A/S [Norwegian Opinion Institute, Inc.] took for AFTENPOSTEN.

"Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's job up to now?"
This question was asked in April. Forty-nine percent answered that they were satisfied, 43 percent were dissatisfied and 9 percent did not know.

Two months later the following question was asked: "Are you satisfied with the job the former government did, i.e., the purely Conservative government we had up to June this year?"

Fifty-two percent of those asked were satisfied, 37 percent dissatisfied and 11 percent did not know.

In August it was asked, "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's job up to now?"

Then 6 percent fewer than in June answered that they were satisfied, i.e., 46 percent, 45 percent were dissatisfied and 8 percent did not know.

As far as the August poll is concerned, it appears that Conservative voters are most satisfied with the 3-party government's job, i.e., 83 percent of

those asked. People who are Socialist Left Party adherents are most dissatisfied. An entire 80 percent answered negatively. Then come the Labor Party's adherents, 74 percent of whom were dissatisfied with the new government's job.

Questions

April 1983: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's job up to now?

June 1983: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the job the former government did, i.e., the Conservative government we had up to 1 June of this year?

August 1983: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's job up to now?

<u>Answer</u>	<u>1983</u>		
	<u>April</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>August</u>
	%	%	%
Satisfied	49	52	46
Dissatisfied	43	37	45
Do not know	9	11	8
Total	101	100	99
Number asked	1004	1003	1005

There is thus somewhat less satisfaction in August with the 3-party government than there was in April and June with the purely Conservative government.

Oslo, 4 September 1983, Norsk Opinionsinstitutt A/S.

As far as those who answered that they were satisfied are concerned, the answers were distributed thus in terms of party support: Labor Party--20 percent, Conservative--83 percent, Christian People's--65 percent, Center--59 percent, Progressive--54 percent, Socialist Left--12 percent, and Liberal--43 percent.

Six percent of supporters of the Labor Party, Conservative Party and Liberal Party, respectively, did not know whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied. For the other parties' voters the "do not know" answers are distributed as follows: Christian People's Party--5 percent, Center Party--4 percent, Progressive--9 percent, and Socialist Left--8 percent.

Fifty-three percent of those who were satisfied with the 3-party administration's work had a family income of 160,000 kroner or more. The family income was under 100,000 kroner for half of those who answered that they were dissatisfied.

The poll also took into account to what extent those asked are union organized or not. Of those who answered positively regarding the government's job 23 percent were members of LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions]. Fifty-two percent belonged to other trade organizations, while 51 percent were not organized in any trade organization.

ELECTION SUCCESS FOR PROGRESSIVE PARTY REFLECTS NORDIC TREND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Sep 83 p 2

[Commentary by Tor Bjorklund and Bernt Hagtvet: "Dissatisfaction Parties Under Magnifying Glass"]

[Text] No other Scandinavian protest parties channel an urban protest so keenly as the Norwegian Progressive Party. The Progressive Party's regional profile signifies intensification of the traditional center--the peripheral in Norwegian election geography. These are some of the conclusions which can be drawn from the year's municipal and county board elections as far as one of the two success parties is concerned, the Progressive Party.

The Conservative Wave with a capital C rolled back to a level approaching the 1977 Storting election. The Progressive party, on the other hand--the party for "us tax-and-duty-bled small people," as Anders Lange once expressed it--crept a notch above the result from the party's breakthrough election in 1973, with 6.3 percent this year and 5 percent then. The result this year is really less sensational than 10 years ago. Altogether the right wing in Norwegian politics received 32.5 percent of the votes in the county board elections. This makes the Conservative Wave still strong. Only the 1981 election gave a bigger count. Every third voter now belongs to the right wing, against every fifth, as was the case in the postwar elections until the wave rose in the 70's.

Stay-at-Homes--How Important?

In the commentaries after the election the losers, especially the Conservatives, sought refuge in a relatively high percentage of stay-at-homes. If the Conservative Party's decline is to be able to be explained exclusively by means of the force of armchair voters, the decline would clearly have to be smaller in municipalities with a big turnout as compared with the 1981 Storting election, and bigger in municipalities with many stay-at-homes.

Such an interpretation hardly holds in detailed studies. What distinguished the Conservative Wave in its rise distinguishes it also in its decline. The Conservative Party is retreating as it advanced: everywhere in the country, regardless of region or the municipality's economic structure. The turnout varied a good deal, but the Conservative Party's support does not appear to

vary systematically with the turnout at the ballot boxes. The result stands out and distinct patterns between decline and voter participation cannot be traced unambiguously. A trend which is delineated, however, is the fact that the Conservative Wave was extra strong in the '81 election and the decline this year is equally pronounced. It can thus appear that the wave metaphor hits the mark well. A wave's nature is to be transitory. Easy come, easy go.

An Urban Phenomenon

The Progressive Party is strongest in urban districts. Right since its beginning in 1973 it is the cities which have given the Progressive Party the clearest support, especially the biggest cities in South Norway and surrounding areas. After the year's election the Progressive Party is the third biggest party in Oslo, Stavanger, Drammen and Bergen. However, the party is doing less well in cities north of Dovre. The farther north, the worse the result, with the oil town of Harstad as an exception. On the whole the party can mark its biggest advance where it was strong before. The party's regional profile has therefore become even sharper--and this in a time when the traditional regional dividing lines in Norwegian politics are on the point of being blurred and Sørlandet's and Vestlandet's deviation in the direction of supporting the in-between parties is almost history. In this situation the Progressive Party, with its heavy concentration in urban areas, represents an interesting new case of regionalization in Norwegian election geography. The party is an example of a revived regional axis.

This is expressed most clearly in the Progressive Party's support in the Conservative Party's old stomping ground, the Oslo Fjord area. The Progressive Party has also made an advance in the right wing's new area of strength in the west--the Rogaland oil county and, in part, Hordaland. But Rogaland is not the Progressive Party's best single county, such as it was in earlier Storting elections. Now it has been surpassed by Oslo, although by only a half of a percent. But the Progressive Party also received important nourishment from the Labor Party--illustrated by the party's strong position on Oslo's East Side. This is of recent date. In the 1973 election Anders Lange's Party received only a little under 3 percent in traditional working class sections on the East Side. The party's breakthrough on the East Side came in 1981 and continued this year, although the advance now is generally greater in West Side circles.

Crest of the Foam

A trait which could be traced already in 1981 became still more obvious this year. Two years ago it was formulated thusly: When the Conservative Wave with a capital C grows markedly--up around 40 percent or more--it seldom rises further; it foams all the more. The crest of the foam is the Progressive Party.

An illustration of this viewpoint is the Conservative Party's fate in Baerum, where the party in 1981 received 56.5 percent. All the same, a slight decline took place for the party (1 to 2 percent) as compared with 1979. In these core areas for the Conservative Party the Progressive Party had good

elections in 1981. The party can record still better results this year. In the four municipalities where the Conservative Party had over half of the voters--Baerum, Asker, N tter y and Tj me--the Conservative Party received on average 54 percent and the Progressive Party 6 percent. In this year's election the corresponding figures were 47 percent for the Conservative Party and 13 percent for the Progressive Party. In other words, Carl I. Hagen reaped the benefit of an opposition wave with sources both in national-policy and local conditions. When the Conservative Party possesses the power-bestowing positions both locally and centrally, siphoning of voters to the Progressive Party becomes especially great. The basis for the Progressive Party lay also in unfulfilled expectations and in the hope of a change of system and not only a changing of the guard.

"Suppressed and Unknown Reality" [in Danish]

In order to grasp the distinctively Norwegian aspect of the Progressive Party's appeal, it can be useful to take a look at the other Scandinavian countries. It is a historical irony that the Norwegian Progressive Party is now experiencing an advance while the Danish model's back is broken--a jailed party leader and a split Folketing group. Today the Norwegian Progressive Party has more voters than the Danish if we are to believe the Danish polls which give Glistrup support of around 5 percent.

The Danish Progressive Party is, in contrast to the Norwegian, a distinctive provincial protest: a cry against a decline in values which people in the provinces have perceived as central. A Danish writer, Carsten Jensen, has described the situation as follows: "When the Progressive Party popped up at the beginning of the 70's it was a suppressed and unknown piece of reality which found its way into official Denmark's consciousness: the other Denmark, the Denmark of the provinces. It was a past we thought was over, which suddenly stared at us in an encounter, the forgotten country, the provinces of diligence and the work ethic, which in incomprehensible dialects questioned the welfare society's conquests [in Danish]."

The Danish and Norwegian provincial districts are not comparable. Still, an obvious difference in the two parties' social and political appeal can be struck: Both parties draw a center-periphery profile. But the two parties each have their own center of gravity, the Norwegian at the center, and the Danish on the periphery.

The Finnish Small Farmers' Protest

With time Glistrup's foothold in the provinces has become stronger. In his prime Glistrup combined the Finnish Rural Party's appeal for the provinces with Anders Lange's helping hand to over-administered and tax-weary city dwellers. Herein lies a key to the Danish party's early success. When Glistrup's party now has lost from about 16 percent in the 1973 election to about 5 percent today, it has approximated the Vennamo party's voter profile. In 1983 the Danish Progressive Party, according to the polls, has upward of one half of its voters in rural districts, where 28 percent of the population

resides. Nevertheless, the farming element is not especially great. The share they constitute of the party's voter ranks--8 percent--is surpassed, to be sure, just by the Liberal farmer's party.

The Finnish protest party under Vennamo's leadership has gotten its votes primarily from small farmers. The party has been contemplated as a protest against "development" which tripped up the social existence of Finnish small farmers. In contrast with the Norwegian Progressive Party, Vennamo channeled a distinct provincial protest and as such more resembles Glistrup.

Various features of Danish and Norwegian Progressive Party propaganda can be seen in connection with differences in the parties' regional centers of gravity. Glistrup and his adherents often emphasize the "simple." Kristen Poulsgaard--the Progressive Party's leading cultural policy spokesman--recommends going back to the "treasury of song hidden in the high school song-book [in Danish]." The desire is to maintain traditions from the Danish village. In addition, it has been indicated that provincial Denmark should stop subsidizing the cultural interests of the upper classes in Copenhagen--an echo from the legendary slaughterhouse workers in Vejle.

No corresponding features are found in the Norwegian party. With his appearance of polished urbane culture, Hagen is poorly suited as a supporter of Norwegian rural traditions and Norwegian provincial consciousness. The Norwegian periphery is also not presented as any milk cow for the cities. On the contrary. Provincial Norway is subsidized by the cities, it is said. Tax pressure on city dwellers is said to increase as the result of big transferring of funds to sparsely populated districts, in part in the form of subsidies for primary businesses.

In Norwegian election history the protest from the provinces has gone to the left, from Thrane's organizing of farm workers and tenant farmers in Østlandet, via Alfred Eriksen's appeal in the "class-polarized north," to use Stein Rokkan's description of North Norway. These inter-Scandinavian differences throw a revealing light on the more universal conditions for conservative populist flareups and put the Progressive Party in its expected place in election history.

Conservative Populism

The word "populism" covers a broad-spectrum political reality. The concept itself can quickly obscure rather than reveal. But common to all populist movements, and the Progressive Party, too, is the belief that the judgement of the common people and their interests take precedence over the political elite. This basic attitude readily results in extensive scepticism of central norms and decision makers in the capital--and in idolizing of spontaneous popular wisdom and energy freed of all unnecessary complications. The examples of this profile are many and extend over several ideological poles. The word is especially used for 1890's populism in the USA, which directed itself precisely against the "bosses" and politicians in Washington and in the big trusts. George Wallace played on the same scepticism regarding the center when he raised the "states rights" banner in the 60's. How mobile

populist trends can be seen from Wallace's later career; Now he takes the side of all underprivileged people, also that of the blacks, against "the big"--and was elected on this in Alabama.

In our part of the world the concept is associated primarily with French "poujadisme" of the 50's, an anti-tax movement consisting of the lower middle classes, craftsmen, farmers and storekeepers.

Which direction populist movements take is dependent on the country's political culture. "Poujadisme" was in a strongly democratic-republican tradition and spoke heatedly in its attacks against State power and public bureaucracy for an almost Jacobin revolutionary value basis. In Germany, where precisely these traditions have been lacking, lower middle class movements with the same social basis have had a tendency to rapidly become hostile to the system, illiberal and anti-democratic. Here conservative populist movements have shown themselves to become fruitful recruiting grounds for fascist appeals.

Our Norwegian version of conservative populism is characterized by the fact that it wants to push back the boundaries of State power. It is doing this liberalistically in an American republican tradition. But it is part of a community with many pitfalls. It remains to be seen whether Hagen is able to restrain the traits which are also found in this tradition: hostility to culture and intellectuals; belief in the right of the strong and power of business, often with ruthless inequality as a result; dismantling of public subsidy arrangements; and nationalism slipping into ethnocentrism and racism. That the Progressive Party still expresses a desire to help the elderly can perhaps be considered a sign that the party is primordially Norwegian when all is said in done. In such an equality-oriented political culture as Norway's, all parties are so "deeply social-democratized" that purely liberalistic appeals would get nowhere. They are historically unfounded and rootless and would quickly result in political leprosy.

8985
CSO: 3639/12

CONSERVATIVE, PROGRESSIVE LEADERS DEBATE POLICIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Oct 83 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "'Abyss Away From Cold Hagen Party'"]

[Text] "I feel coldness from the Progressive Party, especially as far as humane responsibility for third-world countries is concerned, in social policy and in the district policy. The Conservative Party cannot cooperate with a party which is far removed from us in important areas," Secretary of State Erling Norvik says in a confrontation with Progressive Party Leader Carl I. Hagen. "We are carrying out the policy the Conservative Party did before it entered the government," Hagen counters. These two exchange blows regarding conservatism/liberalism.

Secretary of State Erling Norvik states that in a number of areas there is a deep ideological abyss between the Conservative and Progressive parties. "In practical political work we must have it out with the party where ideology results in various attitudes and decisions. But, of course, we have our main ideological clash with the Labor Party. Those who are now demanding that we should almost exclude the Progressive Party as 'impure' must be aware that in this case it is the party's voters who are penalized. In individual counties and municipalities we must have election engineering cooperation with the Progressive Party, which however does not imply any alliance with the party or that we are supporting the party's viewpoints."

Impasse

Hagen: "Then you do not see anything wrong in all parties which are considered to be in the non-socialist camp cooperating in elections of mayors, deputy mayors, etc., rather than cooperating with the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party, because the in-between parties do not want to have anything to do with us?"

Norvik: "No, the Progressive Party belongs to the non-socialist side, but what I am afraid of in the long run is not the Progressive Party as a competitor of the Conservative Party, but that the party's attitudes can destroy opportunities to convert a non-socialist voter majority here in the country into a non-socialist administration. Other parties can come to a total impasse because of the Progressive Party's extreme viewpoints."

Hagen: "The aversion of other parties to us is due to the fact that you ascribe views to us which we do not have, in order to force the Conservative Party to dissociate itself from us. The fantastic agitation against us is based on completely erroneous premises, as parts of your own opening remarks are."

Norvik: "Not in my opinion. I see an important dividing line in attitudes toward our fellow man. In the view of the Conservative Party we have a collective responsibility for our fellow man in our own country who cannot themselves provide for their own security, and to work actively for the same thing for people beyond our borders, too."

Hagen: "We agree on the first thing, and we disagree on the last."

Norvik: "It is typical of the Progressive Party to restrict responsibility for our fellow man so that it will not apply where it is unfortunately a burden for the parties. In any case we do not compromise with international responsibility for our fellow man."

Hagen: "Then you are saying that the Norwegian people are mistaken, while we who use other people's money are right. I will not agree to this. Where people themselves can decide about their own money and own conscience they should do it."

Coldness from Progressive Party

[Question] You say that in a number of areas there is an abyss, Norvik. What other areas than in aid to third-world countries?

[Answer] Norvik: "In the Progressive Party's general policy I read that the districts have no future. It is rather typical that the Progressive Party has not been able to make a breakthrough in the real provinces. Your party, Hagen, has an attitude with regard to the district policy which is good theory when you are safe on the urban side of Sinsen Crossing, but not in the districts. Here I feel some of the same coldness from the Progressive Party as in its social policy and third-world country policy."

Hagen: "In the district policy we are doing the same thing which the Conservative Party says they will do in other areas: reduce selective remedies and go over to general remedies. We are consistent. In the districts we will support all activities to an equal degree. We want to use the employer's tax as the most important remedy. Today 10 billion kroner are being used for food production, justified by the preservation of settlements, not only in the districts, but also elsewhere in the country. Some of those who in our opinion must submit to the rules of competition of course do not like this."

Norvik: "Perhaps. But whatever attitude you have toward Norwegian food production agriculture is an especially important settlement factor. However, the total amount of subsidies for food production can be discussed."

Hagen: "As far as our position in the districts is concerned, it takes time to build up a party organization. Remember that the Conservative Party took 100 years to be able to have a slate in all of the country's municipalities. Up to now we have managed 160 in 8 years. As far as social policy is concerned, we are the party which in the Storting has supported the best solutions for those who really need help in our country."

Help in Practice

Norvik: "In that case there cannot be many who need help. The difference between you and those parties who are sitting or have sat in power is that you have been able to propose without having your proposals tested in practice."

Hagen: "We are fighting to put through our positions in the same manner as the Conservative Party did as the opposition party. In a number of areas we have proposed what the Conservative Party stood for a few years ago. We have suffered the consequences of what was Willoch's tone during the entire opposition period."

Norvik: "The big difference is that Willoch both was and is a man of principle, but has always emphasized that in a country like ours we are faced with individual cases in which we must use a tailor-made solution and not a ready-made one. It is not a question of sitting in Oslo and writing a cook book for the entire country, Hagen. You will have to learn this."

Hagen: "I hope I get a chance to. Besides, your assertion is incorrect."

[Question] You define the party as liberal in its business policy, Hagen. Is it the "night duty State" you want to return to?

Hagen: "No! We stand for the policy which the Conservative Party stood for in the 50's and 60's in many areas. Ideologically, it is obvious that the father of liberalism, Adam Smith, is arousing more and more attention in the world today. Conservatism is only a variety of liberalism. We stand for the citizens' own self-chosen priorities' ruling the society, not politicians by force. We will actively use market forces for the necessary control. For example, if expansion of hospitals is desired, then make it profitable to operate hospitals. Then we will have the demand for hospitals covered in two years."

Uniform?

[Question] Is there anything else than a protest against the political establishment now on the right wing?

[Answer] Hagen: "What permeates our policy is alternative solutions to what all the other parties stand for, although many goals are in common."

[Question] But is your liberalism really any uniform ideology?

[Answer] Hagen: "Yes! Liberalism is not just economics. It concerns everything which can and cannot be done. It consists in freeing the positive in the individual and restraining the negative. In cultural life we support freedom."

Norvik: "I have always said that ideology with ground contact is what we must strive for. The difference between us and you is that conservatism is liberalism with built-in responsibility for our fellow man. What led to conservatism's rally and liberalism's decline was, for one thing, that it was fortunately realized little by little that if conditions of growth are to be arranged in a society then responsibility for one's fellow man must also come forth more strongly."

Hagen: "Responsibility for our fellow man is just as strong among us as far as the really weak in the society are concerned, but we do not take part in defining so many as belonging to the vulnerable groups as the Conservative Party does. The other parties are now on a campaign to define the entire population as vulnerable groups in order to get their votes. We express the distinct opinion that the most vulnerable are some elderly people and the physically and mentally functionally impaired. It is these who deserve our humane treatment and use of others' tax money."

Norvik: "In terms of practical policy we see almost nothing to this. But in the government's policy precisely those groups which Hagen names clearly have priority."

Hagen: "We will see when the budget is drawn up, Norvik."

Clash

[Question] Is what has been said now nothing less than an "ideological clash," as Cabinet Minister Lars Roar Langslet has advertised?

[Answer] Norvik: "What makes politics meaningful for me has been and is to work for a non-socialist majority which would be able to sit in power and which could begin reform work in the direction which the development of the society should go in. Now we are well under way and along the way we have achieved results. Then Hagen's protest party enters the arena and, as for most other protest parties and dissatisfaction parties, the main platform is to stretch themselves further than a responsible majority in those areas in which there is something to gain."

Hagen: "This is precisely what the Conservative Party did up to 1981. Now it is we who are a step ahead of you. We are standing on our basic viewpoints, as everyone does as the opposition party."

Norvik: "The big difference is that we conducted and are conducting a policy which we have demonstrated can be carried out in practice."

Hagen: "The Conservative Party has in reality excluded us from cooperation. You have declared the in-between parties as support parties and us as the opposition, and we are behaving accordingly."

Norvik: "First, we cannot have as a declared support party a party which in important areas is ideologically far from us and, secondly, you know deep inside, Hagen, that a number of your party's planks do not have any possibility at all of being carried out. Accordingly it is purely a protest policy."

Hagen: "I know that our planks should have been carried out, and I will fight for this."

8985

CS0: 3639/12

PAPER DISCUSSES CONSERVATIVES' SETBACK IN LATEST POLL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Oct 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Lack of Confidence"]

[Text] The sharp decline in support for the Conservative Party in this year's local elections was no coincidence. The poor election results can hardly be explained by the common assumption that Conservative Party supporters stayed at home in large numbers or retreated to their weekend cottages because town and county council elections are of less interest and significance than parliamentary elections. They had in fact taken a political position, for when the same voters are asked which party they would vote for if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow, the Conservative Party's position is not strengthened significantly. Apparently, we are witnessing a decline in voter confidence in the party.

This is one of the conclusions that can be drawn from the political opinion poll for September undertaken by the Norwegian Opinion Institute on behalf of AFTENPOSTEN. One question that no one has been able to answer satisfactorily, however, is why voter support suddenly began to decline during the second half of August up to election day on 12 September. Before that time, all available opinion polls showed that the Conservative Party enjoyed remarkable stability, with the support of just over 30 percent of the voters.

Thus, it seems clear that the Conservative Party lost the election despite the fact that the Conservatives concentrated on precisely those policies that enjoyed the greatest support among their voters. So what went wrong? Since it has been shown that the Conservative Party is losing voters to both the right and the left, it is difficult to give a clear political explanation. In any case, Conservative losses to the Progressive Party are not due to concern over rising unemployment. Carl I. Hagen's theory that everyone creates his own breaks is, in reality, an expression for the exact opposite.

Nevertheless, the most recent opinion poll clearly showed that the enthusiasm of broad voter groups for the Conservative Party had declined considerably. Reaction to the proposed budget will enhance this trend additionally. This is the background on which a renewed Conservative Party offensive must be based.

Dissatisfied Conservative voters should understand that their political wishes and needs can be fulfilled only if they support the Conservative Party and continue to strengthen its position in Norwegian politics. A Conservative minority, with "only" one third of the representatives in parliament, has no chance of carrying out its political plans completely, regardless of whether the party rules alone or is in a coalition with other parties. Thus, the Conservative Party's tax policy is supported by a clear minority in parliament. This is the challenge of Conservative Party supporters--to help increase the real influence of the Conservative Party, not decrease this influence.

9336

CSO: 3639/14

BRIEFS

STABLE SUPPORT FOR LABOR PARTY--Labor Party Stability. A poll Norsk Opinionsinstitutt [Norwegian Opinion Institute] took for AFTENPOSTEN shows that the Labor Party has had a high degree of stability in its voter support in the months of April to August of this year. Except for the Progressive Party, all other parties had to record failing support among their adherents in August. The Liberal Party was in the situation of losing relatively most votes. The questions concerned the Storting election. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Oct 83 p 3] 8985

CSO: 3639/12

AP POSITION PAPER BACKS GOVERNMENTAL DECENTRALIZATION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 27 Oct 83 p 24

[Text] AP [Popular Alliance] supports a policy of not challenging the authority and functions of the municipalities and of not undertaking the creation of new agencies before the autonomous state has been completely established. The party proposes the creation of a single civil service system and the establishment of a civil service career system, as specified in the report on autonomous policy and government administration, which was prepared by Jose Manuel Romay and Arturo Garcia Tizon as a working text for AP's 6th National Congress, to be held in Barcelona at the end of January 1984.

The document states that decentralization is necessary for social development and proposes that autonomous and administrative structures be adapted to fit the new territorial structural system of the state. Along with the requirement that the principles stipulated in the statutes be respected "down to the last point," the document suggests that the autonomous process be implemented gradually and that no new reforms be made until the process is ready. The creation of territorial subdivisions, for example, should wait until the process has been completed. Other proposals contained in this document are: the establishment of new agencies in the CCAA [Autonomous Communities]; austerity to avoid unrestrained growth in the autonomous agencies; and the creation of formulas for internal decentralization.

On the subject of transfers, the report mentions the "urgent necessity for close cooperation between political authorities and the autonomous communities with an agreed-upon development," and states that until now such transfers have been impeded by the use of arbitrary power in cases of conflict.

In addition, the report adds that the "Enterria report" and the autonomous agreements were "an attempt to guide the process in

general terms, outside of the actual constitutional and statutory framework, and the LOAPA [expansion unknown] was the normative instrument used for this policy." For AP this once again meant bringing the autonomous policy "up against the ambiguity of Title VIII of the Constitution and of the statutes."

Government Agencies

The second section of the report, which refers to government agencies, proposes reforms and the adaptation of the civil service to meet the new requirements arising from social changes, from the change in the political system, and from the new territorial structure of the state. The legislative proposal on the general state administration should be contained in a fundamental statute.

Other conclusions of this document are: the advisability of eliminating the corps system, while maintaining the career system for the normal and routine needs of administrative agents, replacing the system now in force by the creation of a single civil service system for government agencies, and the reduction of the number of special corps.

In addition to the establishment of a civil service career system, the AP report advocates maintaining the competitive system for access to civil service positions. Strikes should continue to be prohibited in the armed forces, state security forces, the magistrature, and air traffic personnel. Only job-related strikes should be permitted, and strikes of a political nature should be banned.

7679

CSO: 3548/76

INTRA-PARTY REGIONAL CONFLICTS BATTER AP

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 30 Oct 83 p 18

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Madrid—Popular Alliance (AP) is undergoing a crisis—arising from confrontations, basically personal, which have even resulted in splinter groups—in seven regions: Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, Canary Islands, Navarre, Cantabria, and Aragon. In Galicia tensions have been running high due to what some sectors of the party see as the excessive predominance of the president of the Junta. After Joan Gaspar announced his candidacy for the autonomy elections in Catalonia, the latter resigned and Jorge Fernandez was dismissed from his job, although publicly it was termed a resignation.

The regional junta of the Popular Alliance of Navarre has proposed to the party's national discipline committee that various elected members of that junta be expelled. This decision was made as a result of the publication of a letter in a local newspaper by the members in question, stating in very critical and harsh language that Jose Luis Monje and Pedro Pegenaute, president and secretary general of the Navarre AP, respectively, were free to leave.

In yesterday's meeting, according to /Carmelo Ridruejo/, the regional junta reiterated its full support for Monje and Pegenaute, "with whose actions it agrees completely and totally."

The letter had criticized AP's refusal to pay one of its statutory members of Parliament, Lucio Jimenez, the monthly allocation the Navarre Legislature provides for each seat. The published text also listed the various salaries that Monje and Pegenaute were drawing or had received.

"But in many of your decisions, and of course in the truly unethical and absolutely inhumane treatment you have given our member of Parliament, Lucio Jimenez," said the text, "our conscience cannot help but cry out: We cannot continue with you, Monje and Pegenaute."

Upon seeing this document in print, the AP regional junta decided to initiate disciplinary action and propose that three of the seven signatories be expelled from the party. It also decided to propose to the national discipline committee that statutory member of Parliament Lucio Jimenez be investigated

"in order to determine his responsibility for actions detrimental to the image of the party."

This body also proposed that Manuel de Pablo Garcia, former manager of the Navarre AP, be investigated to determine what role he may have played as possible author of the letter in question and primary instigator of what happened. His expulsion from AP was also proposed.

The AP crisis in Malaga, about a month old, ended with the splintering of the core of the Popular Group in the city government into two factions, one comprised of five council members and the other of three. The final break became apparent Thursday night, reports /Jose Antonio Frias/, during a municipal plenum that approved a motion by the dissidents who belong to the most conservative wing of the party to restructure the group.

The confrontation arose at the end of September, when five members of the Popular Group, including the representative of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), decided to dismiss spokesman Jose Cespedes and Deputy Mayor Jose Lorca Navarrete.

In the first days of October, during a meeting of the AP provincial executive board, a secret pact was made between the two factions, which was broken when its contents were leaked to the media. Amid a full-blown crisis, AP Secretary General Jorge Verstryngge went to Malaga. There, unable to reach a compromise, he ordered the dissolution of the provincial executive board and named an interim committee. At the head of that committee he put Jose Lorca Navarrete, the representative of the most progressive sector.

The five dissident council members maintained their stance and made a firm proposal for the restructuring of the Popular Group. Upon receiving that proposal, the interim committee decided to suspend the terms of the council members, a decision later ratified by the national discipline committee.

Interim Junta for Zaragoza

After the dissolution of the provincial committee as a result of continual personal confrontations among its members, an interim junta has been put in charge of the Zaragoza Popular Alliance pending the convening of a special congress.

Rafael Zapatero, chairman of the provincial and regional committees, justified the dissolution of the committee, which was approved by him at the last meeting, on the basis of the continual personal confrontations which "make party activities unmanageable and ineffective." Zapatero, according to /Javier Ortega/, has denied that there are internal factions within AP, an opinion not shared by another sector, which speaks of /ultraconservatives/ and /progressives/ quarreling over party influence.

According to Rafael Zapatero, who has the support of the new generations, since the last elections the number of party activists has grown, and "50 percent are new people who have not been integrated into governing bodies, so the provincial committee was no longer representative."

Fraga gave full power to Zapatero for the formation of the interim junta, which will be made up of people who have not participated in the party's internal politics, and will be in charge of preparing the special congress that will be held in early 1984.

Confrontations in Cantabria

The intensive last-minute efforts by Mateo Jose Rodriguez Gomez (candidate for president of the Cantabria AP, proposed by Manuel Fraga) culminated last week when members of the other two lists agreed to appear on the /officialist/ slate.

Nonetheless, reports /Victor Gijon/, in AP circles there is serious doubt about the effectiveness of a last-minute pact. According to a high-ranking leader of that party, "we keep seeing the same names that were criticized by some who now have agreed to be included on the slate."

The fact that Rodriguez Gomez, Cantabria's deputy to the Cortes, was not mentioned as a future president, favored the agreement among the various factions within the Cantabrian AP. It is not unlikely, however, that the internal divisions will arise again, with greater intensity if possible, after the second regional congress.

8926

CSO: 3548/79

INTERVIEW WITH NDP'S TURGUT SUNALP, KAMRAM INAN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 31 Oct 83 pp 191-202

[Interview with Turgut Sunalp and Kamram Inan by DER SPIEGEL editors Siegfried Kogelfranz and Mareike Spiess-Hohnholz at NDP party headquarters, Ankara, date not given: "We Are Creating an Entirely New Turkey"]

[Text] Until his retirement in 1976, Turgut Sunalp was a four-star general and deputy chief of staff of the Turkish general staff. Following the September 1980 military coup, the military rulers sent their former comrade—who had also served at NATO and on Cyprus—as ambassador to Canada for 2 years. Since his return, Sunalp, 66, has headed the Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP) which the junta called into being with an eye to the elections on 6 November.

Sunalp, who will be Turkey's next prime minister, if he wins, has chosen Kamram Inan as his closest adviser. 54 year-old Inan is a Kurd with extensive land holdings in the Bitlis area of Eastern Anatolia where he owns dozens of villages. Under Demirel, conservative lawyer and political scientist Inan was a member of parliament and minister of energy and natural resources; and under both Ecevit and the military government, he represented Turkey at the United Nations in Geneva. If Sunalp wins, Inan is expected to become minister of foreign affairs.

[Question] 3 years after the military coup, the Turkish junta is letting the people choose. But the generals have picked their own candidates. You, General, are their favorite and all the traditional parties have been outlawed. This can certainly not be called a genuine election.

[Answer] Of course the Turks can choose. For another thing, I am no longer a general but a civilian. I served in the armed forces for 52 years and retired in 1976. Then I served as ambassador to Canada and now I have started a new life as a politician.

[Question] And as the army's candidate.

[Answer] That is not the way I see it.

[Question] Well then--who gave you the idea to found a political party: the Nationalist Democratic Party ? Did you hit upon it all by yourself ?

[Answer] It was not my idea; but then again I was not given an order to do so by anyone. Friends persuaded me to organize the party because they thought I was the right man for it. As an officer, I have served in all sections of this country and have had dealings with the population at all levels. As a diplomat, I gained some additional experience which broadened my horizon and my capabilities. Altogether, I spent 12 years outside the country. You should therefore not look upon me as a simple soldier.

[Question] We don't; but there is no getting around the fact that you are the army candidate. Your fellow generals vetoed several hundred civilian candidates. How does that jibe with democracy to which the military junta supposedly means to return ?

[Answer] In one of his most recent speeches, President Evren said there are vetoes in every democracy--even in international organizations like the UN.

[Question] The military leaders openly stated that it was their intention to keep the old politicians like Demirel or Ecevit, who was haled into court several times, out of these elections. But they not only vetoed former political figures, but even new ones like the son of Inonu, the long-time associate of Ataturk. Were they afraid of the popular appeal of that well-known name ?

[Answer] The vetoes have nothing to do with the integrity of the persons concerned. There were even some candidates of my own party who were rejected.

[Question] But why was Inonu's son of all people turned down ?

[Answer] The fact that you are Inonu's son does not in itself give you the right to run. Exactly why he was turned down, I really don't know.

[Question] Still, the impression remains that these are dubious, manipulated elections. For another thing, the constitution states that the president is entitled to make all the important decisions--and President Evren will stay in office for another 6 years at least. During the weeks preceding the elections, a number of laws were passed--such as those pertaining to union activities, the press, the right to form associations and to the universities--which all regulate the future political life of Turkey. What is the purpose of these elections, if the government elected has virtually no say afterwards ?

[Answer] Who says so ?

[Question] We assume so.

[Answer] I do not. As far as the legislation you referred to is concerned, the country needs these laws. But a future parliament will have the right to change existing laws and pass new ones.

[Question] Will it be able to change the constitution as well ?

[Answer] Yes—with the required majority; the exception being the first three articles of the constitution which stipulate that Turkey is a republic; that it is a secular and indivisible state and that Ankara is its capital. But then we have absolutely no intention of changing the constitution.

[Question] That would be difficult anyway because Turkey has one of the most voluminous constitutions in the world.

[Answer] That is what you say; but it is not correct. The constitution of Cyprus, for example, is twice as long.

[Question] If you win the election and become the next prime minister, which problems will you tackle first ?

[Answer] The most important problem is the maintenance of law and order inside the country.

[Question] But that has already been solved by your fellow army officers, hasn't it ?

[Answer] Yes—but the maintenance of law and order must continue. We must never permit a return to the old chaos.

[Question] The methods used to institute law and order brought on some sharp outside protests. The Council of Europe, the European Parliament, Amnesty International and some allied governments have accused Turkey of human rights violations. There are 20,000 political prisoners in Turkey.

[Answer] My party colleague Inan, who is here with us, can answer that question better than I. He has dealt with all the details. He has been a cabinet member and an ambassador.

[Question] If you please.

[Answer] To begin with, there are no political prisoners in Turkey...

[Question] How was that again ?

[Answer] Terrorists should /not/ be confused with political prisoners. Prior to 12 September 1980, these terrorists had killed more than 5,200 people and injured another 15,000. 800,000 weapons and more than five million rounds of ammunition were found. If we take these assassins into custody, you call them political prisoners. You held to this position up to the time one of them shot at the Pope in May 1981. But just to please you, we cannot pull hundreds of Popes out of a hat for you to believe us when we say that these people are dangerous criminals.

[Question] All 20,000 of them are criminals ?

[Answer] One of them jumped out of the window in Berlin because he was going to be charged with crimes of this sort.

[Question] It was never proven that Kemal Altun was guilty of any crime.

[Answer] You and your European friends are one-sided and prejudiced when you talk about human rights in Turkey. You are blind on one eye. Let me give you an example: in French prisons, 47 inmates commit suicide each year. Do you think they commit suicide because life is so pleasant in French jails ?

[Question] At least they do not resort to premeditated killings there. But what does that have to do with Turkey ?

[Answer] Conditions in French jails have something to do with human rights, too—but you are not interested in that. Listening to your questions, every one of them is prejudiced. I can feel that. In your very first question you referred to a "coup." That was no coup; it was a necessary intervention which had long been expected both by your governments and your media. You said that our party is being favored by the administration. That happens not to be true—but we are in agreement with its policies.

[Question] We did not doubt it for a moment.

[Answer] We support the administration because we believe in the 12 September movement and are in agreement with its goals. I myself often attend the sessions of the European Parliament. Who is it that raises all these questions there ? It is the unified left which is being urged on by the exiled Turkish leftists. It is the communists and the socialists. The christian democrats, the conservatives support us.

[Question] That is hardly surprising.

[Answer] The leftists--the communists and socialists from Italy, Greece and Scandinavia--are attacking us. They are afraid of a democratization in Turkey because then they will no longer be able to cast aspersions on us.

[Question] We beg to differ. The fact is that military dictatorships are not popular in democratic countries. Torture and killings inside prisons--such things do not do a regime any credit. And you don't really expect us to believe that all those 20,000 Turks whom you have locked up for political reasons are terrorists and murderers; that the more than 100 prisoners who died in jail according to Amnesty International were killers and that all the Kurds, Armenians, leftwing intellectuals, trade unionists and students who populate your jails are all common criminals. They are in there because they do not agree with your policies.

[Answer] No. With the exception of some writers and agitators who engaged in propaganda against government actions after 12 September all those who are now in jail were arrested for crimes they committed prior to 12 September. And as far as the alleged number of 100 prisoners who were said to have died as a result of torture is concerned, Amnesty International itself has admitted in the meantime that that figure was incorrect--that there were 75 and not 100.

[Question] That is 75 too many. And why is it that prisoners are constantly going on hunger strikes--in Istanbul in the notorious Diyarbakir military prison ?

[Answer] That is part of their tactics; Marxists everywhere employ them. We have letters from parents to prisoners containing exact instructions from a communist broadcasting station in East Germany--quite near you in fact. Those instructions say that the prisoners--whenever they appear in public--should cry and say they were tortured and that they had gone on a hunger strike. That is a well-prepared bit of play acting designed to influence the world public. These people have obviously convinced you as well.

[Question] Are you seriously trying to tell us that torture is not being used in Turkish jails ?

[Answer] No. Our government officially admitted 2 years ago that 15 prisoners had died as a result of tortures. Those responsible were called to account for this; one policeman has already been sentenced to 14 years in prison. Others received jail terms of 3 or 4 years. But even Mr Ecevit, the former prime minister who enjoys such a good reputation in your part of the world, has stated that torture is not being used in anything like a systematic fashion. But of course there are individual instances of it. One prisoner, who was being brought before a judge, for example, cursed the two soldiers accompanying him--they were both simple Anatolians-- in

a most vicious manner, insulting their wives—and that is a terrible insult for any Turk. So one of the soldiers killed him. That really did happen. The culprit was arrested. But things like that happen everywhere—even in Switzerland where I worked for some time. Security personnel throughout the world are not known for being particularly humane.

[Question] We agree with you on that. But the military today is all-powerful in Turkey, isn't it? It has put to a stop to terrorist activity; why is it unable to put a stop to torture?

[Answer] But that is exactly what we are doing. Why don't you believe us rather than the leftwing propagandists among the Turkish emigres who are spreading such atrocity tales. Be fair and don't make us the victims of your own prejudices.

[Question] But it is no accident that so many Turks are taking refuge in other countries which are opposed to your regime. Military dictatorships tend to provoke this kind of thing. That is the way it was in Greece when the colonels made their coup...

[Answer] To compare our administration with the Greek colonels is an insult which I must categorically repudiate. And you should not forget what Turkey's role was in the toppling of the Greek colonels' junta in the summer of 1974 and the re-establishment of democracy in Greece. Ours is the only developing country in the world—the annual per capita income being \$900.00—which permits democratic rights and liberties which otherwise only exist in highly developed industrial nations with a per capita income of \$7000.00 to \$10,000.00. The French parliament enjoys fewer rights than our future parliament will have. But however hard we try, we cannot do right by you. Our president is no longer a military man; he is a civilian. After 6 November, the military administration will no longer exist. When the revolutionary military leadership held power in Portugal for 6 years, you applauded it. When General de Gaulle buried the Fourth Republic and took over the reins of government in 1958, you applauded him enthusiastically.

[Question] /We/ certainly did not applaud. But if you now say that you wish to introduce democracy, may we remind you that Turkey was considered a democracy for almost three decades until the military took over once more.

[Answer] Well, perhaps we do have 30 years experience. The English have had experience with democracy since 1215 and they still have problems with it. The French started in 1789 and are still experimenting. You in Germany started somewhat later and you are not perfect either.

[Question] Well, who is ? For that matter, the alleged per capita income of \$900.00 which you cited was a good deal higher at one time--up around \$1,400.00. There is no denying that the Turkish economy has gone down despite all of the Dollar and D-Mark transfusions. If you take over the government, how do you propose to put the economy in order ?

[Answer] I think our president, Mr Sunalp, had better answer that question.

[Answer] We certainly do have a lot of problems; but so do you in Germany.

[Question] There are differences, though. Real income in your country has been drastically declining over the past several years. In fact, it is lower today than it was in 1962. Inflation is growing again by almost 30 percent and you have 20 percent unemployment.

[Answer] We have a program for tackling these problems. It has been worked out by 40 or 50 of the best qualified economists in Turkey.

[Question] Is it the same kind of program you had at the start of military rule--the monetarist, neo-liberal kind which has also been tried out in England and some Latin American countries ?

[Answer] First of all, we are telling our voters that they should not expect miracles from us but that they will begin to feel very soon that things are getting better. If you work hard [we tell them] we can solve our problems in the space of a few years. Of course it will be difficult. To get rid of unemployment, we have to have investments to create new jobs. This could heat up inflation again, however. That is why we will not spell out in detail what we intend to do. We will act when the time comes.

[Question] But perhaps you could let us in on the secret of whether you have a mixed economic policy in mind or a more monetarist one which is subject to greater government influence.

[Answer] We have a mixed policy in mind--which is also what our constitution provides for. Ataturk, the founder of our republic, also pursued an economic policy which combined government influence and the free market. In fact, there was no other way. The country and its people were both poor. Who was in a position to make investments except for the government and who could provide training for the people ? In part, this still holds true today. It is quite impossible to do without government influence in favor of a liberal economic policy.

[Question] At this time, nobody is making any investments in Turkey. How do you propose to get foreign capital, for example, to make investments here ?

[Answer] By first of all guaranteeing a stable country and a stable government and by adopting legislation which permits foreign investors to transfer their profits from investments in Turkey to the outside without any restrictions.

[Question] Aren't you afraid that a further drop in the standard of living might trigger new unrest ?

[Answer] No, certainly not. We will see to it with the help of our laws and our actions that there will never again be anarchy in Turkey. The state and the government will be powerful enough to meet every challenge. We will create an entirely new, modern Turkey based on the philosophy of 12 September. The movement of 12 September was created by honorable men...

[Question] ...who made a coup...

[Answer] ...who stand by their country and their duty--which they have proven over the past 3 years. Look at our president: you cannot find a better man. We are good friends; we have known each other for 40 years. He encouraged me to start up our party.

[Question] You have spoken of a philosophy of 12 September--the date on which the military took over. To our mind, the philosophy of soldiers is rather simple as a rule: there are orders which have to be obeyed. Is Turkey going to be governed according to this philosophy in the future ?

[Answer] No. Our view of the philosophy of 12 September is that it will mark a return to the values of the father of modern Turkey, Ataturk, which have been forgotten.

[Question] So there will not be a garrison state democracy in Turkey ?

[Answer] Now wait a minute. I am a soldier. I know more about soldiers and garrisons than you do.

[Question] Without a doubt.

[Answer] Your ideas about orders and obedience may apply to the lower ranks; to drilling recruits where this kind of thing properly belongs. In the higher ranks of every army the problems are discussed and experts are heard. There are consultations before anything is decided. I was a general myself and I know that very well. Now I am the leader of a political party. Why don't you ask Mr Inan, one of my closest advisers, whether I am the type that just gives orders or whether I discuss things with him.

[Answer] You can see for yourselves that our chairman discusses all the questions openly with you as well. And try to remember that the army was

forced to intervene three times over the past 20 years in Turkey in order to save democracy from committing suicide and that it withdrew from politics again—which is unique in the whole world—in order to reinstate that very democracy. The odd thing about it is that that is not even the popular thing to do. If you ask the people in Anatolia whether they prefer the present regime to a new, multi-party democracy, most of them will tell you they like it better as it is. In that sense, the military is leading the country back toward democracy—virtually against popular opinion.

[Question] Toward a very restricted form of democracy. But why do it at all, if the citizenry does not really want it, as you say ?

[Answer] For the simple reason that we believe in democracy and the rights of the individual and that we consider that to be an opportunity for Turkey.

[Question] Part of democracy, we suppose, would be the lifting of martial law. Will the new government lift it ?

[Answer] That depends on a lot of things.

[Question] In other words, it won't come to an end automatically when what you perceive to be the "return to democracy" is achieved ?

[Answer] No. Nor do we know all we need to know in order to assess this question properly. Only the present administration has this type of information at its disposal. If and when we form a government, we will have a better idea and will then be able to decide. I know all about martial law. I held the post of martial law administrator. I am not fond of it.

[Question] Will the name of the next Turkish head of government be Sunalp ?

[Answer] I organized our party in the belief that this will be so.

[Question] Mr Sunalp and Mr Inan, we thank you both for granting us this interview.

9478

CSO: 3620/52

DEFENSE OFFICIAL SAYS FORCES AWARE OF SOVIET 'SPETSNAZ' ROLE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Oct 83 p 8

[Article by Mogens Auning]

[Text] The organization believed to be behind the minisub operations off the coast of Sweden also has missions in Denmark. These missions would be carried out just before the outbreak of a possible future war. The only new information the Danish military has received is the name of this sabotage ring.

For several years the Danish military has known about the Soviet sabotage organization Spetsnaz which, according to an article in the Swiss monthly INTERNATIONAL MILITARY REVIEW, is behind the mysterious minisubs that operate off the coast of Sweden.

Infiltration Before Outbreak Of War

As reported in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE yesterday, the article was written by a Russian intelligence officer who had defected.

"We have known about this organization for the past 4 or 5 years," a source within the Danish military told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "The only new information for us is its name."

The officer in question, who did not want his name revealed, said that the mission of Spetsnaz was to infiltrate countries the Soviet Union sees as unfriendly just before the outbreak of war--the so-called gray period.

"In Denmark the main purpose of the infiltration would be to break down the continuity in the overall defense," the source said. That could be done by sabotaging the communications network and targets in the military, the civil defense, and the central administration.

Although, according to AFTONBLADET, the Swedish military leadership makes no secret of the fact that Spetsnaz (the word means "special unit") is behind the submarine episodes, Danish military sources say they have no evidence that the unit has been active in this country.

30 Thousand Specially Trained

Several years ago a modern Russian gas mask was found in the middle of Bornholm. How it got there was never discovered.

According to the article in the Swiss publication, the organization is under the administration of the Soviet military intelligence service, GRU, and has 30,000 specially trained men. The Danish military does not know if that figure is correct. According to the Danish source, Spetsnaz is a Soviet national organization, although similar units with the same mission exist in Poland and East Germany.

Task Of Home Guard

In an emergency situation it is primarily the task of the home guard, as part of its nationwide surveillance mission, to prevent such special units from landing in Denmark. In this connection, the home guard's knowledge of local conditions and the local populace will play a key role.

9336

CSO: 3613/29

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS STOCKPILING FOR WAR SUFFERS DELAYS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Kjell Harberg]

[Text] A constant state of mismanagement! These are harsh words, but a correct appraisal. They apply to our civil preparedness, the organization and plan that are to secure the Norwegian people in the best possible manner in case of war or other crisis. People are constantly talking about the threat of nuclear war. Demonstrations are held against it. Municipal councils approve resolutions making their little corner of the world a nuclear-free zone. Somewhat poignantly stated, this is all the Norwegian authorities are doing to protect the people. As to preparations for confronting the situation that may arise--nuclear-free towns or not--they are extremely poor.

About 1 year ago civil engineer Olav Karstad began examining our civil preparedness. He was shocked by how vulnerable our society has become in the area of supplies, i.e. our dependence on other countries in a crisis situation. He was shocked by our vulnerable storage and production system and by the official efforts that are being made to protect Norwegian lives and health, to some degree or another, once a crisis has arisen or war has broken out. Karstad's own investigations and his cooperation with people working within our highly deficient civil defense system have resulted in a book: Sivilt beredskap--et skuebrod? (Civil Preparedness: For Show Only?).

It is tempting to answer the question in the book's title immediately--in the affirmative!

We all say we fear nuclear war. We claim that the nuclear threat is getting closer to us. Why then do we react as we do--by neglecting to prepare ourselves? Karstad believes that various groups, for various reasons, "agree that nuclear war is impossible."

Ordinary people believe this because the horrors of nuclear war are too much for them to think about in their daily lives (repressing certain thoughts is an ordinary and necessary means in certain situations).

The politicians believe this because innumerable pressure groups are calling for money for programs that affect their daily lives. No one is calling for

civil preparedness.

The military believes this because their fundamental principle is that war can be fought and won. Nuclear weapons do not fit into this picture, if the other side also possesses them.

Another important reason that must be taken seriously is that many people believe that civil defense measures are useless against nuclear weapons. The Last Shore by Nevil Shute still dominates our imagination, even though we know today that this version of the nuclear threat is incorrect.

The Threat

Karstad based his evaluation of what we need in the form of civil preparedness on the crises that can affect us in times of peace as well as war. In times of peace, we may have emergency shortages of oil and petroleum products, some raw materials, and metals. Civil defense plans must be made for warfare with conventional and chemical weapons. Civilian supplies may be cut off during the war and available in extremely limited amounts during the first 3 post-war years.

Plans must be made for the eventuality of a nuclear war. Plans must be made for an exchange of goods (for example fish and oil for grain) with Sweden, although self-sufficiency within a certain amount of time is the primary goal.

This is the situation. Right? Wrong? Basically, it is of little consequence what each of us, on the basis of wishful thinking, believes about the danger of war. Our society--both authorities and citizens--must face the fact that Norway can be affected. We cannot put an end to conventional or nuclear weapons we know exist--and can be used--by demonstrating. We must realize that there is no contradiction whatsoever between the dedicated struggle for peace and disarmament and preparations for a war that could break out. In this regard, it is not Norway that dictates the fate of the world, but world crises and wars arising elsewhere that will dictate the fate of Norway. We cannot stand aloof, at least with regard to the effects of these crises on the civilian population. It is in this area that we must prepare ourselves through civil defense. It is also in this area that there has been almost total neglect.

In his book, Karstad documents area after area in which we have not faced up to the reality that can affect us. Shelter construction leaves much to be desired. Our water resources are poorly protected against contamination--not just radioactive fallout--and against attack. We store grain for emergency shortages, but three fourths of this grain is stored in communities seen by Norwegian authorities as primary targets for nuclear bombs if Norway should be attacked.

And what about oil and other energy sources? We have a storage capacity of about 1,3 million cubic meters of crude oil and just over 1 million cubic

meters of petroleum products. Major storage facilities contain less than half of their capacity. Many storage facilities are vulnerable to attack. And amazingly enough Norway, with its oil production, is thought to have little need of large emergency stockpiles. After all, we produce oil ourselves. But God knows how many hours notice we will have when the crisis strikes!

Olav Karstad has made a significant contribution to this important debate. He has presented well-documented views and, perhaps most important, a wealth of information. The publisher, Universitetsforlaget, should immediately send 155 copies to: House of Parliament, Oslo 1, Norway.

Olav Karstad:
Sivilt Beredskap--Et Skuebrod?
Universitetsforlaget

9336
CSO: 3639/14

MAJORITY REMAINS OPPOSED TO FULL NATO INTEGRATION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 28 Oct 83 p 20

[Article by Juan Roldan: "Study by Center for Sociological Research on Public Opinion During the Period 1975-83: 56 Percent of the Spanish People Are Opposed to Full Integration Into NATO, According to Government Data"]

[Text] Madrid--The most recent data available to the government on whether the Spanish people are in favor of the full integration of Spain into NATO show 17 percent in favor, 56 percent against, 26 percent don't know, and 2 percent no answer. The survey, conducted in June 1983, was carried out by the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) and was published yesterday [27 October], together with an extensive study of Spanish public opinion regarding NATO, prepared by the magazine published by this state body.

About 71 percent of those opposed to full Spanish integration into NATO continued to hold this view, although Spain had entered the EEC when the survey was made. It is considered that this is one of the most revealing aspects of the poll and could provide some explanation for the fact that the socialist government, which has promised the voters it will hold a referendum on this subject, has not been willing to set the date or choose the question to be asked or set out its position on the matter in clear terms.

Thirty-Four Percent Conservatives

An analysis of the data from this survey also shows an important factor in terms of the division of opinion between the different voters and the political parties. Among voters of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] 10 percent are in favor of the full entry of Spain into the Atlantic Alliance, and 67 percent are opposed. Among voters of the Coalicion Popular [People's Coalition], 45 percent are in favor and 34 percent are opposed. In the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] none are in favor and 92 percent are opposed. Among voters of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] 19 percent are in favor and 24 percent are opposed. In the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] 7 percent are in favor and 55 percent are opposed. In the regionalist parties (grouped together for the survey) 22 percent are in favor and 40 percent are opposed.

In the broad study entitled, "La opinion espanola ante la OTAN 1975-83" [Spanish public opinion on NATO, 1975-83], the CIS sets out for the first time in one place the details of the different surveys which have been conducted in Spain regarding the Atlantic Alliance, including those made by its predecessor, the Institute of Public Opinion (see table below). The study states that since 1978 a "progressive disenchantment" of the Spanish people has been observed in terms of its attitudes on the entry of Spain into NATO. This is reflected significantly in the continuing decline of those who do not answer. Whereas in October 1978 58 percent of those interviewed expressed no opinion on the matter, in June 1983 this figure had fallen to 28 percent.

The increasing sensitivity of Spanish public opinion is also shown in terms of the theme of the referendum, particularly after the entry of Spain into NATO in May 1982, and when the electoral program of the PSOE already was announcing the intention to hold a referendum on the subject, if the party won the elections. For example, in the survey conducted in September 1981 the question of how they would vote in the referendum, despite the fact that the referendum had not been formally raised, was answered in the following way: 12 percent in favor of entry, 37 percent opposed, 11 percent abstaining, and 40 percent didn't know or didn't answer.

Two Surveys

In the survey made in March 1983 the supporters of holding a referendum on our continued presence in NATO amounted to 69 percent in favor and 10 percent opposed. On the same date in March 1983, 77 percent of those interviewed believed that before the referendum is held, the advantages and disadvantages of definitive Spanish entry into NATO should be better known. The CIS adds that only 7 percent of those interviewed indicated that they were sufficiently informed on the matter.

Danger of War

For the Spanish people opinions on NATO do not accept the view that the alliance has avoided a new war on European soil for more than 30 years. In the view of 35 percent in September 1981 and 42 percent in March 1983 the principal reason for not supporting the entry of Spain into NATO is the "danger of war." In second place is the "danger of nuclear weapons" (23 percent in 1981 and 27 percent in 1983). In third place are "economic reasons" (18 percent in 1981 and 11 percent in 1983). In fourth place are "political principles" (9 percent in 1981 and 9 percent in 1983).

The typical profile of those in favor of or opposed to definitive Spanish entry into NATO is reported in the most recent survey in June 1983 as follows:

Those in favor: age between 41 and 60; occupation, businessmen, senior officials; living in cities or towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants.

Those opposed: age between 18 and 40; occupation, skilled workers, subordinates; living in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants.

EVOLUCIÓN DE LAS ACTITUDES ANTE EL INGRESO DE ESPAÑA

	1) EN LA OTAN					
	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)	7)
	Octubre 1978	Julio 1979	Julio 1981	Sep. 1981	Marzo 1983	Junio 1983
	%	%	%	%	%	%
A favor OTAN 8)	27	28	20	13	13	17
En contra OTAN 9)	15	26	35	43	57	56
No sabe, no contesta 10)	58	46	45	44	30	27
Total 11)	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base: 12)	(1.190)	(1.200)	(1.200)	(1.193)	(2.488)	(1.606)
CIS 13)						

Key:

1. Evolution of Attitudes Toward the Entry of Spain Into NATO
2. October 1978
3. July 1979
4. July 1981
5. September 1981
6. March 1983
7. June 1983
8. In favor of NATO
9. Opposed to NATO
10. Didn't know/didn't answer
11. Total
12. Size of Sample
13. CIS [Center for Sociological Research]

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CS0: 3548/70

MULTINATIONAL FIRMS KYMI, KONE, WARTSILA, NOKIA PROFILED

Finland's Multinational Club Is Growing

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Oct 83 p 25

[Article by Heikki Arola]

[Text] Toughening international competition forces export firms to produce in foreign countries.

In 1980 Finland had three multinational firms: Kone, Nokia and Kymi. Now a fourth, Wartsila, has been added to the list. And by 1985 a bunch of other firms too, at least Wiik and Hoglund, Amer-yhtymä (Amer Syndicate) and Partek, will be aspiring to the grandiloquent title of multinational.

There is an explicit international definition for multinationalism, developed at Harvard University in the United States. A firm is multinational if it has at least six production plants, subsidiaries, abroad.

Of Finnish firms Kone, Nokia and Wartsila have already evidently cleared the bar. Many others will brush against it and tumble over it during the next few years.

Funded by the Commerce and Industry Ministry and headed by Reijo Luostarinen, FIBO (Finland's International Business Operations) is studying internationalization in Finland at the Helsinki Business College.

Hot Issue

Internationalization is one of today's hot issues with firms. When Luostarinen founded FIBO in 1974, there was not a single firm in Finland that could be categorized as international.

According to Luostarinen, at that time there were several people in the business world, like Pekka Herlin and Thor Stolpe, who already realized what was at issue: "In firms that were becoming internationalized they had to invest in domestic training because there were no traditions."

Luostarinen described the differences between Sweden and Finland: "The Swedes founded their first foreign plant as early as the end of the last century while the Finns did not do so until 1930, the Kymi Paper Star Mill in England. And it took until right up to 1957 for them to establish a second foreign plant.

According to Luostarinen, the Swedes have a 50-to-60-year lead in terms of internationalization:

"In Finland we have gotten off to a late start, but fortunately a more determined one. The fact that the experiences of others can be exploited is an advantage and that is exactly why FIBO is in existence."

Luostarinen is a unique professor because he has behind him a lengthy amount of international business experience. How he teaches as a professor of international marketing. "Sad to say, I am the only one, while we ought to have five or six by now."

According to Luostarinen's analysis, the internationalization of Finnish firms will go through four phases:

First, there is a firm that starts to engage in ordinary export trade with its agents and importers.

The next step is the establishment of its own sales office in the country to which it exports. This is already quite different from ordinary exporting; the firm has shifted its operations directly to the export country's markets.

The third phase is when the first manufacturing unit is set up abroad. The fourth and last phase is the so-called maturation phase of internationalization or multinational phase: ownership of at least six foreign subsidiaries.

According to Luostarinen's research, there were 1,260 firms in Finland during the first phase in 1980 and 160 firms during the second phase. Eighty firms owned one or more subsidiaries abroad and only three attained the multinational class.

The number of firms in the different phases will grow steadily during the next few years. Just as will the need for workers skilled in international operations.

Luostarinen has estimated that about 25,000 people were employed in firms' international operations in 1980. By 1985 that figure will have doubled. "Firms will yet be fighting over really trained personnel," Luostarinen predicted.

Problems

In Luostarinen's opinion, it would be best for a firm not to ever have to start producing abroad. "It's a leap into the unknown and it always brings with it heaps of problems."

But often there is no choice. "When we investigated firms' motives for wanting to go abroad, we noted that they are defensive. They have to go if they want to preserve their export standing."

Luostarinen, however, emphasized that there are many different ways [of internationalizing]: "One's own subsidiary company is not the only possibility. The development of sales companies, projects or the sale of licenses may be more suited to the firm."

"The matter poses a real challenge. Every firm has to choose its own method; no one can copy others."

Level of Development

FIBO has with interest studied foreign subsidiary companies operating in Finland and noted that their level of development is different from that of Finnish companies abroad.

"We have learned a lot. For example, the fact that a subsidiary is not managed directly by the parent firm, rather usually through the regional Scandinavian unit. Finns can apply the same method."

Morality

The justification for the morality of internationalization is often questioned. Foreign production does after all create jobs abroad, not at home. Luostarinen has a clear view of the situation:

"Let's take, for example, the clothing industry, which has a total of five production plants in Portugal. The alternatives were to either surrender to cheap imports or go to the cheap countries ourselves to enjoy the same advantages as our competitors."

"With the money we got from them we have made high-quality products here. Exports have grown and jobs increased at home too."

Wartsila Pushing Hard Abroad

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Oct 83 p 25

[Article by Heikki Arola]

[Text] Wartsila is an example of a big Finnish firm that is trying to protect its international positions by deliberately extending its production abroad.

This phenomenon is new as far as Wartsila is concerned too and its pace is fast and hard. Wartsila made its first purchase of a foreign firm from Sweden in 1978 and, when a machine-tool company located in Wisconsin in the United States was transferred to Wartsila over a week ago, the firm possessed a total of 11 foreign production companies.

"Perhaps we cannot be called a multinational in the full sense of the word, but we are internationalizing just like many Finnish firms," economic director Sven Bertlin described the situation.

If we glance at Wartsila's figures, we see that Bertlin is quite right. Last year 86 percent of the company's volume was produced in Finland and 14 percent abroad. About 16,000 of its employees are in Finland and 2,000 abroad.

But 5 years ago it had no foreign production volume at all and less than 100 employees abroad.

Reasons

In comparison with many smaller firms, a firm like Wartsila's reasons for internationalizing are good. It has accumulated a great deal of experience in the fields of both customary and project exports.

It is familiar with dependence on international economic situations, foreign currency fluctuations and the customs of foreign countries.

The most important reason for gradually moving abroad is depletion of the demand on domestic markets. Another reason is a growing protectionist mentality in world trade.

Through the purchase of companies a firm can strengthen its market position in the countries to which it exports, since it incorporates a competitor into its own firm. With the aid of a purchase it also obtains new know-how, since there is always something that is handled better in the acquired firm than in one's own.

Everyday Affair

The purchase of foreign firms and their elaboration has become an everyday affair at Wartsila too.

Competitors are constantly regarded in that light and they get in touch with Wartsila when they feel that the firm's interest in them is widening.

Only a few years ago, according to Bertlin, the purchase of foreign firms was pretty much of an occult science. But it has been so common lately that the company's different divisions can almost independently work out the purchases.

Nevertheless, a purchase is never made on impulse. During the preliminary phase they are very thorough, they thoroughly investigate the companies and also take a look at the situation behind the figures.

When firms that are to be bought operate in the same field and are competitors, they and the brains of their organizations are, to be sure, otherwise fairly well known.

At Wartsila a four-man team, which includes a proper team leader, a lawyer, an economist and an auditor, ordinarily puts a firm that has aroused its interest under a microscope.

"It has to be exact because neither Wartsila nor any other Finnish firm can afford big failures," Bertlin said.

All the firms acquired by Wartsila were fairly small when they were bought. All of them are also firms that fit into the natural development phase of the parent company's own team.

Wartsila's general principle has been to purchase firms on the verge of bankruptcy. The firm must be in good enough shape not to have to make improvements, at least not immediately. If a firm that is in a critical situation is acquired, there must be a really well-founded reason behind it.

Bertlin admitted that some of those that have been purchased "were not in quite first-rate condition," but the general principle has been: the bigger the acquisition, the better.

At this point, about 5 years after the first purchase, Wartsila's general picture with regard to such purchases is favorable.

There has not been one catastrophe nor has Wartsila had to abandon a single acquisition.

There have, to be sure, been difficulties, the worst of them in the United States where the severe recession in the construction industry struck at a time when they had to get a subsidiary company purchased in California into full swing.

According to Bertlin, the first 2 years following acquisition of a firm are the most important. During that period they can see what its future will be.

Management

The choice of management is one of the most important factors. Since it has been the custom with Wartsila to acquire firms that are in good shape, it has not had to change personnel much either.

Subsidiary firm personnel, right down to its managers, are usually foreigners, that is, local personnel. But several Finns occupy key posts to guarantee that the subsidiary and parent firms "understand one another."

The parent firm would prefer to transfer more personnel abroad, but in that area they run into a problem, which at Wartsila they see as an economic stumbling block: There are not enough competent people to send abroad.

"For a Finn going abroad, into the unknown, is a heavy decision," Bertlin said. They have observed that the biggest obstacle to going abroad is the family, how to arrange for the children's schooling, among other things.

A tour of duty at a foreign post is generally 2 years, but Bertlin feels that that is too short: The first year is spent in familiarizing oneself with the situation and the second in getting ready to leave.

Parent and Subsidiary

Bertlin recommends that relations between subsidiary and parent firms be organized on an explicit basis right from the start. The tether should be a long, but firm one.

"Finns are usually accused of being too soft and there may be some truth in that. One has to be prepared for the fact that at the start a lot of measures may be necessary."

However, the foreign firm's own cachet must not be allowed to deteriorate. "Every country has its own way of doing business. Local employees have the best command of that and that's exactly why the firm is acquired.

"First, you have to decide on an explicit economic planning model. Then you follow its development with constant reports. As long as things are running smoothly, you won't see the hearse in the courtyard," Bertlin characterized the independence of subsidiary firms.

Tailoring

In the course of its internationalization Wartsila has followed several clear principles:

It has without a single exception not founded any foreign firms, instead buying them. With an existing firm it obtains knowledge, skills and markets.

It started out cautiously, acquiring small, but promising firms.

First, it extended itself to our neighbor, Sweden, and the other Nordic countries, from which conditions are favorable for trying to move farther afield. Seven of its 11 firms are in the Nordic countries.

Or, as Bertlin put it: "You'll get along in the world if you don't bite off more than you can chew and if you specialize in tailoring."

Only One Way Forward for Industry

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Oct 83 p 25

[Article by Timo Voipio]

[Text] "Internationalize or die," all Finnish businessmen are today threatening one another. In the frenzy to internationalize, however, less consideration has been devoted to where they will get all those people who are capable of internationalizing the marketing, management, administration and funding of these firms.

By 1985 Finnish industrial firms will probably need almost 50,000 people to carry out established internationalization objectives. According to the latest calculation that has been made of company strength, only somewhat more than 25,000 people in Finnish industry now participate in foreign operations.

In the opinion of our country's only professor of international marketing, Reijo Luostarinen, Finland's international supply and demand are in a bad state of imbalance. Luostarinen predicts that the situation will only get worse in future.

The small number, laziness or lack of skill of our exporters is no longer so much of a problem, factors Finns have become accustomed to using to explain to themselves why all Finnish inventions spread throughout the world as Swedish — not Finnish — exports. On the contrary, Finnish industry today boasts of its export knights as being hard-working, professional traders.

However, exporters' degree of internationalization is no longer high enough. Project exports, the establishment of foreign marketing units and subsidiary firms, licensing agreements and other international operations require the internationalization of the entire organization of the firm. In addition to export salesmen, finance experts, managers, training gurus, production planners and the firm's chief executives also have to master the tricks of internationalization.

"But," Luostarinen emphasized, "just becoming familiar with the tricks of the export trade is no longer enough. You have to learn to adapt export techniques to the conditions and needs of the target country. And even more than that: You have to familiarize yourself with the local culture and also be able to adapt your marketing to the target country's level of customs and needs."

Professor Luostarinen has with Marja Svard, who holds an M.A., studied what the development needs of Finnish firms that are internationalizing will be by 1985.

Even in a world that is getting to be more and more technically oriented, these investigators believe in human knowledge and skills. At the beginning of their report, published in the FIBO series issued by the Export Training Institute, they assert:

"A firm's ability to solve problems involving the development of internationalization and guarantee successful internationalization depends on the abilities of its executives and other employees.

"It has been shown that the training of competent personnel takes years. Nevertheless, it is only now that firms have begun to regard the internationalization of employees as an indispensable investment," the investigators complain.

In 1980 Finnish industries invested a total of 70 million markkas in the internationalization of their Finnish employees. If training increases at the same rate as that of other plans for internationalization, as much as 200 million will be spent on it in 1985.

Every other markka that has gone into training has been spent on courses organized within the firm and for the planning of which firms do indeed receive aid from the Export Training Institute and other training institutes. Education received "outside the firm" has accounted for the other half of training budgets.


In Finland, in addition to colleges and some commercial institutes, about 10 business training institutes, the biggest of which is the Export Training Institute which operates with funds provided by the state and industry, arrange for internationalization training. The others are the supplementary training centers set in motion by economist, engineer and lawyer organizations, big industry's Rastor Institute and the Institute for Managerial Skills and LIFIM [expansion unknown] Business Management Institute, which take good care of this sort of training with the large sums of money obtained from firm executives.

Firms have also sought information on internationalization on international training markets, whose share of "outside-the-firm" training has amounted to 17 percent. The percentage of training that takes place abroad is sharply rising.

There are special educational programs specializing in international trade or marketing at all the business colleges. At Helsinki Business College, for example, about 50 students a year participate in the training program for international activities. Given exclusively in English (!), the course of instruction on international activities is also open to students engaged in other training programs if they still have enough interest in it and time after their obligatory courses.

Professor Luostarinen complains that there is often not enough interest. Those people who will in practice have to execute the subtle strategies of the internationalization gurus will be left with a bad gap in their knowledge of internationalization.

In several firms export and other activities abroad are the jobs of personnel who have been trained as engineers.



Key:

1. Wartsila, Finland.
2. Rorstrand AB [company], Sweden.
3. IFO Sanitar [sanitary systems and products] AB, Sweden.
4. Evak Sanitar AB, Sweden.
5. IDO AB, Sweden.
6. Trio Ving, Norway.
7. Anchor Eskilstuna AB, Sweden.
8. Nohab Diesel AB, Seden.

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CSO: 3617/15

GOVERNMENT PLANS NATIONALIZATION OF PAPER PRODUCERS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 27 Sep 83 p 15

[Text] All the "strategically" important paper plants will soon come under absolute state control. The nationalization of the EGL-Ladopoulos complex, Thessalia Paper Manufactory and MEL Macedonian Paper Industry has already been decided with the methodization of "problematic" enterprises, while nationalization of Athenian Paper Manufactory is being coordinated.

As Deputy Minister of National Economy Dim. Dimosthenopoulos stated yesterday, the first three plants will come into the public's absolute control and will operate under new agents.

According to information, the same representative from the Ministry of National Economy will participate in the three administrative councils in order to coordinate and supervise all the plants.

The production of the three complexes will be reformed, on the basis of a study already existing in the Ministry of National Economy, so there will be no competition between them.

Economic observers stressed yesterday that, with this method, paper production and movement in Greece will be under the state's complete control, resulting in a monopoly being created and the laws of supply and demand not functioning, thus falsifying any sense of free competition.

According to information, operation of the Thessalian and Macedonian paper industries will begin first and in a second phase the Ladopoulos plant in Patrai will be activated.

Based on the Secretariat's data, the total debts of the three plants will amount to approximately 12.5 billion drachmas.

Athenian Paper Manufactory

The procedures for putting Athenian Paper Manufactory under the public's control have begun. After government recommendation, DEI [Public Power Corporation] is asking for the company to be designated as problematic. As Deputy Minister of National Economy Dim. Dimosthenopoulos stated, there is no "file" on the company.

in the appropriate service since DEI's related request is recent. Of course, a file will be created soon after data made available by the lending banks (basically the National Bank) are collected.

The issue of Athenian Paper Manufactory has occupied the ministry's services and, according to information, the related decisions on the company's fate have already been made.

More specifically, the government intends:

1. To restrict the complex's production to paper for home use (toilet paper, paper towels, napkins, etc.) so there will not be competition with the other three plants which are being nationalized.
2. To increase production in newsprint, printing paper and writing paper. More specifically, as concerns newsprint, there is a study on fully covering the country's needs.

It is calculated that completion of the government's methodizations in the paper sector will require two months. Thus, by the end of the year, at the latest, the branch will be under absolute state control.

As concerns any criminal responsibilities for management of the four complexes, it has become known that special committees will be formed which will undertake a cash audit of recent fiscal years--this, of course, independent of their nationalization, and the decision for this is considered irrevocable for the government.

9247

CSO: 3521/29

ECONOMY MINISTER HOLDS WIDE-RANGING PRESS CONFERENCE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Oct 83 p 1

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Text] Restrictions on imports are being systematized by the government in order to hold at tolerable levels the deficit in the balance of payments which is constantly enlarging as a result of the drop in exports and fall in receipts from tourism, shipping, etc. In order to pave the way for imposition of these restrictions, which in practice will mean a downgrading of the standard of living, the government is again resorting to the tactic of reorienting public opinion with the pro-government press' sensational projection of scandal-mongering news. Yesterday at noon, the minister of national economy, Ger. Arsenis, called economic writers to notify them that in the afternoon he would preside over a conference of governors of banks under state control in order to discuss issues involved in implementing the credit policy. And while, in fact, the credit policy today has many sharp sides connected with the phenomena of suffocation in the market, Mr. Arsenis negated all the problems and turned the outflow of credits into a central issue, warning of sanctions against those acting irregularly.

At the same time, answering questions, Mr. Arsenis:

1. Admitted that the government, in the frameworks of the talks about the memorandum which it is holding with the Community, is also discussing issues related to our imports from the EEC. According to related information, the government has asked the EEC committee to allow it, as concerns the status on imports from the EEC, to turn to what was in force on 31 December 1980. This means a possibility of imposing indirect restrictions (monetary prepayments, etc.) on our imports from the EEC.
2. Confirmed that a new foreign loan has been contracted in order to cover a portion of the deficit in the balance and to meet the needs for purchasing oil. Thus, after the standard loan of 450 million which the Bank of Greece contracted a few months ago from the international money market, and the short-term lending to which it often turns to meet pressing payments, it has been forced now to resort also to a long-term loan of 150 million dollars from Saudi Arabia; according to information, it obtained it with the intercession of Shipowner I. Latsis.

The Outflows

The business of outflows of a portion of the bank credits to imports is a routine affair which has always been happening and the Bank of Greece's Credit Control Service has always imposed sanctions on banks and businesses whenever it uncovered such cases.

It is possible that the phenomena of outflow have increased recently because the government's economic policy has nullified profit margins in production and domestic commerce (with price freezes, etc.), while it has left them untouched on imports, where prices are not freezing! It is natural for certain branch-bank managers wishing to increase their banks' profits to promote such financings.

The maximization of this side-effect and projection of it in a sensational way by Mr. Arsenis has the following three basic aims:

First, to maintain the scandal-mongering climate in the government press in order to orient public opinion away from immediate problems and their consequences because of unlucky government maneuverings.

Second, to offset protests by tradesmen and merchants over the lack of credits, by ascribing responsibility to the outflows when it is known that the phenomena of credit suffocation are due to large public deficits which are absorbing the greatest part of the available funds and, as a result, the banks do not have money for their customers.

Third, to create the appropriate climate which will allow new persecutions at the expense of private enterprises.

Finally, economic observers noted that Mr. Arsenis' references yesterday to the banking establishment's responsibility for the outflows of credits, and his observation about the slowness of the Union of Greek Banks in submitting proposals related to the problem of bad checks, again targeted the governor of the National Bank.

9247

CSO: 3521/29

PSOE CHARGED WITH POLICY FAILURE IN EEC ENTRY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Nov 83 p 11

[Text] While the minister of foreign affairs wastes time in China, Spain's European interests are again in jeopardy in Paris.

Time and again plans are confused by the problems involved in Spain's entry in the EEC. There is a historic plan in which the general interests of the Ten coincide with those of our country: general historical, strategic and political interests. The signatories of the Rome Treaty recognize that it is not possible to aspire to European unity, the ultimate and unrenounceable objective of the treaty, without one of the nations that shaped the reality of Europe.

Neither is it possible to leave out the great strategic platform that Spain represents in a year that is critical for the defense of the continent. Lastly, it is necessary to have one of the large nations (second in size, fifth in domestic product and population) that has been involved in the defense of democratic values after requesting its admission to the EEC 20 years ago. This is the plan of great interests. The European governments have no chance of withdrawing from that plan because vital questions are put into play. Under that plan is the plan of concrete interests and technical problems. A political plan and diplomacy are needed in order to confront them. Mr Moran has not only demonstrated throughout these 11 months that he lacks a plan; he has also proven that he is capable of paralyzing all our diplomatic efforts to resolve the technical problems that separate us from Europe.

The latest incident occurred when the Spanish socialist delegation walked out of the French PS [Socialist Party] Congress because of Mr Jospin's indifference. This only confirms one fear: the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] launched an electoral campaign based on a more than dubious offer. The slogan "we have the key to the Common Market" will be remembered by many voters along with the announcement of 800,000 new jobs.

The French position concerning Spain's entry is very simple. There will be no Spanish entry as long as the EEC does not agree to create a guarantee and protection fund for French Midi agriculture.

About 5 years ago, the French socialists gave their Spanish counterparts the conditions for Spain's entry in the EEC. In these 5 years, nothing has been

negotiated between the two parties nor is there a real Spanish socialist counterproposal to the French proposal.

The Spanish socialists have repeatedly distorted reality to the national public, leaving it understood that ideological fraternity would solve the technical problems. For 5 years, the Spanish socialists have ignored what the French conditions mean; they have not known how to issue a counterproposal.

The 400,000 new unemployed people that the OECD announced for the French economy in the coming year were an object of great concern for the French socialists at their congress. The Spanish delegation expected a phrase of imaginary fraternity that they had never negotiated through viable offers or counterproposals. Because of that vagueness, the French socialists preferred to devote themselves to their own serious problems rather than waste an afternoon on something that has not been achieved in 5 years.

7717

CSO: 3548/83

REAL INCREASE IN EXPORTS FOR FIRST NINE MONTHS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 47

[Article by Salvador Arancibia]

[Text] The deficit in the Spanish balance of trade has reached a little more than a billion pesetas, with an increase of 14.41 percent over the same months of last year, according to figures from the General Directorate of Customs. Measured in dollars, the deficit in foreign trade has undergone a significant decline, going from \$8,264,000,000 in the first 9 months of 1982 to \$7,168,000,000 in what has passed of 1983. In real terms, exports have increased 6.2 percent above the initial forecasts of the administration.

FOREIGN TRADE (Millions of pesetas)

January-September

	1982	1983	% change
Imports	2,463,719	2,992,184	21.45
Exports	1,586,539	1,988,532	25.33
Deficit	877,180	1,003,652	14.41
Rate of coverage	64.39%	66.45%	

Source: General Directorate of Customs

Foreign trade figures for September confirm the increase in Spanish exports, which are being helped by the depreciation of the peseta with respect to the strong currencies, particularly the dollar. Sales of Spanish products reached 228,236,000,000 pesetas, which means an increase of 33 percent over the same month last year. Exports in the first 9 months of the year are approaching two billion pesetas (1.98 billion), with an increase in monetary terms of 25.33 percent over 1982. In real terms, accumulated exports have grown at a rate of 6.2 percent over initial forecasts of 5 percent for the entire year.

On the other hand, Spanish imports increased 7.8 percent in September--286,827,000,000 pesetas--while for the entire year they have increased 21.45 percent, totalling 2.99 billion pesetas. In real terms, the increase in imports is 0.4 percent. Administration figures at the beginning of the year set as a target a decline in purchases of foreign products of 2 percent less than last year. Recent months show a slowdown in these purchases but also show that it is not enough because they still maintain positive percentages of increase.

In the January-September period the trade deficit has been more than a billion pesetas, which means an increase of 14.41 percent over the same period last year. The rate of coverage--the value of imports that is covered by Spanish exports--has gained two points over 1982 and is now above 66 percent. Although the trade deficit continues to grow, if measured in pesetas, the truth is that during those months on which figures are available it has undergone a large improvement, if the amounts involved are expressed in dollars. Thus, while the trade deficit was \$8,264,000,000 in the first 9 months of 1982, according to the General Directorate of Customs, it is now \$7,168,000,000, which represents an improvement of 13.26 percent. Figures provided by the General Directorate of Customs agree substantially with those of the cash records of the Bank of Spain.

8908

CSO: 3548/82

alleviated precisely by the book presented yesterday. The basic objectives of the book have been to identify a cycle and timetable of reference beginning in 1968 so that later a classification of economic indicators as being ahead, behind or equal, depending on their position with respect to the timetable, can be made.

Those indicators classified as being ahead seek to avoid what the authors of the book call "a clear lack of available statistics."

8908

CSO: 3548/82

FOURTH QUARTER GROWTH RATE DECLINE, OVERALL ANNUAL RISE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 47

[Article by Gustavo Matias]

[Text] Economic activity has weakened in the fourth quarter of this year, quarter during which the rate of growth may have fallen to 1 percent, according to a number of indicators prepared by the General Directorate of Forecast and Present Economic Conditions of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. However, that management center maintains that the overall year's growth will be on the order of 2 percent, as was announced officially last week, because of a greater increase than initially estimated during the first three quarters.

The new methods for measuring and forecasting economic activity have been collected in a book titled "Cyclic Indicators: Preparation and Application to the Analysis of the Spanish Economy." In the presentation of the book to the press, Anselmo Calleja, director general of Forecast and Present Economic Conditions, said that the slowdown in growth is caused by the decline in domestic demand noted after the summer as a result of the effects of monetary policy. This decline has been compensated for in part by the improved showing of exports, despite which it appears inevitable that there will be a smaller increase in the Gross Domestic Product.

New official forecasts were released a week after Minister of Economy and Finance Miguel Boyer announced in the Congress of Deputies that the increase in the Gross Domestic Product this year will slightly exceed 2 percent, compared to the 1.7 percent forecast some months ago.

Statistical Desert

Several private analysts had forecast a deterioration in activity beginning with the summer, basing their estimates on the last known indicators and on the impact larger tax withholdings and restrictions on monetary policies would have on the private consumer. However, those experts have also revised their forecasts upward because they believe that the deterioration has been somewhat delayed and could thus be less for the entire year. The uncertainty which usually surrounds all state and private forecasts because of the statistical desert those who deal with economic conditions say they dwell in, is sought to be

BRIEFS

CREDIT FOR MOROCCO--Spain will grant Morocco a credit of 1.26 billion pesetas at an interest rate of 5.5 percent with 20 years amortization and 5 years grace to aid the construction of a phosphate plant in this neighboring country. The credit will be studied at the next meeting of assistant secretaries and then sent to the Council of Ministers. The Official Credit Institute will act as financial agent. According to the official document from the Ministry of Economy and Finance that the assistant secretaries will study, the credit will be used to finance payments for Spanish participation in the construction of a sulfuric acid plant in the Maroc Phosphore III complex. In February of last year this plant was awarded to a consortium of Japanese, British and Spanish enterprises, the last represented by FOCOEX [Enterprise for Foreign Trade Development]. About 35 percent of the total amount of the project--19.886 billion pesetas--corresponded to the supply of goods and services from Spain. In exchange, our country promised to grant a credit for 2.1 billion pesetas based on the following timetable: 315 million to be used in 1982, 100 million of this when the contract goes into effect; the rest would be paid during the next 3 years. After this disbursement, only 425 million will remain to be delivered to the commercial operation underwritten by the Spanish FOCOEX. [By C. de Miguel] [Text] [Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Nov 83 p 43] 7717

CSO: 3548/83

ECONOMY LEADERS TURN COLD SHOULDER TO PALME FUND TALKS

Union Refuses to Give Views

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Sep 83 p 1

[Article: "TCO Had to Reveal in Front of Palme: We Have No Advice to Give"]

[Text] We are in disagreement within TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] about the wage earner funds, and it is therefore reasonable that we refrain from presenting views to the government a chastened TCO spokesman said after last Monday's continuing discussions with the government about the crisis policy.

The division within the white collar movement became quite clear at the press conference which was arranged after the meeting. Later chairman Bjorn Rosengren explained why TCO should remain silent about the funds, while vice chairman Bertil Axelsson launched a counterattack and insisted that TCO should have taken a stand.

"It is our responsibility to the wage earners to take a position in this question that is so important for them," he said.

Rosengren also rejected a delay to give the membership a chance to vote on a TCO position. The differences would remain even after such a delay he believed.

Business, Industry Avoid Talks

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial: "The Palme Doctrine"]

[Text] A popular movement like the social democratic party can obviously not lightly repeal a decision taken by the party congress...

Those are the words of Premier Olof Palme in a debate article in DN [DAGENS NYHETER], which continues: "SAF [Swedish Employers' Federation] demands as a condition for participating in discussions that we in reality

should drop the decision of the congress and the declarations before the 1982 elections. It is not reasonable to be given this sort of ultimatum from an interest organization."

Behind these words lies in all probability a deep worry that the social democrats so completely misjudged the seriousness of the funds' opponents. The social democrats have apparently convinced themselves that they could maneuver around the funds issues so as to remove this handicap in the 1985 election campaign. With the Edin proposals and the assurance that this was the first and final step they apparently hoped to be able simultaneously to satisfy LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] and receive support either from some separate nonsocialist party or the business community.

What the government found instead was that LO considered Edin's proposals as the first step and certainly not the last! The non-socialist parties were reluctant to negotiate about the introduction of socialism in our country. Business's attitude was the same. The government found itself in the same funds dilemma as before.

The will of the party congress is according to the Palme doctrine the government's law. It is as if the party congress should have demanded that the five stubborn business organizations should appear before the government to discuss the funds! When the opponents of the funds from deep conviction will not negotiate about the funds, their actions are called by Olof Palme an ultimatum!

Palme accuses the five organizations of "refusing the possibility of reaching a compromise in discussions." What is a compromise other than negotiating the means of implementing funds-socialism?

Industry Leaders' Open Letter

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Sep 83 p 2

[Article: Open Letter from the Business Community in Response to Palme on the Funds Negotiations: "A Serious Misunderstanding"; portions within slantlines are in italics]

[Text] Premier Olof Palme has in an article criticized SAF, Sweden's Industrial Association, SHIO [Swedish Trade and Industrial Organizations] Family Firms, Swedish Industrial Union and the Merchants' Association for declining the government's invitation to discuss the formulation of collective wage earner funds. The premier stresses in his article the same point contained in the formal invitation; namely that the discussion should consider the /technical formulation/ of the proposal and /not the principal question/ whether a system with collective wage earner funds should be introduced and what in such a case would be the consequences for firms and the national economy.

All previously presented proposals for wage earner funds from SAP [Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party] and LO, including the current one, have been based on the same principles.

/By means of extra taxes on businesses, institutions dominated by the labor unions gradually will gain ownership of Swedish firms currently in the private sector./

A number of technical models toward this end have been presented in recent years: different taxes on profits, different maxima in the size of funds, different rates in the process of socialization, etc.

A serious misunderstanding has occurred if the Social Democratic party believes that the firm resistance by Swedish businesses to collective wage earner funds is merely based on dissatisfaction over technical details. It is the basic principle, to take money from firms and give it to the union-run funds, which has uniquely united the business world in resistance to the LO/SAP proposal.

The leadership of the private business sector cannot therefore participate in deliberations concerning the formulation of a proposal whose ultimate goal is gradually to remove private ownership from the firms. We have no such mandate from our members. Olof Palme has cited the decisions of the LO and SAP congresses. They have no greater weight in this matter than our own highest decision-making bodies.

As representatives of Swedish firms, we see a coordination of country's resources in order to solve problems with the economy and employment as an urgent and important matter. It should not be hindered by a divisive struggle concerning collective wage earner funds.

Swedish Employers' Association: Curt Nicolin, Olof Ljunggren
Sweden's Industrial Association: Sven Wallgren, Lars Nabseth
Swedish Trade and Industrial Organizations--Family Firms: Sven-Olof Traff, Ingemar Essen
Swedish Merchants' Association: Erik V. Ramberg, E.O. Holm
Swedish Industrial Union: Herman Gotting, Sven Langenius

9906

CSO: 3650/301

SKEWED INCOME DISTRIBUTION FOCUSSED ON ACADEMIC'S SALARY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 24 Oct 83 pp 1,11
[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] Reading the interview between the distinguished professor of economics Memduh Yasa, who is introduced as the economic brain of NDP, and our colleague, Fusun Ozbilgen, helped me resolve a problem which has been nagging me for some time. Well, I have always been curious about how the good professor was able to make ends meet. It turns out that the professor had been receiving TL 600 thousand a month and that he was able to live on that and he had no trouble making ends meet...

If another person were in his shoes he would have had trouble in making ends meet, but since the professor has studied economics and finance, and also teaches it, he has been spending his money wisely and thus managing to make it to the end of the month... God knows what would have happened had he been receiving TL 500 thousand a month?

In our day, it is impossible for a professor of economics to live on half a million liras. Not only that but it is unjust, unlawful, unfair.

It is necessary to grant a "supplemental rise" to our economics professors who act as consultants to holding companies and who sit on the boards of banks. How can the man live on TL600 thousand? Should he be receiving charity? Should he be borrowing money left, right and center?

If you ask me, it would be right and proper to give TL200 thousand a month as 'fuel money' to professors like Memduh Yasa, for the moment. We would increase the amount later. Thus the salary would rise to TL800 thousand. That may just be adequate to make ends meet. From time to time, the professor would impart 'judgement' over economic matters in exchange for a fee thus collecting a couple of piastres here and there. When you add all these up it would total one million. That's it! It might just be possible to live on that.

Our honorable professor says: "There isn't a serious piece of work that reveals the imbalances in income distribution in Turkey...."

Maybe there wasn't one before. But now, with the professor announcing that he could "live on TL600 thousand", there is a 'serious' study and the results of the research has been published before the Institute of Statistics could make a move. It is now understood a university professor gets TL600 thousand as a result of established connections with the private sector in a country where the public employees, workers receive TL30-40 thousand per month. Is there a more striking picture than that?

Well, it may be necessary to view the problem from another perspective. As our forefathers have said: "The fingers of a hand are not the same"; one is long, one is short and the thumb has remained stocky. There is no country where everyone gets paid equally. Everyone gets paid according to his skill, competence and knowledge. Do you suppose that the holding company professors who work at the holdings and who offer enlightenment in the press on economic trends all receive TL600 thousand a month? If so, you are wrong. The injustice starts among the holding company professors. Whereas a holding company professor gets paid TL400 thousand a month another receives TL300 thousand.

And the highest fees are paid to the advisors of those firms and holdings which have gone down under....

The inequalities among the holding company professors are quite clearly in violation of the Constitution. Is there anything in the Constitution that entitles any professor to more privilege than others? No, there isn't!

If you ask me, it is obviously clear that in our country "a certain class of holdings have established their hegemony over other holdings". And that's a shame.

That Memduh Yasa lives on TL600 thousand is the most important subject these days. For this reason alone Memduh Yasa is to be elected, so that everybody is able to earn TL600 thousand a month...

Long live Memduh Yasa...

12466
CSO 3554/45

AEGEAN LEADERS CALL FOR FOREIGN TRADE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 24 Oct 83 p 7

[Text] As preparations are being made for the announcement of the 1984 export and import regime, a mood of anticipation is observed among businessmen and industrialists. Varied forecasts and opinions are aired regarding the probable orientation and policies of the new government which will take office after the November 6 elections.

Heading the list of measures that businessmen and industrialists wish to see included in the new regime are the speedy elimination of bureaucratic red tape; the introduction of the exchange rate guarantee and no more delays in the provision of export credits.

The businessmen also demand that the foreign trade regime should include incentives for investments and industrialization, with a view to increasing the pace of industrial development. Whether the free market economy should function with all its aspects and that the time factor should be given priority in all activities are the major points of discussion.

A number of industrialists, businessmen, bankers and academics from the Aegean region have been asked to state their opinions on these issues. This is what they said:

Selcuk Yasar (Chairman of the Board, Yasar Holding)

"The exchange rate guarantee is a necessary cure for the rehabilitation of the economy, for the acceleration of investments and a way out of the economic stagnation that we are currently experiencing. There is no direct relation between inflation and devaluation as claimed by the sector which does not want exchange rate guarantees. It is obvious that bringing the inflation rate down to 10% is next to impossible when we have a devaluation rate of 40% and interest for credit is around 60%. There is no direct relation between inflation and devaluation. If the balance of payments problem is resolved, then there would be no need for devaluation. However, investment and development would hardly be possible under

present circumstances. If the exchange rate guarantee is granted but no devaluation is made, the state would not have to pay any differential thus nothing would come out of the state treasury."

Yasar, noting that these measures, which make up the core of the January 24 resolutions, are necessary for a stable economy, continued: "If the value of the Turkish lira is not protected, then inflation rate will not drop below 30%, private firms will come under state ownership and everyone will become enemies."

Egebank - Tutunbank - Tarisbank Officials

"All banks, import and export firms are facing major problems because of the current import and export regime. Topping the list of problems is bureaucratic red tape, having to engage in endless correspondence which prevents rapid decision-making. One is lucky to get through such an obstruction course."

The officials drew attention to the problems created by the heavy sanctions and obligations imposed by the Law Protecting the Turkish Currency. At a time when banks, firms, individuals alike were all trying to cope with the vagaries of commercial life in a legal vacuum, giving battles at courts to collect their rightful claims, this was particularly troublesome.

The officials added:

"The existing cash shortage is further compounded by the 15% and 2% cutbacks in import funds. The daily escalations and fluctuations in the exchange rate have so bewildered the import firms that they can no longer calculate how much they owe. Great difficulties are encountered in obtaining import permits and when the relevant ministerial offices issue these permits, it is almost too late. The copies of permits do not reach the Ziraat Bank in time which causes considerable loss of time due to a further round of correspondence and knocking on doors. Switching the country of origin during an import transaction causes great delays due to red tape and the transfer of funds from the Ziraat Bank is also subject to delays."

The officials demanded that banks be allowed more discretion in view of their responsibilities within the 1984 foreign trade regime and with a view to improving their performance which has lagged recently because of the chaos partly created by red tape. They also asked for a revision of the sanctions system which places the banks under unbearably heavy obligations.

The banks, supporting further liberalization of imports, suggested that transferring necessity goods from List II to List I will further ease the process. As to exports, the banks had this to say:

"The banks are all diverting more and more of their funds to export credits. However, the demand for export credits is far from being met, due partly to price increases and partly to inadequacy of funds. Then there is the lack of coordination between the Incentives-Implementation Section (IIS) and the Central Bank, which is a major problem in its own right. What happens is that a firm, acting upon the authority of a document obtained from the IIS, applies for export credit at an intermediary bank (the firm is so confident that market research is already underway). However, when the application reaches the Central Bank via the intermediary bank, there is either no answer or partial payments are made which are extended to indefinite periods causing disruptions in the process.

As a result, some firms default on their export commitments while incurring great losses on both counts - the overseas connection and domestic sanctions. In this way export procedures reach a point of total congestion. The Central Bank does not allow discount credits to be used in the regular fashion; the applications for discount are either unanswered or their use is allowed only in minute installments.

Thus the banks, having gradually lost some of their effectiveness and function as a reliable source of discount credit, are still struggling, however inadequately and under very trying circumstances, to contribute their share to the export campaign."

Export insurance was described by the officials as a vital issue, always under consideration but with no concrete results. They stressed the urgent need for export insurance.

Melih Gursay (Member of the Board, Enka Holding)

Melih Gursay maintained that there isn't all that much difference between the 1983 export and import regime and those of the previous years, and added: "The most notable shortcoming in the 1983 foreign trade regime has been the failure to issue export credits in time and by the required amounts."

According to Gursay, the formation of trading companies (which would ensure more effectiveness in foreign markets and which would be able to enter into competition with the trading companies of other countries) would be most beneficial for exports. Gursay demanded that the export insurance system should be set up without delay. Pointing out that the unavailability of export insurance deters exporters from doing business with certain countries believed to be risky, he continued: "Certain sectors in our economy should be protected by the foreign trade regime and incentives should be provided to increase sales in foreign markets. The present stage

of Turkish industrial development (that is, the transformation from the import-dependent Turkey of the 1950s to the Turkey of the 1980s exporting industrial goods) has been made possible by protecting the industrial sector through various means. The continued survival of the industrial sector, which is barely 20-30 years old, still depends upon its being protected. The free market principles are not applied in full these days. What is called the free market economy is a system in which every country follows its own interests. The Common Market which claims to operate under the free market principles imposes textile quotas and import bans on Turkey without impunity. The U.S., that great bastion of free market economy, applies textile quotas to the countries of the Far East. Similar restrictions take place in other countries."

If Turkish industry, which is a relative newcomer, is left to fend for itself in domestic markets against the seasoned European industrialists, then this could only harm our developing industry, and some industry may even face extinction in the process.

Regarding export procedures, Gursoy urged the bureaucracy to avoid being restrictive and be more encouraging instead. He said:

"In import procedures complete absence of restrictions will not be beneficial. However, constraining bilateral and multilateral agreements may be, we should be implementing a method widely-practised in the world. Otherwise, there could be a drop in our exports."

According to Gursoy, it is inevitable that the Turkish lira should be floated to ensure the viability of our exports and to prevent undue profits accruing to importers. Gursoy urged that the importation of unused machinery should be tightly controlled.

Izdas Izmir Dis Ticaret A.S.

Izdas, maintaining that the 1983 import and export regime contained adequate clauses, on the whole, viewed the shortcomings as arising from its implementation.

Of the shortcomings observed during the implementation of the 1983 foreign trade regime, the most important was the delay in issuing incentive credits, according to Izdas. The restrictions in funds and high interest rates were also cited as shortcomings.

The officials of Izdas considered the state bureaucracy as playing an obstructionist role, a perennial problem which has been discussed so many times. They elaborated their views as follows:

"The state bureaucracy plays an obstructionist role in export procedures. However, we do not really believe that the problem of bureaucracy will ever completely disappear. This is because we do

not expect that the personnel who are rolling within the wheels of bureaucracy will ever be knowledgeable, experienced and economically independent enough to break the chains of the bureaucratic wheel."

Izdas officials, referring to the intensification of their relations with the banking sector, agreed that the banks are performing their duties but pointed out that their practices differ widely, thus creating some confusion.

In import procedures the biggest headaches were the liberalization lists and the prevailing disharmony between Incentives-Implementation Section (IIS) and the Central Bank. The officials argued that "the IIS should be given more autonomy". They also remarked that the discontinuation of 'clearing' would lead to a contraction in the volume of imports.

Ege Yatirim

Ege Yatirim offered the following views as we spoke to them during the preparation of the 1984 foreign trade regime:

"The most notable shortcomings in the 1983 export and import regime were: the delays in the payment of tax rebates, the inadequacy of export credits, the transportation problem and low ceilings in bank lending. In the new foreign trade regime some points should receive priority.

Our domestic economy requires that some sectors should be offered incentives through the foreign trade regime. Refraining from offering protection to a sector (which has been adversely affected by global and domestic conjectures and which may be experiencing a temporary crisis) would be harmful to Turkish economy in the medium- and long-run. If we think of the free market economy in theoretical terms, protection is out of the question. But in today's world, free market economy is a textbook artifact and there is no country which implements it in its pristine sense.

Having pointed out that all countries offer protection to some sectors in line with their economic structure and targets, Ege Yatirim made a case for similar protection to be offered to some sectors in industry."

Ege Yatirim officials noted that the state bureaucracy is somehow out of sync with developments in industrial and commercial life, and added: "It is regulations rather than the bureaucrats themselves which are behind obstructionism. The living standards of the bureaucrats and their working conditions are also compounding the problem."

Apart from a few exceptions, the banks, with their present structure, are obstructing the development of the industrial and commercial sector to an even greater extent than the bureaucracy, the officials maintained. He said: "Whatever the difficulties,

the commercial and industrial sectors have managed to adjust to the January 24 measures and to the new economic policies. However, the banks insist on clinging to their old ways. The banking sector has shown the weakest response to the rapid expansion of our economy to the outside world. This is evidenced by the fact that foreign trade operations are conducted at only a few branches (not more than a dozen) of even our largest national banks. The inadequacy of our national banks has been highlighted by the impressive performance of the overseas banks.

The fallen share of private sector investments within the total in 1981 and 1982 has also been mentioned. It was argued that: "the discontinuation of the exchange rate guarantee is not the only reason. Therefore, the exchange rate differentials fund is not sufficient in itself to give momentum to investments."

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CSO 3554/45

BRIEFS

COST OF LIVING FIGURES--According to the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) cost of living index, retail prices continued their rise during October. The annual ITO index increase has risen above 30 percent. No index thus shows price increases to be below 30 percent. According to the ITO index, October retail prices in Istanbul increased 3.4 percent. Although, with the October jump, prices for the first ten months of the year amounted to a 23.3 percent rise, the overall price increase for the last 12 month period has been 30.1 percent. The increase for the 12 months before that had been 29.0 percent. While retail food prices for October increased 4.2 percent, there was a 4.4 percent rise in commodity food prices. Leading food items with increased prices have been wheat flour, drinking water, sausage, fresh and canned vegetables, sweets, potatoes, onions, olives, yogurt, white cheese, and vegetable and animal cooking oils. The steepest price increases for October were seen in the areas of sanitation-health costs with 10.9 percent and in the culture-entertainment field with 8 percent. Monthly rent increases amounted to 6.3 percent. [Text] [Istanbul CUMHURİYET 3 Nov 83 pp 1, 11]

CSO: 3554/62

ENERGY MINISTRY ISSUES FORECAST ON LONG-RANGE POWER NEEDS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Oct 83 p 8

[Text] In just the next 40 years we will have to chose between constructing eight nuclear power plants and 12 coal-fired plants, according to a report from the Energy Ministry.

If the decision is made in the near future to use nuclear power in Denmark, the first plant cannot be completed before the mid-1990's. According to the ministry, an additional seven nuclear plants would be required by the year 2020 if the decision is made to expand the use of nuclear energy.

If, however, we chose to continue using coal-fired plants for electricity generation, then 12 coal-fired power plants will be needed.

In either case, however, it may be necessary to construct 10 small electricity and heat-producing plants, so-called cogeneration plants. These plants will be coal fired. At the turn of the century, nuclear power could cover no more than one fourth of Denmark's total electricity needs, according to the Energy Ministry.

In any event, extremely large sums of money must be invested in the electrical generation system by the year 2000. It will cost 45 billion kroner if conventional plants are constructed, while the choice of nuclear power would add 10 billion kroner to this figure.

In return, however, the use of nuclear power would provide considerable savings in fuel purchases, the Energy Ministry stated in a collection of works (a total of 15 publications) with the joint title of Energy and Denmark. This material is being published in conjunction with the 10th anniversary of the Middle East conflict, which led to the oil crisis in 1973 and 1974.

9336

CSO: 3613/29

LABOR PARTY NEWSPAPER ATTACKS GOVERNMENT ON STATOIL POLICY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Oct 83 p 4

Editorial: "The Administration of Statoil"

Text The new permanent undersecretary of the Department of Oil and Energy, Arild Rodland, presented in a speech last week a highly unsympathetic picture of the way Statoil is administering its activity. The permanent undersecretary maintained that one would be completely justified in asking if it was the Storting that controlled Statoil or Statoil that controlled the Storting. He maintains that Statoil's methods contribute to the situation where the industrial organizations allow themselves to be influenced in the expression of their opinions of the proposal from the so-called Mellbye committee, suggesting some changes in Statoil's status. This is an open hint that industry is afraid to miss its bid for the state oil company if it doesn't support Statoil's interests in the discussion which the Mellbye committee has raised. Finally, the permanent undersecretary presents the leadership of Statoil as power-hungry people who will not let themselves be hindered by decisions made by the company's board of directors--which consists, for all intents and purposes, of the Minister of Energy and Oil. The permanent undersecretary sees this last factor as especially serious, and it occasions the following remarks from him: "Normally, it is the case in a corporation that when the board of directors makes a decision, the debate is over. If the company leadership does not accept the decision, then they leave the company. But this is not always the case in Statoil."

We have noted that Oil and Energy Minister Kaare Kristiansen has taken exception to the views of his own permanent undersecretary for some time. He has emphasized that the cooperation between the department and Statoil has been good during his term as minister. Nor does he believe that the leadership of the company favors going against the policies of his department.

This, then, is the opinion of the board of directors of Statoil. It puts the permanent undersecretary's speech of last week in a peculiar light. The contents of that speech were not tossed off casually--they were presented at a press conference. What is most serious about this situation is that it is Permanent Undersecretary Rodland who, on behalf of the government, is currently in charge of arranging for Statoil's future. His current analysis of Statoil displays some fundamental attitudes towards the state oil company which are

downright disquieting, coming from a man in his position. We have noted that not only his superior, the minister, but also the acting chairman of the Storting's industry committee, Arnljot Norwich (Conservative), and representatives from the Center Party and the Labor Party, have indicated bewilderment at the permanent undersecretary's statements and evaluations. All in all, we think this gives us cause to raise questions about the permanent undersecretary's competence as a leader in arranging for Statoil's future status in oil activity.

Some individual politicians, including the permanent undersecretary of the Oil and Energy Department, have the idea that a system different from the one in use today will effect better political administration over Statoil. We think this is an error. The authorities have better control over Statoil than they do over any other oil company. Every year the company has to present its agenda for evaluation by the Storting. The company must, of course, yield to the decisions which the minister of oil and energy makes, in his capacity as company board of directors. The Storting, also, can order the board of directors to make certain decisions regarding Statoil.

Most recently, in October, we have noted two incidents where the oil and energy minister has gone against Statoil's own wishes in his decisions as the company's board of directors. In both incidents, of course, it has been the wishes of the board of directors that matter. In the first incident, Oil and Energy Minister Kaare Kristiansen said no to Statoil's plans to start activity--even on a very modest level--on the Danish continental shelf. Last Saturday, Statoil received notification from the oil and energy minister that the company is to support the Hydro expansion plan for the Oseberg oil field. It is significant that the minister, using industrial policy standards, has come to a conclusion different from that achieved by Statoil's leadership, using commercial standards. It is only natural that such an opposition would result. But whatever people think about the outcome of the matter, there is no doubt as to who will determine what will happen in the final analysis.

In our opinion, Statoil is functioning splendidly under the system of administration which exists today. This is the reason why so many are in opposition to the proposal of the Mellbye committee for reorganization.

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OIL PRODUCTION UP 23 PERCENT IN FIRST THREE QUARTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Oct 83 p 30

[Text] Norwegian oil production for the first three quarters of this year was a total of 23 percent higher than during the same time period last year. The combined production of oil and gas from the Norwegian continental shelf rose to 39.6 million tons of oil equivalents [TOE] in the course of the first nine months of this year, an increase of almost ten percent compared to last year, according to the Oil Directorate.

Oil production amounted to 22.4 million tons, while gas production amounted to 17.2 million tons. Average oil production was at a level of 628,000 barrels a day in September. The high level of production from the Statfjord oil field is the main factor behind the increase in production. The Norwegian share of the production from the two platforms at Statfjord has reached a level of 11.4 million tons so far this year, compared to 6.7 million tons during the same time period last year. Average daily production from the entire field in September was at the level of 359,700 barrels a day.

Oil production from Ekofisk showed a drop from last year, with only 9.9 million tons produced in the first three quarters of this year, compared with 10.8 million tons last year.

There has also been a decrease in gas production, from 10.5 million tons to 9.5 million tons. Average oil production in September was at a level of 285,000 barrels a day.

Gas production from the Frigg field has been maintaining at about the same level as last year. In the first nine months, gas corresponding to 7.6 million TOE was produced, compared with 7.4 million during the same time period last year.

The Norwegian share of the Murchison field has yielded a total production of 741,000 tons of oil. Gas production from this field has also been initiated, yielding a total of 14,000 TOE up to this point.

Production at the problem-filled Valhalla oil fields is now starting to pick up. In September, average production was at a level of 23,500 barrels a day. Total production has amounted to 417,000 tons of oil and 14,000 TOE of gas.

CNR PRESENTS PROJECT FOR ANTARCTIC SCIENTIFIC STATION

Milan SCIENZA & VITA NUOVA in Italian Aug 83 p 9

[Article by Giorgio Riveccio: "Italians in the Antarctic"--The Project to Create a Permanent Scientific Base on the Icy Continent Is Finally Getting under Way"]

[Text] With the arrival of summer's warmth, the Italian proposal to install a scientific base in Antarctica has finally thawed--a proposal that had hibernated for decades, since our country had never demonstrated much interest in the coldest continent on Earth.

In 1957, at the conclusion of the International Geophysical Year, many states had already started scientific expeditions in the southern polar lands, setting up permanent bases there and carrying on geological, oceanographic and biological research; and in 1959, 12 nations (including the United States and the USSR) signed the Antarctic Treaty, by which they pledged not to exploit the territory economically and not to use it for military operations or atomic tests.

Italy was not on the spot that time either. Only more than 20 years later, in 1981, after a series of appeals to our authorities by scientists and researchers (including Prof Ardito Desio, of the University of Milan) did the Italian government subscribe to the Antarctic Treaty; but to fully achieve the status of advisory member, it will have to show that it has initiated scientific missions and that it has set up a permanent base on the polar territory.

Another 2 years have gone by, and finally, in recent weeks, the Italian "Antarctic project" has been presented, in the charge of a commission formed within the framework of the CNR [National Research Council].

The project, which will last about 7 years and should cost around Lit 250 billion, provides for the installation of a permanent base in Victoria Land, the edge of Antarctica, at about 160° East longitude, that faces in the direction of New Zealand. The station will be added to the dozens already established by other states: Russia alone has more than 10, scattered along the entire perimeter of the continent, while the United States has already installed actually semi-underground polar cities, which are completely

autonomous because they are powered by nuclear energy and are equipped with very advanced installations for desalination of sea water.

The Antarctic Project Commission is directed by Prof Praturion and is composed of some dozen members, including Prof Finetti (geophysics), Prof Brambati (marine geology), Prof Ferrario (mineralogy), Prof P.F. Bravo (chemistry), Prof Guerrini (meteorology) and Prof Battaglia (biology). The operational part of the project, comprising transport and logistical support, will be assigned to the Ministry of Defense.

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